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Abstract 
In recent decades, Aristotelian virtue ethics has reemerged as an 
alternative to deduction-based moral theories. Yet, Aristotelian virtue ethics has 
often been conceived, by its proponents as well as its detractors, as an approach to 
ethical thinking that is neither normative in nature nor capable of being formulated 
in normative terms. 
In this thesis, I argue that the fundamental elements of Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, examined and modified in light of modern thinking, provide the basis for a 
systematized, normative ethical theory. I further argue that such a theory can be 
grounded in induction, rather than deduction, and that it can fully acknowledge 
and incorporate the ethical significance of particulars, particular relationships, and 
human experience. I suggest that an induction-informed normative theory not 
only avoids such logical pitfalls as Hume's "is-ought" objection and concerns 
pertaining to the truth-value of moral claims, but also that it provides an accurate 
account of our moral and non-moral experience, as well as of their areas of 
intersection. I propose methods for evaluating the acceptability of general 
guidelines and singular moral judgments, and I argue that these methods can be 
successfully achieved within, and enhanced by, the framework of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. 
I examine various aspects of moral theory in general and Aristotelian 
virtue ethics in particular (e. g. principles and guidelines, human nature and telos, 
virtue, partiality and universalizability), and argue for their place within and 
relationship to an induction-informed normative moral theory. I reply to 
criticisms leveled against Aristotelian ethical theory and, in so doing, argue that 
Aristotle's classification of arete as a dunamis in the Rhetoric has significant 
implications for moral theory, argue for the claims and obligations generated by 
particular relationships, and reevaluate the role of the phronimos. I review. the 
logical and practical implications of an inductive model, and suggest not only that 
such a model is more consistent and more practicable than are current deduction- 
based normative theories, but also that it calls into question our standard 
conceptualization of non-nativity. In closing, I suggest a reexamination of 
"normativity" in terms of the function of normative theory. 
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Abbreviations 
Aristotle: 
DA De Anima (On the Soul) 
EE Eudemian Ethics 
GA Generation of Animals 
Gen. Corr On Generation and Corruption 
MA The Movement of Animals 
Met Metaphysica (Metaphysics) 
EN Ethica Nicomachea (Nicomachean Ethics) 
Phy Physics 
Pol Politics 
Rh Rhetoric 
APo Analytica Posteriora (Posterior Analytics) 
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Notes on Terminology and Translation 
The project of this work is to combine an examination of Greek thinking 
about the foundational elements of ethical theory, as presented by Aristotle, with 
the formulation of a normative ethical theory that modifies, incorporates, and 
relies upon these same elements. It includes an examination of the roles of 
induction, particular relationships, and experience in such a normative theory, and 
it takes Aristotelian conceptualizations of the ethical life as presenting both an 
objection and an alternative to post-Kantian understandings of normativity. 
In certain particulars, this project shares links with other works on Greek 
ethics, most notably those of Alasdair Maclntyre (After Virtue, Second Edition, 
Notre Dame Press, 1984), Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
Harvard University Press, 1985), and Martha Nussbaum (The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986; Love 's Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Specifically, my presentation of human life as a narrative, within which each 
individual develops and through which each individual relates to others, shares a 
conceptual link with Maclntyre and Nussbaum. My criticism of the modes of 
justification associated with deontology and consequentialism, in combination 
with my fundamental grounding of ethical norms in human dispositions, links this 
project loosely with Maclntyre and Williams. However, the theoretical approach 
to Aristotelian virtue ethics presented here is more detailed, more precise, and 
more systematically developed than those presented in the works that comprise 
the background against which it must be placed. 
6 
Such a systematic approach to Aristotelian virtue ethics seems 
fundamentally necessary for two reasons. First, "virtue ethics" as a category 
suffers from a sort of schizophrenia, due to the variety of dissimilar ethical 
approaches, many radically anti-theoretical, that have been so categorized. 
Indeed, Nussbaum ("Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category, " Journal of Ethics, 
3(3): 163-201,1999) has recently suggested that we do away with the category of 
"virtue ethics" altogether and replace it, if we must, with such categories as "Neo- 
Aristotelians, " "Neo-Humeans, " "anti-Utilitarians, " and "anti-Kantians. " On her 
view, categories that accurately represent trends in thinking about virtue would be 
preferable to one that mistakenly suggests unity among theorists, a systematized 
approach, or the idea that "virtue ethics" can be viewed as an alternative to 
Kantianism or Utilitarianism, since these theories, too, incorporate thinking about 
virtue. 
The second reason, which is closely related to the first, is articulated by 
Michael Slote ("Moral Theories and Virtue Ethics, " The Proceedings of the 
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 51-57,1999). Slote suggests that, while 
those who helped to revive virtue ethics during recent decades have 
predominantly objected to the theoretical character of modern moral theory, more 
recent defenders of virtue theory have argued that it has or should have a distinct 
theoretical character of its own. On this view, the main difference between virtue 
ethics and other moral theories would lie in the way that virtue ethics is organized 
as a theory. According to Slote, however, while the revival of virtue ethics tended 
to be in some sense neo-Aristotelian, the current defenders of the theoretical 
approach to virtue ethics are, for the most part. exploring the possibility of virtue 
theory grounded in Stoic ideas (Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, Oxford 
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University Press, 1993) and in the moral sentimentalism of Frances Hutcheson, 
David Hume, and James Martineau (Michael Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, " 
in Virtue Ethics, eds., R. Crisp and M. Slote, Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Although Rosalind Hursthouse ("Virtue Theory and Abortion, " Philosophy, and 
Public Affairs 20: 223-46,1991) has defended neo-Aristotelianism as a type of 
theory, there have been remarkably few attempts to provide a systematized 
theoretical character to Aristotelian virtue ethics. The project of this work, 
however, is one such attempt. 
In order to accomplish this project, I have chosen to focus each chapter on 
a particular aspect of Aristotelian ethical theory, although I recognize that this 
choice of methodology artificially isolates otherwise interrelated and 
interdependent concepts (e. g. human nature and virtue). While I acknowledge this 
potential drawback, I have adopted this methodology because the theory presented 
here, although profoundly informed by Aristotle, is not an exegesis of Aristotle's 
work. In the chapters that follow, I examine each element individually, both as it 
is presented by Aristotle and as it is modified by its placement in an original 
theory, and the work is meant to make a sustained argument. While each chapter 
relies upon its own argumentation, it also relies upon earlier argumentation and 
conclusions. For this reason, I have provided a large number of cross-references, 
which, I hope, will be of particular use to readers whose interests center on 
individual chapters. When necessary, footnotes provide the relevant claim or 
briefly quote text, to save readers from referring back to earlier chapters. My 
conclusion is concerned with the implications of the theory and, for this reason, 
does not include footnoted references to earlier arguments. 
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Due to my methodological approach, I must utilize content-rich 
terminology (e. g. "character, " "human nature, " and "excellence") prior to fully 
explicating each term and integrating it into the larger theory. While the use of 
such terminology is unavoidable, an adequate discussion of all terms upon their 
first appearance would make it impossible to proceed with the project. This being 
the case, I acknowledge that such terms will be weighted with Aristotelian 
concepts that may extend beyond their early uses. Certainly, using a term such as 
"character" in an Aristotelian context will connote such things as becoming, 
contingency, virtue, and so forth. In a modern rendition of virtue ethics, however, 
advances in neurobiology also bear on such concepts as "character. " Thus, the 
preliminary elements, both ancient and modem, must be in place in order to 
adequately address each term, along with the interrelated concepts to which it 
pertains. 
I also use terminology, such as "induction-informed" and an inductive 
model, " that requires explanation. The theory presented here incorporates and 
relies upon induction to an extent that covering-law, or deduction-based, models 
do not. Specifically, I argue that induction has a fundamental role in (1) the 
nature, acquisition, utilization, and revision of general principles and guidelines; 
(2) the formulation of singular moral judgments from values; and (3) the 
formulation and acceptability of regulating notions. Within this framework, there 
is an acknowledgment of particulars, particular relationships, and experience that 
is not always strictly inductive, but that acknowledges the role of induction in 
reasoning from these particulars to more general conclusions. 
For these reasons. I consistently refer to the theory presented here as an 
induction-informed normative theory, or as an inductive model. However, the 
9 
terms are not meant to suggest that every element is dependent upon inductive 
reasoning. For example, in Chapter 4,1 specifically argue against the idea that the 
origin of values can be understood or formulated in terms of inductive 
conclusions, for I have no intention of postulating induction as an adequate 
explanation of causality. Moreover, I acknowledge that there may be some ideal 
norms concerning human emotional and physical well-being, or notions of what 
constitutes healthy mental functioning, for which induction alone does not 
account. 
The process that I describe as "inductive reasoning" or "induction" is 
familiar and straight-forward, and it includes movement from particulars to a 
particular conclusion and from particulars to a more general conclusion. In order 
to discuss this process in anything other than strictly logical terms, however, and 
in order to discuss and evaluate human experience, I must also use terms that 
designate the class of persons whose experiences, perspectives, or conclusions are 
to count. This being the case, the terms "we" and "our" will designate both 
myself and the large number of other rational adults of both sexes who, in the 
relevant cases, appear to share intellectual and emotional responses similar to my 
own. While I acknowledge the rather sweeping generalization implied by the 
terms "we" and "our, " and while I acknowledge that readers may well disagree 
with my intellectual and emotional responses, I use the terms in good faith to 
discuss human experiences and perspectives that, I genuinely believe, are not 
idiosyncratically my own. This designation, of course, includes both "the many" 
and "the wise, " and it is necessarily imprecise. In this case, rigid precision in 
defining the category of adults to whom the terms refer would unacceptably 
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restrict whose experiences are to count, which experiences are worth counting, 
and so forth. 
My use of induction also necessitates discussion of "facts" and of the 
movement from "facts" to more general conclusions. Where appropriate, I 
discuss situations in which "facts" are weighted with prior assumptions or 
complex philosophical questions, and I deal very specifically with Aristotelian 
value-laden "facts. " More generally, however, I use the term "fact" to designate 
an event, circumstance, or situation that could, in principle at least, be 
independently verified as corresponding to a particular state of affairs. This 
designation is not meant to heighten the degree of precision above that of common 
usage, but rather to indicate that my use of the term "fact" retains the ambiguities 
that normally accompany discussion of particulars, human experience, and 
inductive reasoning. 
Moreover, because I am taking a theoretical approach to virtue ethics, and 
because one aspect of this approach is to call into question the distinction often 
made between moral and non-moral considerations, I wish to distinguish between 
my use of "ethical" and my use of "moral. " In this work, the term "moral" will 
loosely retain the distinctive content given to it by Williams in Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), in that it 
will refer to a subset of the ethical, one that has taken on special significance in 
modern Western culture, and one that carries presuppositions relating to particular 
notions of obligation. The term "ethical" carries no such necessary connotations 
and will be used more broadly and without a precise definition to discuss how we, 
as humans, might be, or live, or interact. As Williams points out, once "morality" 
is seen as a special system, even insofar as it demands "moral" and "non-moral"' 
senses for words and principles, it does no harm to leave the notion of the 
"ethical" vague and to suggest that a range of considerations falls under it. 
Moreover, I will call into question the distinction between "moral'" and -non- 
moral" early in this work; however, for the sake of clarity in a sustained argument, 
I will retain the terminology throughout. 
In referring to human subjects, I use the terms "human being, " "person, " 
and "self' interchangeably, with no suggestion of a Cartesian theory of self- 
transparency. Certainly, all of these words are charged with assumptions 
concerning second-order intellectual and emotional capacities, but, even so, each 
carries the same assumptions to the same degree, at least as they are used in this 
work. Since many of my final conclusions rely upon argumentation concerning 
human nature, I do not incorporate prior assumptions pertaining to, say, 
theoretical criteria-. by which a person may be distinguished from a human being. 
Moreover, since I do not deal with such things as, for example, the legal 
implications of classifying a corporation as a person, the terms "person and 
"human being" remain interchangeable throughout this work. 
Although I retain the original gender of all pronouns when translating 
ancient text, I use "he" and "she, " as well as "him" and "her, " indifferently, as 
gender-neutral pronouns, in original argumentation and examples. Also, I use 
"s/he" as a non-subject-specific, gender-neutral pronoun. In composing this work, 
I have found myself in the awkward position of postulating a modern theory, in 
which women are as likely as men to be included among the phronimoi, in terms 
of an ancient theory, in which only a male could be accurately described as a 
phronimos. To reconcile the two approaches, I have retained the masculine 
gender when summarizing Aristotle's text and I have used the masculine and 
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feminine genders interchangeably in original arguments, even if those arguments 
are based on or informed by Aristotelian theory in all other respects. As a 
feminist, I reject Aristotle's position on women and slaves, but I find no 
contradiction in arguing that an ancient concept, such as human nature, can be 
modernized and enriched by the inclusion of all human beings, regardless of their 
sex. 
I have chosen to use transliteration for Greek words and phrases and, in 
order to make the main text accessible to the Greekless reader, all Greek words 
and phrases are translated. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine. 
However, I gratefully acknowledge the translations in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation (1991). These translations have proven 
a valuable source of reference and, in order to retain consistency, I have deferred 
to this work in translating certain words and phrases, as noted. All spelling and 
punctuation in original arguments and original translations is American English, 
following, for the most part, Chicago style (The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th 
Edition, The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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Introduction 
In order for an ethical theory to be considered normative, I and in order for 
it to be both logically consistent and efficacious, it must meet certain minimum 
requirements. Traditionally, these requirements concern the internal, logical 
relationship between requirements, permissions, and prohibitions, and they 
involve the formal relationship between general principles, specific guidelines, 
and singular moral judgments. By way of introduction, I intend to briefly review 
the components that traditionally characterize normative ethical theory2 and to 
partially address some of the objections to an Aristotelian-based normative theory. 
Throughout this work, I hope to challenge both the modern conceptualization of 
normative theory and the sorts of biases that exclude, sometimes out of hand, 
Aristotelian virtue ethics from being considered normative. 
In modern ethics, theories with normative force generally rely upon a first 
principle or principles, 3 often held to be self-evident, from which specific 
guidelines and singular moral judgments can be derived. 4 These principles 
By "normative" I mean a system of ethics that is evaluative rather than merely descriptive, and 
that prescribes/recommends morally correct conduct. In contemporary ethics, normative theory 
has come to be rather narrowly understood as a system that establishes a standard of correctness by 
prescription of rules (within which specific moral judgments are derived from one or more general 
principles). Baier states: "A second difference between Aristotle and Hume and most 
contemporary philosophers is that the latter have normative theories, and I think we find nothing 
analogous to these in Aristotle and Hume (although we do in Aquinas and Kant). By a normative 
theory I mean a system of moral principles in which the less general are derived from the more 
general" (Baier, in Clarke, Simpson, eds., 1989,33). 
2 For a good guide to recent literature, both for and against moral theory, see Clarke, Simpson, eds. 
(1989), 291-301. 
3 Kagan (1998), 2, states, "Is there, then, a single ultimate moral principle from which all other 
moral principles can be derived? The debate over whether there is, and if so, what it might be, is 
the concern of normative ethics. And even if there is no one single fundamental moral principle, 
we can still try to arrive at a complete list of the basic moral principles... Normative ethics, then, is 
concerned with stating and defending the most basic principles" (italics in original). 
' "Many of the ethical theories which have been proposed in the past may without injustice be 
called `Cartesian' in character: that is to say. they tr-N to deduce particular duties from some self- 
evident first principle" (Hare, 1961,39). 
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customarily mark a starting-point that includes a definition of either the Right (e. g. 
deontological theories) or the Good (e. g. theories of utility). ' and they are based 
on assumptions concerning either a well-ordered and comprehensible universe or 
an equally well-ordered and comprehensible idea of human nature. Theories that 
incorporate and rely upon such overarching first principles often achieve 
normative force by also incorporating the assumption that the "apparently endless 
diversity of particular moral judgments" can be reduced "to some order, absolute 
or relative, " from which these first principles can be ascertained and specific 
moral judgments derived. 6 
In such a system, deduction leads from general principles to both specific 
guidelines and singular moral judgments, and it is the logical tool by which 
permissions, requirements, and prohibitions are identified.? As a set, these 
permissions, requirements, and prohibitions are expected to be consistent (if not 
complete) and universalizable (with no reliance on partiality, emotion, or personal 
preference), and they are expected to have both prescriptive and evaluative force. 
The requirements, permissions, and prohibitions have a logical relationship within 
5 See Louden (1984), 227-236. He states, "Contemporary textbook typologies of ethics still tend 
to divide the terrain of normative ethical theory into the teleological and deontological... A second 
feature shared by teleological and deontological theories is conceptual reductionism. Both types of 
theory start with a primary irreducible element and then proceed to introduce secondary derivative 
concepts which are defined in terms of their relations to the beginning element. Modern 
teleologists (the majority of whom are utilitarians) begin with a concept of the good-here defined 
with reference to states of affairs rather than persons... For the deontologist, on the other hand, the 
concept of duty is the irreducible starting point... [and] here the notion of the good is only a 
derivative category, definable in terms of the right" (227). 
6 "An unavoidable assumption for the moral theorist is that there is some coherence or unity 
among all moral standards-unavoidable because as a moral theorist his goal is to reduce the 
apparently endless diversity of particular moral judgments to some order, absolute or relative. He 
will attempt to do so by finding the basic or underlying principles which, when combined with a 
certain spirit of judgment and knowledge of fact, would lead to the acceptance of these particular 
moral judgments. The theorist may admit that absolute order or unity may not be available in that 
there may be a plurality of basic principles which have no set order of priority, but even in this 
case he is searching for whatever degree of order or unity there is, and he tends to believe that a 
small number of basic principles can be found" (Noble, in Clark, Simpson, eds., 1989,50-1). 
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the specific normative system and they involve a set of basic predicates that 
prescribe, permit, or forbid (i. e. n-required, n-optional, n-forbidden). 8 Other 
predicates can be constructed from this basic set, such as n-permitted (which 
would mean either n-required or n-optional), and all predicates, whether basic or 
derived, refer to behaviors that are required, prohibited, or optional within a 
specific system of norms "n. " The set of basic predicates consists of imperatives 
or permissions that require, permit, or forbid certain kinds of actions in certain 
kinds of situations, and there is a logical relationship between the individual 
predicates and subsets. Permissions rule out requirements to the contrary and a set 
of requirements for a particular situation is consistent if the individual predicates 
that comprise the set could be jointly satisfied. 9 
Even in outline, such a system involves certain difficulties. The logical 
relationship that holds between the propositions, wherein some propositions can 
be said to exclude or imply others based on the meaning of the statements 
themselves, finds its objectivity and coherence within a closed system that may or 
may not correspond in any meaningful way with statements of fact. 10 Purely 
factual statements are non-prescriptive and non-evaluative, and the move from 
factual statements to prescriptive and evaluative propositions is traditionally 
problematic. " Such a move requires us to side-step Hume's "is-ought" objection, 
if we deduce prescriptive or evaluative propositions from factual statements, and it 
"The traditional conception of ethical theory sees it as the project of developing a coherent set of 
rules from which one can infer all determinate moral verdicts" (Shafer-Landau, 1997,584). 
8 Here, I am borrowing terms from a discussion between Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard on 
the Frege-Geach objection. See Villanueva (1993), 60-73. Also, see Gibbard (1990), 86-9. 
9 See Gibbard in Villanueva (1993), 71. 
'0 See Hare, in Pojman (1995), 428-435. Here, Hare claims that the prescriptivity and the 
universalizability of moral judgments of the form "I ought" can be established by arguments based 
on the meanings of words, or on logical arguments. 
1 See Hare (196 I ), 17-31. 
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leads to a questionable acceptance of the truth-value of allegedly factual claims 
that call an act right/wrong or good/bad. 
Moreover, even if we accept certain general moral precepts as somehow 
factual, we run into a problem of consistency once content-rich guidelines are 
specified for particular situations. If, for example, a general moral precept states 
that lying is wrong, specific guidelines must be derived that forbid lying. 
However, if lying is permitted under certain circumstances, then either the specific 
guidelines that permit lying (and they could be numerous) are somehow derived 
from the general principle which states that lying is wrong or they are derived 
from a general principle which states that lying is right. 12 Either way, consistency 
is compromised and we are left to marvel at the deductions used to justify 
conflicting specific guidelines. 13 
The potential for conflicting guidelines and contradictory moral judgments 
leads to the question of hypothetically unresolvable moral dilemmas and to how 
this question is addressed by the various normative schemes. One answer to the 
problem suggests an analogy with science, such that the existence of an objective 
moral order, particularly one that is comprehensible by reason, would exclude (or, 
at the very least, make highly improbable) the possibility of entirely unresolvable 
moral dilemmas. 14 Although this ideal does little to explain away the possibility of 
12 See Kagan (1998), 106-116 for an interesting discussion on normative theory and lying. 
13 See Hare (1961), 32-55. 
14 To put the point in such a way as to reveal the scientific analogy that guides his search for the 
fundamental laws, the moral theorist hypothesizes that among various dissimilar moral phenomena 
such as rights and duties of friendship, marriage, sexual behavior, work, and the exchange of 
property there exists some relation as that between the dissimilar physical phenomena of a 
lightening storm, the motions of a compass, the appearance of a rainbow, and the formation of an 
optical image in the range finder of a camera. As Ernest Nagel, whose examples these are, says of 
them: they can all be accounted for by a `single set of integrally related principles. ' those of 
modern electromagnetic theory. A like set of principles is the ideal for moral theory and to the 
extent that the basic principles cannot be ordered, there is an acknowledgment (as there would be 
in science) that an ideal has been failed of' (Noble. in Clark, Simpson eds., 1989,50-1). 
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conflicting first principles, even within an objective moral order, it is the 
assumption that is often embraced and advanced. 15 If we possessed all of the 
relevant data-such that we could fully comprehend the structure of the moral 
universe, adequately understand human nature, or grasp objective truth wý-e 
would find that no moral dilemma, however resistant to reason, was entirely 
unresolvable. For example, utility is the standard by which conflicting moral 
judgments can be resolved for utilitarians, just as duty is the standard for 
deontologists. A proper understanding of the Good in the former case and of the 
Right in the latter would provide a sufficient basis for resolving moral dilemmas. ' 6 
To suggest otherwise would be to introduce an element of disorder, in the form of 
unreliability or uncertainty, into the controlling notions of the Good or the Right. 
For Kant, of course, it would be incorrect to say that our principles conflict 
in the first place, for he argues that it is part of the very idea of a moral rule or 
principle that it can never conflict with another moral rule. ' 7 As Nussbaum states: 
15 Annas (1993), 7, states, "Modern theories often see it as a demand that they be able to generate 
answers to hard cases in a comparatively simple way; and to this extent ancient ethics fails to meet 
modern demands on casuistry. The source of this difference is easy to locate: it is the demand, 
explicit since Sidgwick, that we identify, systematize and formalize out of our moral thinking 
certain `methods' or procedures for coming to ethical conclusions. This demand in turn rests 
transparently on the demand that ethics become more like the physical sciences; just as they enable 
us to make particular predictions as to what will happen, so a `scientific' ethical theory should 
enable us to make particular decisions very directly, without the intervention of further 
deliberation on our part. This often goes with a general attitude that ethics, as it stands, is a mess, 
and needs to be sanitized by scientific methods. " 
16 Yet, it is precisely this proper understanding that seems the most difficult to come by. Shafer- 
Landau (1997), 588, states, "Absolutism promises justificatory security once the relevant moral 
rules are identified. Nothing convinces like a good moral deduction. But complex or novel cases 
invariably arise where we feel the need to alter absolutist rules, thus undermining confidence that 
we have ever really accurately captured their content. " 
17 Because. . . 
duty and obligation are in general concepts that express the objective practical 
necessity of certain actions and because two mutually opposing rules cannot be necessary at the 
same time, then, if it is a duty to act according to one of them, it is not only not a duty but contrary 
to duty to act according to the other. It follows, therefore, that a conflict of duties and obligations 
is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur). It may, however, very well happen that two 
grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi), one or the other of which is inadequate to bind as a 
duty (rationes obligandi non obligantes), are conjoined in a subject and in the rule that he 
prescribes to himself, and then one of the grounds is not a duty. When two such grounds are in 
conflict, practical philosophy does not say that the stronger obligation holds the upper hand (Jortior 
18 
The requirement that objective practical rules be in every situation 
consistent, forming a harmonious system like a system of true 
beliefs, overrides, for Kant, our intuitive feeling (which he 
acknowledges) that there is a genuine conflict of duties. It appears 
that our duties may conflict. But this cannot be so, since the very 
concepts of duty and practical law rule out inconsistency. We 
must, therefore, find a more adequate way of describing the 
apparent conflict. Since at most one of the conflicting claims can 
be a genuine duty, we should call the other merely a ground of duty 
(Verpflichtungsgrund). When the stronger `ground' has prevailed, 
we see that this alone has all along been our duty in the matter; we 
drop the conflicting `ground' as not binding. It quits the field; it no 
longer exerts any claim at all. To say anything else would, for 
Kant, be to weaken the strong conceptual bond between duty and 
practical necessity, and between both and logical consistency. 
Perhaps even more important, it would be to concede that what 
contingently happens to an agent (he just happens to be cast into a 
situation of this sort) could force him to violate duty. For Kant this 
would be an intolerable thought (Nussbaum, 1986,31-2, italics in 
original). 
Regardless of the potential, either real or apparent, for conflicting moral 
principles, a foundational grounding in the Good or the Right has traditionally 
been deemed necessary for devising or ascertaining the moral principles from 
which prescriptive and evaluative guidelines may be deduced, and it is familiarly 
legalistic in form. The concrete particulars of a given situation matter less to the 
rightness/wrongness, goodness/badness of a specific action than does adherence 
by the agent to the principle or guideline that requires, permits, or prohibits the 
act, and determining the morality of an act depends upon the form that the first 
principle takes. For example, motivation (i. e. strict adherence to duty) determines 
the morality of an act for a deontologist, while consequences (i. e. the predictable 
and expected consequences of an action) play the same role for a utilitarian. The 
character of the agent herself, while certainly a factor in achieving the ends or 
obligatio vincit), but that the stronger ground 
binding to a duty holds the field (fortior obligandi 
ratio vincit)" (Kant, 1797, Introduction to the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Akad. 223, in Nussbaum, 
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goals of a particular theory, is given a secondary role. Likewise, ideas of virtue 
and vice tend to be more involved with the agent's ability to both comprehend and 
make good use of rules, maxims, and directives than they are in determining the 
morality of an action itself. Human character and the motivational force 
associated with human character are not ignored in these theories, and they 
certainly bear on ideas of duty and goodwill in deontological theories, but they are 
not taken as a starting-point in any of the influential, modern, normative 
theories. 18 
This conceptualization of normative theory-with its heavy reliance on 
inviolable first principles, deduction, and an objective moral order, along with its 
devaluation of situation-specific moral factors-has excluded Aristotelian virtue 
ethics from the realm of normative theories from (roughly) the Age of the 
Enlightenment until the modern revival of virtue theory. Even during this modem 
revival, however, virtue ethics has often been conceived, by its proponents as well 
as its detractors, as fundamentally anti-theoretical, incapable of being formulated 
in normative terms, or lacking the theoretical character necessary to classify it as a 
"theory" rather than as an "approach. "19 The objections to formulating virtue 
1986,3 1, translation Nussbaum, italics in original). 
18 See, for example, Louden (1984), 227-236. He states, `Both types of theory [teleological and 
deontological], despite their well-defined differences, have a common focus on acts as opposed to 
qualities of agents... [For the utilitarian] the concepts of virtue and rights are also treated as 
derivative categories of secondary importance... [and] virtue is construed as a `tendency to give a 
net increase to the aggregate quantity of happiness'... For the deontologist, on the other hand.. . the 
virtues tend to be defined in terms of pro-attitudes towards one's duties. Virtue is important, but 
only because it helps us do our duty" (227). 
19 See, for example, Nussbaum (1999), 163-201; Slote (1999), 51-2; Clark, Simpson, eds., (1989); 
Louden (1984), 227-236. Louden (1984), 229-30, states, "[P]eople have always expected ethical 
theory to tell them something about what they ought to do, and it seems to nie that virtue ethics is 
structurally unable to say much of anything about this issue... [O]ne consequence of this is that a 
virtue-based ethics will be particularly weak in the areas of casuistry and applied ethics... The 
increasing importance of these two subfields of ethics in contemporary society is thus a strike 
against the move to revive virtue ethics. " Moreover, Annas (1993). 7, states that it is a 
"widespread modern assumption that ethical theory must have a structure of which two things 
must be true: it must be hierarchical and it must be complete" (italics in original). She then points 
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theory in normative terms focus on various aspects of Aristotelian ethics and they 
suggest a broad range of obstacles to such a project. I have chosen to recount the 
objections raised by Edmund Pellegrino in his paper, "Toward a Virtue-Based 
Normative Ethics for the Health Professions ,, 20 because they are representative of 
the scope of the problem. While Pellegrino is sympathetic to the idea that a 
restoration of virtue ethics to a normative status is possible in restricted arenas, 
such as medical ethics, he argues that such a restoration would be impossible in 
general ethics. 
In brief, Pellegrino argues that Aristotelian virtue ethics can be accused of 
circular reasoning: "namely, that the good is that which the virtuous person does 
and the virtuous person is the person who does what is good for humans. "`' 
Without a grounding for virtue outside of this circular reasoning, prescriptions and 
evaluations become little more than intuitive or subjective understandings of both 
virtue and the good. Moreover, Pellegrino suggests that Aristotelian virtue ethics 
will be devoid of normative force as long as a consensus on the human good 
cannot be reached. This objection, it seems, is fundamentally and historically 
related to the first, for, according to Pellegrino, in classical (and even medieval) 
constructions of virtue-based ethics, virtue was grounded in an understanding of 
to the movement away, in recent work on virtue ethics, from hierarchy (i. e. the idea that some set 
of notions is taken as basic and the other elements in the theory are derived from these basic 
notions) and completeness (i. e. that the theory claims to account for everything in its area in terms 
of the basic and derived concepts). She states, "A great deal of recent work which centres on 
virtue has tended to query the demand for hierarchy and completeness. By now it is accepted that 
virtue theories may be more or less `radical', and many have found attractive the idea of 
'moderate' virtue ethics, by which is meant precisely a virtue theory that renounces claims to 
hierarchy or completeness" (Annas, 1993,9). 
20 Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1995), "Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for the Health 
Professional, " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 5(3): 253-277. 
21 Ibid., 262. For additional criticism of the virtuous person as standard, see Louden (1984). 227- 
236. 
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the ends and goals of human life that was itself derived from a philosophical 
conceptualization of natural law. Virtues could be ascertained, defined, accepted. 
rejected, and potentially ordered with respect to one another and in direct 
correlation with something more fundamental: something to which virtues and 
virtuous persons themselves conformed. It was this confluence of virtues with the 
philosophical understanding of natural law that gave virtue ethics the normative 
force that it no longer enjoys. According to these objections, the overall 
disagreement on aspects of human psychology, human nature, and the concept of 
human ends and goals make devising a viable normative-based virtue ethics too 
formidable a task to be completed successfully. 22 
Pellegrino argues that an ethical theory that takes human good as its 
starting-point, and which depends upon a reliable and consistent understanding by 
the virtuous person of the good for human beings, will never have the precision in 
directing and evaluating human action that gives rule-based ethical theories their 
normative force (at least in the abstract). 23 Without some general agreement on 
what the good for human beings actually is, or, at the very least, agreement among 
virtuous persons, it seems impossible to suggest that the virtuous person will, in 
all circumstances and with utter consistency, act to promote human good. Indeed, 
according to Pellegrino, it was a shared and highly specific notion of the good that 
gave focus and normative force to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and even to 
Aquinas' Summa Theologica. and it is just such a shared and specific notion of the 
good that is absent in modern ethical theory. 24 In the absence of this shared 
22 Ibid., 262-4. 
2" Ibid., 263. 
24 1 would argue against the claim that Aristotle and Aquinas set forth a generally shared 
conceptualization of the good, but we need not concern ourselves with this point here. I discuss 
the human good in detail in Chapter 2. 
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understanding of the human good, and of the ends and goals of human action. both 
the human good and the virtues seem, once again, to be defined in merely intuitive 
or subjective terms. 
Another group of objections centers on both the internal and external 
difficulties supposedly inherent to a virtue-based ethics. Pellegrino argues that, in 
the face of moral and practical luck, genetics, environment, fortune, and the like, 
expecting humans to sustain an internal adherence to and understanding of 
excellence is both unrealistic and unfair. Humans are neither created equal, at 
least in their genetic predispositions, nor subject to equal environmental forces 
and pressures (e. g. luck, advantage, disadvantage, etc. ), and they cannot be 
expected to have an equal opportunity to achieve excellence. It is vastly more 
realistic and fair, so runs the objection, to demand adherence to a system of rules, 
maxims, and directives-that need not be entirely understood in order to be 
consistently followed-than it is to assume that each and every human being is 
equally capable of comprehending and possessing virtue, and of acting in 
accordance with excellence at all times and under all circumstances. Virtue 
ethics, it is argued, simply demands too much. 25 
However, throughout this work, I intend to answer these objections by 
expanding upon and emending a suggestion made by Flage and Glass in their 
paper "Hume's problem and the possibility of normative ethics, , 26 namely, that 
normative theory can be grounded in inductive, rather than deductive, reasoning. 
Now, this notion might be disastrous if entertained without regard to its place 
within a well-constructed moral theory, and it might lead to insufficient 
25 Pellegrino (1995), 263. 
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justifications for singular moral judgments in such a case. It is. however, the 
notion that will enable us to reconcile Aristotelian virtue ethics and normative 
theory, and to potentially open a dialogue between two traditionally hostile camps. 
In brief, Flage and Glass argue that if the covering-law model of moral 
justification 27 is correct, then Hume's "is-ought" paragraph calls into question the 
possibility of a justifiable theory of moral obligation. After delineating Hume's 
doubts, they conclude that, on Hume's principles, we can justify the acceptance of 
a rule of moral obligation neither on the basis of reason (relation of ideas) nor on 
factual claims. What this entails is worth quoting in full: 
In claiming that putative rules of moral obligation cannot be 
justified on the basis of relations of ideas, Hume is arguing that no 
grounds exist for claiming that rules of moral obligation are 
necessary truths. In claiming that putative rules of moral 
obligation cannot be deduced from statements of fact, Hume is 
arguing that no factual grounds exist upon which general rules of 
moral obligation can be shown to be true. This second position 
inveighs even against the non-cognitivist insofar as it rejects any 
factual basis for claiming that we are justified in accepting a 
putative rule of moral obligation as specifying that an action of a 
particular kind is morally obligatory or morally forbidden. 28 
Further, Flage and Glass point out that, "if Hume's account is correct, either we 
are never justified in accepting a putative rule of moral obligation or, if rules of 
moral obligation exist, then they are conventional rules or else they are rules 
known on the basis of induction. "29 This assertion, as they correctly 
acknowledge, poses a dilemma, for "if the meta-ethical position is correct that a 
singular moral judgment is justified if and only if it is deduced from a justified 
'`' Flage, Daniel E., Ronald J. Glass (1995), "Hume's problem and the possibility of normative 
ethics, " The Journal of i "alue Inquiry, 29: 231-239. 
27 See Hare (1961). 56-78: Frankena (1973), 25. 
28 Flage, Glass (1995). 235-6, italics in original. 
29 Ibid., 236. 
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moral rule, 30 and we are never justified in accepting a putative rule of moral 
obligation, we are never justified in accepting a singular judgment of moral 
obligation. "3 1 So, the dilemma and its consequences, as set forth by Flage and 
Glass, call into question the viability of traditional normative theories and they 
are, again, worth quoting in full: 
If all rules of moral obligation are conventional, then even though 
the meta-ethical principle will allow us to justify singular 
judgments of moral obligation, such judgments are relative to a 
conventional set of rules of obligation.. . 
If rules of moral obligation 
are rules known on the basis of induction, then the justification of 
singular moral judgments is logically prior to the justification of 
rules of moral obligation, which is inconsistent with the meta- 
ethical principle. Further, were we to contend that rules of moral 
obligation have only an inductive justification, we would implicitly 
acknowledge that the justification of a general moral rule of 
obligation is always open to doubt, and, consequently, a rule of 
moral obligation could not provide the basis for a conclusive 
justification of a singular moral judgment. Thus, if the position 
Hume advances in the "is"-"ought" paragraph is sound and you 
contend that the covering-law model is necessary for the 
justification of a singular moral judgment of actual or prima facie 
moral obligation, the possibility of normative ethics is called into 
doubt. 32 
This does not mean, however, that singular judgments of moral obligation cannot 
be justified in some manner. Hume's objections in the "is-ought" paragraph are 
limited to a covering-law model of justification, since what he deems "altogether 
inconceivable" is "how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which 
are entirely different from it. "33 Hume can be understood to hold that our beliefs 
about the facts, in concert with our emotional responses, determine our obligations 
and duties, for this is what Hume himself proceeds to do. 34 It would be a mistake, 
30 See Hare (1961), 56-78; Frankena (1973), 25. 
n Flage, Glass (1995), 236. 
Ibid. 
Hume (1978). Book 111, Part I. Section 1,203-4, italics added. 
'ý Hume (1972), Book III, Part I1. Section V, 245-6; Book III, Part II, Section 1,211. 
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however, to think that this derivation is an inference. 3' Moral evaluations, like our 
passions, volitions, and actions, are matters of fact in the sense that they are 
"original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to 
other passions, volitions, and actions. , 36 But they are not susceptible of the kind 
of agreement or disagreement with real relations of ideas or real existence and 
matter of fact that is necessary for the discovery of truth or falsehood. Whatever 
is not susceptible of the sort of agreement or disagreement in which truth or 
falsehood consists can never be an object of our reason and it can neither 
contradict nor conform to reason. 37 Moreover, we cannot derive a rule of moral 
obligation from either real relations of ideas or real matters of fact because, while 
such relations of ideas and matters of fact have ascertainable truth-values (at least 
in principle), no values, moral obligations, or moral evaluations have a truth-value 
independent of particular emotional reactions. As Maclntyre rightly insists, 
Hume, unlike R. M. Hare, cannot be classified as a philosopher who insists that a 
moral conclusion can be reached only from premises at least one of which is 
moral. 38 Instead, he is a philosopher who is attempting to describe how we can 
arrive at moral evaluations and feel morally obligated in a world in which, 
independent of our emotional responses, values and obligations do not exist. 
While he rejects a covering-law model of justification, and thereby calls into 
question the possibility of deduction-based normative theories, he bases his 
35 For a different approach see Maclntyre (1959), "Hume on `Is' and `Ought', " The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. LXVIII. Maclntyre argues that Hume is not denying that one may derive statements 
of obligation from purely factual premises, only that such derivations are extremely difficult. For 
further discussion on the "is-ought" passage, see Atkinson, R. F. (1961), "Hume on `Is' and 
`Ought': A Reply to Mr. Maclntyre, " The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXX; Scott-Taggart, M. J. 
(1961), "Maclntyre's Hume, " The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXX; Flew, A. (1963), "On the 
Interpretation of Hume, " Philosophy, Vol. XXXVIII. 
36 Hume (1972), Book 111, Part I, Section 1,193. 
'' Ibid. 
38 Maclntyre (1959). 
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description on empirical evidence concerning human nature and human emotional 
responses. 
Therefore, by rejecting a deductive model of justification in favor of an 
inductive model we cannot only side-step the difficulties raised by Hume. but 
according to Flage and Glass we can also (1) bring moral reasoning into line with 
most other judgments found in ordinary life; (2) develop a normative theory that is 
independent of meta-ethical positions concerning the nature (truth-value) of moral 
propositions; and (3) provide a means of justifying singular moral judgments 
without appealing to moral rules. 39 They suggest that the same standards of 
evidence which are employed in cases of non-moral reasoning (i. e. in courts of 
law, scientific investigation, and ordinary life) can be employed in the moral 
sphere, and they point out that, even if investigators could not come to complete 
agreement in resolving a moral dispute, it would be possible for them to agree on 
what would count as evidence. They explicate four conditions that would have to 
be fulfilled in order to resolve a moral dispute and they describe a method by 
which investigators could reach a conditional moral agreement. 40 Their four 
conditions are: (1) investigators must use the relevant terms in the same sense; (2) 
investigators must agree on what is or would be relevant evidence for or against 
the claim that x is F; (3) investigators should be psychologically normal; and (4) 
investigators should investigate the evidence without bias. 41 
Although my conceptualization of induction-informed normative theory 
differs significantly from theirs, I will refer to some of their specific suggestions 
below as I build upon and emend their basic proposal. 
39 Flage, Glass (1995), 236-8. 
'° Ibid. 
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Induction-informed normative theory, like its deductive counterpart. must 
be evaluative rather than merely descriptive, and it must be capable of prescribing 
(or recommending) morally correct behavior. 42 In contrast to its deductive 
counterpart, however, induction-informed normative theory cannot be understood 
as a system that establishes a standard of correctness by prescription of rules, nor 
as one in which specific guidelines and singular moral judgments are strictly 
derived from one or more general rules. Indeed, an inductive model is one in 
which general rules, insofar as they are introduced, must be justified on the basis 
of inductive arguments from singular moral judgments and, as inductive 
generalizations, they would never be more than guidelines. In all instances, 
including singular moral judgments, if our standard is induction, we can only 
claim that our conclusions or judgments are probable, never that they are 
absolutely true. The inductive process leads to hypothetical and conditional 
conclusions such that if a given set of facts obtain, then we are justified in 
reaching a particular conclusion. All that we can reasonably expect is the 
probability of the truth of our conclusions, not certainty that the conclusions are 
true. If conditions change, then our conclusions must be revised on the basis of 
the additional evidence. Thus, general guidelines would be useful as rules of 
thumb, pedagogical tools, and references in circumstances that require a quick 
decision, but they would always be subject to revision. 
While it might seem to be a weakness that we cannot stand on the absolute 
truth of our conclusions and general guidelines, an induction-informed normative 
41 Ibid., 237. 
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theory side-steps the logical difficulties inherent in determining the truth-value of 
moral claims. Flage and Glass correctly point out that such a method is 
independent of meta-ethical positions concerning the truth-value, or nature, of 
moral propositions. 43 In essence, an inductively informed normative theory is "a 
method for determining the acceptability, rather than the truth, " of singular moral 
judgments and general guidelines, and the "same method can be employed 
regardless of whether moral claims have a truth-value. "44 Yet, Flage and Glass 
also state that "this method provides a means of justifying singular moral 
judgments without appealing to moral rules , "4' and this claim leaves an 
incomplete picture of the process at hand. 
Under such a system, although singular moral judgments can be justified 
without deducing them from moral rules46 they can be justified only by appealing 
to something. It is not enough to examine factual claims, either the sort which 
describe the specific circumstances at hand or the sort which are weighted with 
complex philosophical questions, and then to arrive at a singular moral judgment 
without reference to a fundamental claim or claims pertaining to something. In 
the absence of first principles that can be justified on the basis of relations of ideas 
or deduced from statements of fact, I intend to argue that fundamental claims 
about the good, or about that which is good for humans, must proceed from an 
analysis and examination of human nature and human ends. If a moral 
investigation should proceed without such a basis, even if it proceeds along the 
42 This section is intended to introduce ideas that will be explicated and supported in subsequent 
chapters. 
4; Flage, Glass (1995), 238. 
" Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
29 
lines suggested by Flage and Glass, the judgments arrived at by the investigator 
would be deeply suspect. 
Still, the factual claims that provide evidence for the acceptability of our 
singular moral judgments must be taken as objects of dispute. Here. I am in 
agreement with Flage and Glass. 47 The "facts, " which concern everything from 
the relevant concrete particulars of a given situation to the philosophically 
complex questions that often underlie the particulars, 48 are at the heart of all but 
the simplest moral disputes and they provide the content for singular moral 
judgments. For example, murder is considered a wrong action under most ethical 
theories, including Aristotelian virtue ethics, and while this general guideline or 
principle might not be cause for dispute, a specific instance of killing about which 
we must make a singular moral judgment certainly can be. If murder was simply 
a matter of semantics-generally, taking the life of another unlawfully-and if the 
laws of a given society were the last word in morality, then the only relevant 
factual claim would involve whether or not a specific person killed another 
unlawfully. This is not the case, however, and it is the concrete particulars or 
"facts" involved in an act of killing that ultimately determine the morality of that 
act, even under a covering-law model. 
However, Flage and Glass state that we must take the factual claims that 
provide evidence for the acceptability of our singular moral judgments as the 
46 In the theory set forth in the following chapters, the justification of singular moral judgments 
involves a relationship between those judgments and general principles and/or values. See 2.6 and 
4.4 below. 
47 Flage, Glass (1995), 238. 
48 For example, determining identity relations over time, particularly if one is deciding the 
punishment for a person who has committed a serious crime and who has subsequently suffered 
such severe brain damage that questions arise as to whether she is the "same" person who first 
committed the crime. 
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primary objects of dispute, and this claim poses theoretical difficulties. ``' In and 
of itself, the assertion could lead to the highly questionable contention that we can 
formulate singular moral judgments with the facts and with nothing more, and that 
we can somehow formulate singular moral judgments that are comprehensible and 
acceptable to others as well as to ourselves. Flage and Glass' procedure for 
inductively resolving either a moral or non-moral dispute-based as it is on 
investigative techniques, 50 rather than on moral theory-is not a satisfactory 
resolution to the problem. Instead, we must be able to place factual claims, as 
well as the evidence they provide for the acceptability of our singular moral 
judgments, within a moral framework that is informed by and directs the inductive 
process. 
51 
Throughout this work, I intend to argue that an Aristotelian-based 
conceptualization of human nature provides both the order and the flexibility 
necessary to serve as just such a moral framework. I further intend to argue for a 
view in which order is sustained through interconnected regulating notions, 52 
rather than through inviolable claims concerning the nature and ends of human 
beings, and flexibility is provided by both a reliance upon inductive conclusions 
and an integration of the moral claims and obligations that arise from particular 
49 Flage, Glass (1995), 238. 
so Ibid., 237. 
s' As Kagan (1998), 21-2, states, "Ideally, after all, appeal to the correct foundational theory would 
help resolve any unsettled disputes we might have about the normative factors. It would enable us 
to see just which factors genuinely have direct moral significance, and it would answer questions 
about the precise nature of these factors, their relative weights, and how they interact. Indeed, 
since it is the correct foundational theory-whatever that turns out to be-that provides the basis 
for and explains the various normative factors, it should not surprise us if these various disputes 
about the normative factors could not be completely resolved in the absence of an adequate 
foundational theory. " See Chapter 3 for a discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics as a framework 
for induction-informed normative theory. 
52 My concept of a regulating notion resembles Kant's regulative principles only insofar as both 
serve a useful purpose by stimulating, unifying, or advancing knowledge. However, I conceive of 
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relationships. Although each foundational element will be explicated in the 
following chapters, a cursory examination of eudaimonia, understood as a 
regulating notion, 53 suggests a preliminary response to Pellegrino's objections to 
an Aristotelian-based general normative theory. 
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by examining three theories of 
human good, conceived of as the satisfaction of desire, that he develops and 
abandons. 54 He states that human beings identify happiness, or the human good, 
with pleasure or honor (and he briefly refers to the contemplative life), and he 
admits that there is no consensus among humans as to what comprises 
happiness. 55 In Chapter 7, however, Aristotle suddenly abandons the orectic 
theory and develops the famous function argument that dominates the remainder 
of the text. It is here, it seems, that Aristotle attempts to both understand and 
explicate human good by making a distinction between the form56 of the best 
human life (i. e. happiness) and the content of that life (i. e. the satisfaction of 
rational desire in the form of goods, or constituents, of the ultimate end). 57 It 
seems clear to Aristotle that, while the ultimate end of human life might be 
ascertained by reason and observation, and while an understanding of the form of 
a regulating notion as an observation or inductive conclusion of long-standing duration, which 
cannot be conclusively justified or refuted, that serves a useful practical and theoretical purpose. 
53 See 2.4 for a full discussion. 
sa EN 1.5. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Throughout this work, I use the term "form" in a distinctly Aristotelian sense. See 2.4 for a full 
discussion. 
57 This form/content distinction is not meant to imply that eudaimonia is something over and above 
the things that make it up. It is a conceptual distinction only, and one that relates to the order and 
relations of the various constituents of eudaimonia. It is not a suggestion that eudaimonia is 
somehow added to these constituents, as something that completes them, anymore than it might be 
suggested that score is something over and above the order and relation of the notes which 
comprise it. My thanks go to Angela Hobbs for bringing this possible misunderstanding to mý 
32 
that end might be shared, at least in outline form, disagreements concerning the 
content would persist and require detailed treatment. 58 It is just such 
disagreements that he hopes to arbitrate by an examination of virtuous behavior 
and its contribution to the end of human life. 
Now, it is unlikely that Aristotle's claims concerning the ultimate end of 
human life will be either substantiated or conclusively refuted, for arguments that 
draw on modern psychology, human history, and sociology can weigh in on both 
sides of the debate. However, the Aristotelian claim that humans seek 
eudaimonia, in the form of a life well lived, agrees enough with our experience 
and inductive conclusions to be valuable as a regulating notion. In other words, 
we do no damage to our intuitions, nor do we fly in the face of our experience and 
inductive conclusions, if we conditionally accept the notion that humans, by their 
nature, seek happiness and a life well lived above all other things. Indeed, in the 
absence of justifiable moral rules of obligation, we are faced with either 
skepticism or reliance upon those concepts and arguments that have an inductive 
justification and that can be effectively, if conditionally, utilized as regulating 
notions in a fundamental sense. In this case, the notion that eudaimonia is the 
primary end of human activity provides us with the form of good that is sought by 
all human beings, as part of their nature, and it provides the basis for foundational 
claims concerning morality. 
attention and for suggesting the score/notes analogy. See Santas (1996) for an interesting 
discussion of form and content in EN. The following discussion is informed by this text. 
58 See EN 1.7.1098a20-1098b8. Here, Aristotle states that his argument concerning the human 
good must serve as an outline that will later be filled in with details (at least with such precision as 
the subject-matter allows). He points out that a carpenter and a geometer look for right angles in 
different ways; the former does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter 
inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is, for he is a spectator of the truth. On Aristotle's view, 
while he must establish the first principle, others can carry on and articulate what has been well 
outlined. and time is a good discoverer or partner in such work. It is to such facts. he states, that 
the advances of the arts are due. 
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The vast number of goods that supply the content of a life well lived are 
linked in Aristotelian thought with ideas of virtue, human character, and human 
interaction. These goods are the constituents of the ultimate end, such that they 
allow eudaimonia to be an ongoing and content-rich activity, rather than an 
unfulfilled goal. In an induction-informed normative theory, particularly one that 
takes human ends and human happiness as fundamental, these goods are rarely 
absent from the factual claims that provide evidence for the acceptability of our 
singular moral judgments. Indeed, on this view, prescriptions (or 
recommendations) and evaluations must take the situation-specific goods and 
particular relationships that comprise the content of eudaimonia into 
consideration, both as having moral significance in and of themselves and as they 
relate to the ultimate end. 
However cursory this introduction to form and content might be, it 
provides a means by which we can begin to answer Pellegrino's claim of 
circularity. 59 For example, on this view, the good for humans, eudaimonia, is 
formal in the sense that it is the ultimate end towards which all human beings aim 
and, as such, it is without specific content and in accordance with reason. 
Eudaimonia also has content, in the form of the numerous goods60 that satisfy 
rational desire; a content that is identified and understood by way of observation, 
habituation, and education, and that is exemplified by the decisions and actions of 
virtuous persons. Yet, while Pellegrino's phrase "what is good for humans" may 
59 That is, "namely, that the good is that which the virtuous person does and the virtuous person is 
the person who does what is good for humans" (Pellegrino, 1995,262). 
60 As constituents of eudaimonia, I would argue that these goods are often incommensurable, in the 
sense articulated by Nussbaum (1990). She states, "To value each of the separate types of 
excellent activity as a constituent of the good life is tantamount, in Aristotle's conception, to 
saying that a life that lacked this item would be deficient or seriously incomplete, in a way that 
could not be atoned for by the presence of other items, in however great a supply" (60). 
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be meant to describe both the ultimate end and the constituents of that end, it fails 
to differentiate between the two. When a virtuous person acts in such a way as to 
promote, enhance, or honor either the ultimate or subservient ends, he does indeed 
act in a right manner, but human actions cannot create, alter, or affect the formal 
aspect of eudaimonia. The formal aspect of the good for humans, or the end 
towards which all humans move, is determined by their nature as humans. 
In contrast, the content of eudaimonia is created, altered, or affected by the 
decisions and actions of the virtuous person (or the average or vicious person, for 
that matter). For example, while acting compassionately to a friend may promote, 
honor, or enhance the ultimate end, the activity itself is a constituent of the 
ultimate end and, as activity, it creates, alters, or affects the content of 
eudaimonia. Thus, Pellegrino's phrase "the good is that which the virtuous person 
does"61 is a correct statement, but this is the kind of good that contributes to the 
satisfaction of rational human desire. It involves decisions and actions that 
contribute to the well-being of the agent and that promote, enhance, or honor the 
ultimate end. This good does not create the end, but, rather, it aims at the end 
through activity. 
Moreover, as I will argue in the following chapter, to act rightly, the 
virtuous person must take into consideration not only the ultimate end (form) and 
the factual claims in any given situation (content), but also inductive guidelines or 
principles (content). Without such guidelines or principles, human beings would 
be no more capable of making and acting on moral decisions than they would be 
6' Further objections concerning the virtuous person, or phronimos, as an ethical standard per se 
will be discussed in 2.3 and 3.5 below. 
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capable of making and acting on non-moral decisions or of carrying out non-moral 
tasks. 
For example, once a driver determines, through experience or education, 
that she must look at the lane beside her before moving her vehicle into that lane, 
she will act on that principle of driving (without revisiting its contribution to the 
end of driving, or to safely reaching one's destination) until or unless it is called 
into question by new evidence. 62 If a driver had no such principles of safe 
driving, she would be unable to leave the curbside without reinventing the art of 
driving. In like manner, human beings act on similar kinds of moral principles, 
using them as guidelines while considering the relevant particulars in a given 
situation. A virtuous person is indeed one who acts in accordance with what is 
good for humans, but, to a certain extent at least, the good for humans is 
something that is known, first in a formal sense and then by way of principles and 
guidelines, to the virtuous agent prior to acting. 
With this understanding in place, we can suggest that Pellegrino's phrase 
"the good is that which the virtuous person does and the virtuous person is the 
person who does what is good for humans" is circular because both uses of the 
word "good" refer to content. The ultimate end for humans, or the good that is 
determined by human nature and that involves form rather than content, is 
neglected entirely. It is only the good that comprises the content that can be 
described by the phrases "that which the virtuous person does" or the person who 
does what is good, " for while a virtuous person can identify, understand, and aim 
at the formal good, she cannot "do" it. We have two kinds of good, and however 
62 1 am specifically using the example of a driver to call to mind the arguments set forth bý Hare 
(1961). 
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related and interdependent they might be, they have different formal and practical 
properties. Indeed, as I will argue in 4.3, the relationship between primary moral 
values and the formal end for humans provides an objective standard by which 
principles, singular moral judgments, and moral virtues may be evaluated. 
Pellegrino also claims that it was a shared and highly specific notion of the 
good that gave focus and normative force to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 63 He 
argues that, without such a shared and specific notion of the good, the virtues, and 
even the good itself, will be defined in merely intuitive or subjective terms. 64 No 
agent under such circumstances, virtuous or otherwise, can be expected to have a 
reliable and consistent understanding of the good for human beings or to act in 
accordance with that good on a consistent basis. 
However, this objection is based on the same confusion concerning form 
and content that was evident in the first objection. If we again consider the 
form/content distinction, we can suggest that the only necessary consensus 
concerning the human good is one that identifies the end of human activity as 
happiness, or as a life well lived. Under such circumstances, an agent must 
reliably and consistently understand that all human beings aim at happiness, but 
she need not have a complete understanding of what comprises happiness for all 
persons at all times. She will, of course, have a set of working principles- 
developed through observation, induction, habituation, and education-which 
inform her decisions and guide her actions. These principles will be available to 
each agent to whatever degree she has been habituated and educated, and each 
agent will comprehend them to whatever degree she is capable. In any case, no 
63 See n. 24. 
64 Pellegrino (1995), 262-4. 
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agent would be expected to reinvent the art of ethical speculation each time that 
she faces a dilemma concerning the human good or human happiness. 
Yet, it seems that with such a vague conceptualization of human 
happiness, prescriptions (or recommendations) and evaluations would be based on 
little more than intuition or subjective notions concerning happiness. However, if 
a comprehensive understanding of human happiness is necessary for prescriptions 
(or recommendations) and evaluations, then most forms of utilitarianism are open 
to the same criticism. It is not, as I will argue in the following chapters, a highly 
specific and shared notion of human happiness that is necessary for prescriptions 
(or recommendations) and evaluations, but (1) a general agreement that happiness, 
in the form of a life well lived, is the end/goal of human life (form); and (2) an 
understanding, made reasonably reliable and consistent by way of induction, 
education, and habituation, of the various constituents of that end (content). We 
are clearly in line with our experience and average expectations when we suggest 
that psychologically "normal" adults and many children have a reasonable 
understanding of the goods and actions that contribute to human happiness and 
those that do not. As John Stuart Mill said, "There is no difficulty in proving any 
ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be 
conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time 
have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their 
happiness. 65 
In any case, I would agree with Mill that it is unrealistic to expect human 
beings to approach any moral theory without some sort of ethical grounding, or to, 
say, pick up a gun, aim it at another person. and consider for the v er` first time 
38 
whether murder is a right action or a wrong one. There are, of course, logical and 
practical considerations that must be examined before setting out a complete 
explanation of the prescriptive66 and evaluative elements in an induction-informed 
theory and these will be discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover, the discussion in 
Chapter 4 includes an examination of what a normative theory does (or what it is 
that distinguishes a normative ethical theory from all other ethical theories) in 
terms of its ergon, or function, and this examination will bear heavily on the 
prescriptive and evaluative elements as well. For now, let it suffice to say that 
rigid precision in directing and evaluating human behavior may be an unrealistic 
goal in any normative theory. rule-governed or otherwise, and that failure to 
accomplish such precision is a criticism that can also be leveled against 
deontological and utilitarian theories. 
Pellegrino also suggests that moral and practical luck, chance, genetics, 
fortune, and environmental factors present internal and external difficulties that 
can be insurmountable for moral agents who are expected to sustain the internal 
adherence to and understanding of excellence that is demanded of them by virtue 
ethics. 67 This objection requires extended treatment and will be answered in 3.1 
and 3.2. Indeed, although we now have a partial answer to several objections in 
hand, all further discussion requires detailed examination of text and development 
of the theoretical aspects of induction-informed virtue ethics. It is to this task that 
I turn now, and I begin with principles and guidelines. 
65 Mill, in Burtt (1939), 914. 
66 Henceforth, in discussions pertaining to the theory set forth here, the term "prescribe" will be 
used sparingly to mean "to lay down as a guide to action" (i. e. a strong recommendation), rather 
than "to lay down as a rule of action" (i. e. a strict obligation) and will be used, therefore, in a less 
stringent manner than it is by philosophers such as R. M. Hare. 
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Chapter 1 
Principles and Guidelines 
1.1 
As stated above, if our standard is induction, we can only claim that our 
conclusions are probable, never that they are absolutely true, and in introducing or 
rejecting general principles, we would be arguing for or against their acceptability, 
rather than their truth. Indeed, we would be arguing, in agreement with Aristotle, 
that the amount of precision expected of any theory must be in relation to the 
nature of the subject-matter at hand, and that when dealing with matters of human 
behavior we can expect precision only to an inductively justifiable degree. 
In EN 1.3, for example, Aristotle argues that because fine and just actions 
exhibit a great deal of variety and fluctuation, they may be thought to exist only 
by convention (nomos) and not by nature (phusis), and that because goods bring 
harm to many people, they exhibit a similar fluctuation (1094b12-18). This 
variety and fluctuation in fine and just actions prevents us from identifying one set 
of criteria by which we can classify all actions of a particular kind and degree as 
fine and just absolutely. In like manner, the fluctuation in goods, by which we 
mean that something that is good under a particular set of circumstances may not 
be good under another, prevents us from classifying anything as good absolutely. 
Under such circumstances, when we are speaking or reasoning about human good 
and human behavior, we are speaking or reasoning about things that are merely 
probable, with premises of the same kind and conclusions that are no better 
(1094b19-22). We are reasoning from the facts, with whatever degree of diversity 
67 Pellegrino (1995), 262-4. 
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they might display, to general principles that are acceptable and inductively 
justifiable, regardless of their actual truth-values. 
On Aristotle's view, inductive reasoning is not only appropriate to the 
nature of the subject-matter at hand, it is the only form of reasoning possible, at 
least when one is moving towards first principles. Whether one begins with 
deductive reasoning or inductive reasoning depends upon whether one is moving 
towards first principles or away from them (1.4.1095a30-32), and this movement 
itself depends upon the starting-point for knowledge. If one is dependent upon 
facts and experience for knowledge, then the facts must be the starting-point from 
which inductive reasoning takes place (1095b 1-8) and the fact is the primary thing 
or first principle (to d' hoti proton kai arche) (1.7.1098b2-3). If, on the other 
hand, one is attempting a demonstration, then necessary principles must be the 
starting-point from which deductive reasoning proceeds (APo. 1.4.73a21-24). On 
this view, principles of things different in genus are themselves different in genus 
(1.32.88b26). We would not expect probable reasoning from a mathematician, 
nor would we demand demonstrative proofs from a rhetorician or from a political 
scientist who deals with human behavior, human ends, and human goods (EN 
1.3.1094b23-27). 
Induction, then, is the method by which general principles concerning 
human good and right action are acquired, and while induction is of first 
principles and of the universal (he men de epagöge arche esti kai tou katholou), 
deduction proceeds from universals (ho de sullogismos ek tön katholou) 
(6.3.1139b28-29). There are, on this view, principles from which deduction 
proceeds that are not acquired by deduction (1139b29-31). and all such principles 
would be, by the very fact that they are inductive conclusions, both contingent and 
41 
hypothetical. Such principles would not be knowledge in the strictest sense, or in 
the sense of being necessary (ex anankes) and eternal (aidion) (1139b22-23), but 
if the facts upon which they are based are well-established, they can serve as 
acceptable and valuable guidelines for human behavior. 
As Aristotle points out, however, because questions concerning what is 
good for a particular person have no fixity beyond a given time or particular 
situation, and because questions concerning right action depend upon the 
particulars of a specific situation, general guidelines function in ethics only to the 
degree that texts function in matters of health and charts/maps function in matters 
of navigation (2.2.1104a1-9). Without medical texts, for example, the physician 
would have no starting-point for evaluating and diagnosing a patient, and he 
would lack the cumulative wisdom of others. However, without taking the 
specific complaints and symptoms of the patient into consideration, he could not 
make a fully informed decision, nor could he act in a right and appropriate manner 
towards the patient. In like manner, in matters of human conduct, general 
statements may apply more widely, but those that are particular are more accurate, 
since matters of conduct involve not only general precepts and principles, but also 
individual cases and highly specific situations (2.7.1107a27-32). 
Having some sort of general beliefs and guidelines, however, is as 
necessary to right conduct as is correctly identifying the relevant facts in any 
given situation. In EN 7.3, for example, Aristotle points out that, because the 
lower animals have no universal beliefs (katholou hupolepsin), but only 
imagination and memory of particulars (phantasian kai mnemen), they cannot be 
accused of incontinence (akrate) (1147b3-5). On this view, it is our universal 
beliefs, themselves inductive conclusions, that allow us to properly identify the 
42 
class to which a particular instance belongs and that provide the universal 
premises in practical syllogisms. If, for example, our experience NA-ith human 
culture and interaction has led us to the conclusion that stealing is a wrong action 
in general, then before we can censure a particular instance of stealing, we must 
be capable of (1) identifying a specific action as stealing; (2) further identifying it 
by way of general guidelines as a generally wrong action; and then (3) censuring it 
(to a greater or lesser degree) by examining the particular circumstances under 
which it occurred. The lower animals, on the other hand, have no universal 
beliefs concerning the belongings of others and they will either take them or 
refrain from taking them based solely on desire or the memory of past 
punishments respectively. 
On this view, general beliefs concerning human good and human conduct, 
along with the general guidelines that prohibit, require, or permit specific actions, 
are the context into which particular instances must be fitted and by which they 
may be initially classified and understood. Yet, when Aristotle speaks of 
judgment (gnome), understanding (sunesis), practical wisdom (phronesis), and 
comprehension (noos), he is speaking of faculties that deal with ultimates 
(eschatos), or with the particulars (hekastos) (6.11.1143a25-29). In like manner, 
when he speaks of a person of practical wisdom, he is speaking of someone who 
knows the facts in a given situation, exhibits understanding and good judgment 
concerning both the facts themselves and their relationship to general guidelines, 
and who acts appropriately under the particular circumstances (all actions are 
included among the particulars) (1143a29-35). Comprehension, which in the case 
of demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and primary definitions, grasps the last 
and contingent fact (i. e. the second proposition) in practical reasoning (1143a35- 
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1143b4). Since both the primary definitions and the particulars are objects of 
comprehension and not of argument, and since the universal is reached from the 
particulars, comprehension must be able to grasp both as starting-points and to 
grasp the relationship between them (1143b 1-6). Likewise, it is the ability to 
grasp both general moral principles and specific concrete facts, as well as to grasp 
the relationship between them, which provides the basis for making sound, 
justifiable moral decisions. On this view, ethical decision-making is dependent 
upon an application of general principles that is informed by specific facts. 
1.2 
This understanding of the interrelationship between general principles and 
specific facts in the moral decision-making process parallels our understanding of 
the interrelationship between them in the non-moral decision-making process, or 
in ordinary life. From infancy onward, human beings learn to conduct themselves 
in accordance with principles that guide their actions and inform their decisions. 
For example, through habituation and education, we acquire such mundane 
principles as "over-eating produces discomfort and occasional illness" and "we 
should not jump into a pit without having an unobstructed view of the ground 
below. , 68 We abide by these principles so long as the effects of doing so 
consistently accord with our intentions and our beliefs about the world, and we 
modify them when they fail to do so. Without such principles, we would be-in 
every instance and circumstance-entirely without the benefit of past experience, 
the wisdom of others, and any guidelines whatsoever. In every instance and 
circumstance, would have no choice but to mentally review the possible effects of 
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every action that we might take and examine each in light of our intentions and 
beliefs. The time involved in making decisions in this fashion would reduce our 
ability to live full, rich, or complex lives. 
Yet, principles alone are clearly inadequate for guiding and directing 
human action. For example, even a person who holds general principles 
concerning pits must bring her particular circumstances to bear (e. g. her height, 
weight, and strength; the size and depth of the pit; whether it would be more 
expedient and safer to go around or through this particular obstacle; and so on), 
along with the relevant principle, if she wishes to navigate a particular pit safely. 
Upon encountering such an obstacle, she must perform an action that is informed 
by both the relevant principle and the concrete facts in the particular situation. 
Without non-moral principles of action, we would surely be paralyzed into non- 
action by a flood of conflicting and ever-changing particular facts, and without 
careful attention to particular facts, we would be incapable of acting appropriately 
in non-repeating and incommensurate circumstances. 
Moreover, the line of demarcation between moral and non-moral 
principles blurs in many instances, and an examination of non-moral principles 
often reveals moral content that bears on the reasons for their instantiation. For 
example, the rules of driving are a code for competently maneuvering a vehicle on 
public roadways; however, they are also a code for protecting and preserving 
human life in the presence of vehicles and, as such, they incorporate a moral value 
(i. e. the value of human life). In like manner, the above mentioned non-moral 
principle, `` we should not jump into a pit without having an unobstructed view of 
68 The following discussion is informed by Hare (1961), 56-78. 
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the ground below, " incorporates the same moral value, and the reasons for its 
instantiation include protecting and preserving human life. 
This "shared territory" between moral and non-moral principles69 presents 
an objection to the claim that while moral principles can be understood as self- 
evident, the principles by which we conduct our ordinary lives are the result of 
observation, experience, and inductive reasoning. For example. although we 
would never seriously claim that the rules of driving are self-evident principles, 
we might argue that a moral principle of the sort "it is always wrong to treat 
another human being as a mere means" is self-evident. Yet, without being able to 
explain what is meant by "means" in this context, and possibly "end, " terms 
which involve (at the very least) capacities such as reason and the ability to 
consent, ideas of dignity and respect, and social and interpersonal relationships 
that are not self-evident, we would be left with a vacuous moral principle that 
could not be applied in any meaningful way to specific situations. 
Indeed, it is the overlap between moral and non-moral principles that 
suggests that both kinds of principles are acquired and utilized in the same 
manner. While it might be argued, for example, that the moral principle "it is 
always wrong to tell a falsehood" is self-evident, we could not give a single 
adequate explanation of this principle, in terms of human relationships, without 
discussing the effects of lying on individuals and communities. And in the way in 
which I am using the word "effects, " namely, in reference to the reasons for 
69 See Nussbaum (1986), 4-5,28-30,427-8, concerning her general mistrust of the moral/non- 
moral distinction. Also see Williams (1985). Here, Williams abandons the moral/non-moral 
distinction as the basis for ethical inquiry and he argues that the Greek question, "How should one 
live? " is the most promising starting-point for ethical inquiry. He claims that the "moral, " 
understood as centered around notions of obligation and duty, should be viewed as a mistaken 
subset of the ethical. Moreover, he argues that a proper investigation of the Greek question 
does 
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holding any general principle, this argument applies equally to moral and non- 
moral principles. 70 The ostensibly non-moral principle "you should always look 
both ways before you cross the street" involves the same notions of protection and 
preservation, or the same intended effects, that are embedded in moral principles. 
such as "murder is always wrong, " that are designed to protect and preserve 
human life. While "you should always look both ways before you cross the 
street" would never be represented as a self-evident principle, however, but as one 
that includes content and inductive conclusions, it is possible to masquerade some 
formulations of "murder is always wrong" as self-evident moral principles. 
Unless we wish to argue, however, that such principles involve nothing other than 
the logical relationships between the terms themselves, we cannot sustain the 
claim that they are self-evident. It is far more convincing to argue that such 
principles are based on notions of human worth, human good, and human frailty, 
and that they are given content by an understanding of the terms used to express 
them, both in and of themselves and in relation to human experience. 
If the acquisition and utilization of moral principles parallel the acquisition 
and utilization of non-moral7l principles, it suggests that the acquisition and 
utilization of moral principles depend as heavily on induction, empirical evidence, 
not lead either to an inflexible separation of moral requirements from other concerns that arise in 
response to the question or to a ranking of these requirements above the other concerns. 
70 Here, I am not advancing ideas of expediency. All actions, even those done for the sake of duty 
or for the sake of abiding by a particular set of principles, bring about an effect in the total 
situation. While it is certainly the case that some effects must receive greater consideration than 
others, principles are in place precisely for the reason of increasing the probability of certain 
effects and reducing the possibility of others. Even acting in accordance with a principle which 
states that all moral actions must be undertaken for the sake of duty alone is an action with 
expected effects, backed by reasons for desiring those particular effects. Cf. Hare (1961), 57. 
71 See Notes on Terminology and Translations. As stated therein, although I have called into 
question the line of demarcation between moral and non-moral principles, I intend to retain the 
terminology throughout this work in order to maintain clarity as I argue that my position 
concerning moral reasoning is strengthened by examining areas of life that are less obviously 
moral. 
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and attention to particulars as do the acquisition and utilization of non-moral 
principles. This in turn suggests that the acquisition of both types of principles 
involves experience as well as reason. Moreover, our ability to utilize general 
principles of both types, including the degree to which we will adhere to them, 
involves our experience, observations, and our particular circumstances, including 
our understanding of the world around us, at any given time. If, for example, we 
have acquired a non-moral principle of driving, such as "to stop a vehicle 
abruptly, apply firm and continuous pressure to the brakes, " we will be forced to 
revise this principle the first time we attempt to stop abruptly on an extended 
patch of ice. This act alone will alert us to the fact that the original principle 
contains presuppositions pertaining to the performance of a vehicle on dry roads, 
and that the effects of abiding by it are dependent upon knowledge of these 
presuppositions. Even deliberating on the effects of applying the brakes firmly 
and continuously while on an icy road might be cause to revise our original 
principle of driving. In any case, by way of our action or deliberation, we will 
have revised the original principle to something along the lines of "to stop a 
vehicle abruptly on dry roads, apply firm and continuous pressure to the brakes. " 
By such a revision, we have tightened our original principle, making it more 
precise and exact, and we can either further emend it to account for stopping on 
icy roads or develop a new principle altogether. 
In the moral sphere, there is a strong parallel. If, for example, we have 
adopted the moral principle that "it is morally acceptable to enslave human beings 
of an inferior race, " we will be forced to either reject or revise it the first time we 
call into question the presupposition that there are inferior races of human beings. 
We certainly cannot claim that notions of inferiority, either mental or physical. are 
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implicit in the terms themselves, or that such a moral principle is derived from one 
that is self-evident. A moral principle of this type is dependent upon factual 
information and it can only be justified, if it can be justified at all. inductively. If 
it contains false presuppositions pertaining to ideas of human inferiority or to the 
act of enslavement, then it must be either revised or rejected. In any case, its 
acceptability as a moral principle is dependent upon reliable facts and, at least in 
part, on inductive reasoning. 
It must be noted, however, that very few moral principles or, for that 
matter, their non-moral counterparts, exist in isolation. In addition to the 
relationship between general moral principles and particular facts, there is a 
relationship between the general principles themselves that involves ideas of 
ranking or hierarchy. For example, if a person holds the general principles "it is 
always wrong to tell a falsehood" and "human life should always be preserved and 
protected, " and she is confronted with a situation in which she can save an 
innocent life only by telling a falsehood, then she must rank or order the two 
principles. Moreover, while the resulting hierarchy might be generalized by the 
agent (e. g. it is always correct to tell a falsehood if doing so will save a human 
life), all such rankings involve the relationship between the agent's foundational 
moral framework and her beliefs concerning the effects of choosing one 
conflicting principle over another in particular circumstances. If, for example, the 
agent's foundational moral framework involves Aristotelian-based notions of 
eudaimonia, or human flourishing, she is likely to rank human life over honesty, 
since life is the sine qua non of achieving eudaimonia. Such considerations 
suggest that, even if one holds to the idea that general moral principles are self- 
evident, it seems absurd to suggest that a hierarchy of such principles is equally 
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self-evident (or unnecessary). We do. in the course of our moral lives, face 
situations in which principles come into conflict and pose ethical dilemmas, and 
these dilemmas can be resolved only by taking both our moral framework and 
particular circumstances into consideration, and by ranking the general principles 
accordingly. Any meaningful explanation for upholding one principle while 
simultaneously disregarding another must incorporate the effects on human life 
and human interaction that will result from such a ranking of moral principles. 
Moreover, it is the theoretical separation of moral and non-moral 
principles that is largely responsible for the notion that conflicting moral 
principles or a hierarchy of moral principles is ontologically or morally 
problematic. The difficulties that result from this theoretical separation are 
particularly evident in deduction-based normative theories that take general moral 
principles to be self-evident and that recognize that moral agents must, at least 
occasionally, prioritize and rank these self-evident moral principles. Both the 
theoretical separation of moral and non-moral principles, along with the resulting 
theoretical difficulties, can be eliminated, however, by an understanding of the 
parallel between the nature, acquisition, and utilization of both types of principles 
and of their relationship to induction, experience, and an acknowledgment of 
particulars. 
For example, we rarely find a theoretical problem with the idea of 
conflicting non-moral principles, and we tend to have a reasonable degree of 
confidence in our ability to resolve such conflicts, as well as in our methods for 
both resolving the conflict and evaluating our choices. We generally accept the 
idea that non-moral principles are largely the result of induction and that they are, 
therefore, merely conditional conclusions. Moreover, we tend to accept the fact 
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that we will hold conflicting non-moral principles, quite simply because we have 
induced them from facts which may or may not be consistent with one another, 
and because we conduct our lives in a world which, prima facie, involves some 
degree of disorder. 
It is quite possible, for example, to simultaneously hold the non-moral 
principle "brush your teeth after you eat" and the non-moral principle "do not 
brush your teeth so often that you damage your gums. " Both take into 
consideration a set of facts concerning the teeth and gums, and both involve 
inductive conclusions and empirical evidence concerning the methods by which 
the teeth and gums may be kept healthy. Depending upon specific circumstances 
(e. g. the number of times one eats on a given day), however, it may be impossible 
to abide by both of these principles simultaneously and fully protect the health of 
one's teeth and gums. Yet, in resolving such a conflict, we do not question either 
the methods by which we acquired the principles or their respective value as 
principles. Instead, we rank them in whatever order best accords with our overall 
intentions and goals (i. e. healthy teeth and gums), and agrees with our beliefs 
about the world (i. e. it is possible to maintain the health of our teeth and gums by 
properly balancing specific hygienic measures). Such a move is theoretically 
unproblematic, in part because neither principle has the status of being self- 
evident or related to notions of duty, and in part because an evaluation of our 
decision would be based on little more than an assessment of the agreement, or 
lack thereof, between our choice, our beliefs about the world, and our desired end. 
If we can order and rank conflicting non-moral principles without 
theoretical difficulty, however, and if there is a large degree of overlap between 
moral and non-moral principles, so that no clear line of demarcation exists 
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between many of them, then we must question the origin of the theoretical 
difficulties involved with ordering and ranking moral principles. And this 
question brings us back to the nature, acquisition, and utilization of both moral 
and non-moral principles. If both sets of principles are accorded the nature and 
status of conditional conclusions, then ordering and ranking conflicting principles 
of either designation will involve the particular facts in any given situation, the 
agent's beliefs about the world, and the agent's overall intentions. While certain 
moral principles may acquire an elevated status based on the consistency of their 
effects, their importance within an overall system of beliefs, and the weight of 
tradition, this status does not alter their nature as conditional conclusions. Just as 
modern scientists work within a tradition that places a high degree of confidence 
in the theory of gravity, modern moral agents work within a tradition that places a 
high degree of value on human life. Neither the degree of confidence placed in a 
principle, however, nor the degree of value attached to it alters the fact that the 
content of the principles includes inductive conclusions and attention to 
particulars. A principle cannot be classified as self-evident simply because it is 
backed by a sense of inviolability; instead, it must be classified as a conditional 
conclusion that is very probably true or, perhaps, that is perceived as true by the 
majority of humans. 
Moreover, if both types of principles can be considered inductive or, at the 
very least, conditional conclusions, and if we acquire both sets of principles in the 
same general manner, namely, through induction, experience, and observation, we 
can better understand the overlap between moral and non-moral principles. 
Indeed, the territory that is shared by both types of principles seems to be an 
inescapable result of the fact that human beings are social creatures who share 
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interconnected and interdependent lives, and who demonstrate the ability to care 
deeply about themselves and others. Under such circumstances, it would be 
impossible to, say, formulate rules of driving that entirely sidestep ideas of safety 
and convenience, both for the driver and for others (i. e. other drivers and 
pedestrians). Likewise, even non-moral rules concerning personal hygiene can 
involve notions of social acceptability, avoidance of harm or risk to oneself, 
avoidance of unduly burdening oneself and others financially, and the like. Moral 
overtones are pervasive in non-moral principles and they often serve to explain, at 
least in part, why particular non-moral rules should be instituted and observed. In 
human life and interaction, the moral and the non-moral spheres share too many 
points of intersection for the rules concerning them to be clearly and completely 
demarcated, and our human experience, habits, and education reinforce, rather 
than deny, these points of intersection. Accordingly, our rules of conduct, both 
moral and non-moral, contain principles that incorporate, far more seamlessly than 
theory often admits, inductive conclusions that bear on both realms 
simultaneously. 
In like manner, we can identify areas of agreement in the ways in which 
we utilize moral and non-moral principles. As conditional conclusions, we abide 
by our principles so long as they advance our intentions, accord with our beliefs 
about the world, and produce the expected effects. They are rules of thumb that 
guide our behavior in general circumstances, but they must be informed by the 
facts in any given specific circumstance, as well as by our overall intentions. We 
might, for example, be driving within the prescribed rules and limitations and 
suddenly encounter a small child dashing into the street in front of us. At that 
point, we might choose to swerve our vehicle into another vehicle, or place 
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ourselves in the line of oncoming traffic, if circumstances do not offer a safer 
move and if we wish to avoid hitting the child. The fact that we disregard our 
previous principles of driving, or at the very least order and rank them, does not 
depend upon finding ourselves in a moral situation in otherwise non-moral 
circumstances. Instead, it reinforces the suggestions that moral and non-moral 
rules often contain elements of one another and that human activities often involve 
an ordering and ranking of principles, both moral and non-moral, depending on 
specific circumstances and overall intentions. In other words, our decisions are 
often based on both moral and non-moral principles in concert with highly 
specific and non-repeating facts and events, and they are justified, in part, by 
examining all of these elements in light of our foundational moral framework. 
At this point, it must be noted that this discussion takes for granted the 
assumption that both moral and non-moral principles have content, and although 
this assumption is safe enough when both sets of principles are classified, at least 
partly, as inductive conclusions, it is not equally reliable when moral principles 
are classified as self-evident or when a sharp line of demarcation is drawn 
between moral and non-moral principles. 72 Thus, in order to remove a possible 
point of contention and to fully advance my argument concerning the nature of 
moral principles, I intend to argue that only principles with content are adequate 
72 Williams (1972) says, "I shall assume as given ... a conclusion... which must certainly 
be 
correct, namely that any significant delimitation of the moral must involve reference to the content 
of the judgments, policies, principles, or whatever, that are being described as `moral'. It might 
perhaps surprise people innocent of moral philosophy that anyone has ever supposed this not to be 
so; but it has in fact been maintained, and frequently, that moral views (as opposed to nonmoral 
ones) can be identified without reference to their content, by some considerations such as their 
being practical maxims which are entirely universal or their being practical maxims which are 
acknowledged as overriding other practical maxims. The motive for these improbable maneuvers 
has been, as always, the maintenance of the fact-value distinction" (79-80, italics in original). 
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guidelines in the area of human conduct and that only principles that incorporate 
or rely upon inductive conclusions have content. 
1.3 
Let us begin by examining the moral principle "it is always wrong to tell a 
falsehood" as a self-evident principle, ascertainable by reason alone. Let us 
further state that this principle is evident to reason as being consistent with a state 
of affairs that we could will for ourselves and others. On this view, if we want the 
institution of truth-telling to continue, we could not justify telling a falsehood for 
our convenience or to avoid unpleasant repercussions, because we could not both 
consistently will that all humans should be free to tell falsehoods whenever it suits 
their individual purposes and consistently believe the words of others. On a 
universal scale, there is a contradiction between wishing that falsehoods might be 
perceived as truth and maintaining the integrity and value of truth itself. 
While this much might arguably be self-evident to someone who 
understands relations of ideas but who also has no experience whatsoever of 
human life and human interaction, no such person exists and few moral principles 
offer even this degree of rational self-sufficiency. All human beings who have 
survived infancy and childhood have led interactive and interdependent lives, and 
most have formulated ideas concerning falsehoods long before they have 
formulated ideas concerning the relations of ideas. Moreover, principles like 
"killing is always wrong" and "stealing is always wrong" depend upon ideas 
concerning the value of self-preservation, personal property. human interaction, 
human desire, and so on that are not implied by the terms alone. 
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Even in the case of "it is always wrong to tell a falsehood, " the 
justification that results from an examination of the terms and relations of ideas 
can be understood as a convenient, but superfluous, addition. Surely. we could 
not seriously argue that the justification of such a principle, as well as the claim 
that it is self-evident, preceded the personal, social, and communal reasons for its 
instantiation and acceptance as a moral principle. It may be a happy coincidence 
that certain authoritative and widely-accepted moral principles, or their stylistic 
variants, lend themselves to arguments concerning the nature and justification of 
self-evident moral principles, but this happy coincidence does not alter their 
original status as conditional conclusions. 
Indeed, any meaningful account of the principle "it is always wrong to tell 
a falsehood" would consist of a complete account of the effects of observing the 
principle (i. e. what abiding by the principle actually consists in), for it is the 
effects that give content to the principle itself. A complete justification of any 
decision that is based on such a principle would consist of a complete account of 
its effects, together with a complete account of the effects of observing the 
principle, together with a complete account of the way of life of which the 
principle is a part. This type of justification would be impossible to offer in 
practice, of course, but should one be capable of providing it, then all further 
questions pertaining to justification would have to be directed at the way of life 
itself. 73 Since a justification of the way of life itself would be an entirely separate 
matter, we have arrived, by a different route altogether, at a point similar to one 
reached by Maclntyre in After Virtue, namely, that all arguments that attempt to 
" Cf. Hare (1961), 69. 
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justify a way of life by justifying the set of universal, self-evident principles that 
advance it have failed to be universally convincing. 
This failure is due, in part, to the fact that the content of moral principles, 
like the content of non-moral principles, is provided in part by inductive 
conclusions concerning the world, human life, and the interrelationship between 
the two. To give an explanation of a moral principle in terms of relations of ideas 
would be to speak of such things as definitions and contradictions, and this would 
be to provide a vacuous explanation in terms of human behavior and human 
interaction. The understanding of the world and the place of human beings within 
that world, or the multitude of information and beliefs that constitute a way of life, 
would be missing entirely from such an explanation. Moreover, it would be 
impossible to construct a way of life from such principles, or even to explain a 
particular way of life in terms of them. 
Let us say, for example, that we know only that a particular person or 
society has adopted the moral principles "killing is always wrong, " "stealing is 
always wrong, " and "telling a falsehood is always wrong, " and that they have 
accepted these principles as self-evident. While this knowledge might suggest to 
us that such a person or society has strong beliefs about the value of human life, 
personal property, and notions of truth, it would tell us nothing concrete about 
their particular beliefs, traditions, and forms of social interaction. If we wished to 
gain a fuller and more meaningful understanding of their way of life, we would 
have to ask, "But why do these particular relations of ideas (i. e. those that support 
the self-evident status of the principles) matter to you and what gives them 
authority over your conduct? " In order to answer such a question, a complete 
explanation of the content of the principles must 
be offered, and that explanation 
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would be based on the effects of the principles, or what abiding by the principles 
actually consists in. It would be a full and rich explanation in terms of beliefs 
about the world, human behavior, and appropriate ways of conducting one's life, 
and it would be partly dependent upon numerous inductive conclusions. In the 
final analysis, the content of both moral and non-moral principles is provided by 
inductive conclusions, and the weighting of them is in respect of a way of life that 
includes ends and intentions. 
While a principle without content might be internally and logically 
consistent, although few content-less principles meet even this standard, it would 
be useless as a precept that was meant to govern human behavior. A person 
might, for example, be convinced that the principle "treat all human beings as 
ends in themselves" is in some way rationally required for rational agents. But 
such a person would surely be hard pressed to abide by it, merely for reasons of 
having been persuaded of its consistency, if her family, nation, or way of life were 
threatened. A content-less principle might be interesting as a logical 
phenomenon, but it is useless as a practical guide to action and as an aid to the 
decision-making process. The dilemmas with which humans wrestle are complex 
and rich, and they are often made more complex by non-repeating scenarios and 
incommensurate states of affairs. We must be capable of both formulating our 
decisions and justifying our actions within our moral framework by reference to 
content-rich principles and particular facts. 
This way of conceiving the nature and role of moral principles agrees with 
our typical way of conceiving the nature and role of non-moral principles, yet the 
latter conceptualization causes us little consternation. Non-moral principles are 
expected to be content-rich, useful guides to action 
because they are perceived, 
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largely, as inductive conclusions and because they are updated as our knowledge 
base increases and changes. We are not motivated to attempt to reduce them to 
self-evident principles in an effort to universalize and justify them, and yet we 
find that, as inductive conclusions, they are remarkably universal and justifiable 
propositions. 
This degree of universality seems to follow from the fact that, despite 
obvious differences in people's perspectives of the human condition, both 
historically and geographically, there seem to be a large number of apparently 
universal claims that can be made in respect of it. For example, the human 
condition has recognizable and consistent features, regardless of cultural 
differences and social adaptations, and we can easily comprehend and accept that 
it would be dangerous for any human being to leap from the top of a two-hundred 
foot cliff, or that emotion is a constituent of human nature (however that nature 
might be conceived), or that some form of social cooperation is necessary for 
human life and development. Yet, while we find it reasonably simple to construct 
and justify content-rich, non-moral principles relating to the human condition as 
we understand it, we find it equally difficult to construct and justify content-rich, 
moral principles. However, once we acknowledge the parallel between the nature, 
acquisition, and utilization of both sets of principles, we can more fully 
comprehend the ways in which they are constructed, the reasons for their 
instantiation, and the means by which they can be justified. It is simply 
unnecessary to postulate that moral principles are self-evident and absolutely 
universalizable in order to justify them and give them authority over human 
conduct. 
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It is necessary, however, to understand the ways in which the specific and 
the general cooperate in recommending and evaluating human conduct, both in the 
moral and non-moral spheres. It is necessary, as well, to explicate the ways in 
which this is accomplished, both in theory and in practice. To do otherwise, 
would be to leave the impression that subjectivism is an inherent component of 
induction-informed normative theory, and that impression would be erroneous. 
To this end, I turn back to Aristotle. 
1.4 
In EN, particular facts play a critical role in both ethical speculation and 
action in three, often interrelated, ways. First, as discussed above, 74 particular 
facts provide the starting-point for inductive arguments and it is certain inductive 
conclusions that become ethical principles and guidelines. Second, excellent 
action depends upon particular circumstances and it does so in several 
interconnected ways. It is particular actions that must be performed and, on 
Aristotle's view, it is perception of the particulars that determines action, in that 
particulars form the minor premise in the practical syllogism. Moreover, conduct 
has to do with individual cases and, in order to act in a moral manner, an agent 
must act as s/he ought at a particular time, in a particular way, and depending 
upon particular circumstances. Finally, states of character are produced from 
exercise of activities on particular objects, and it is just such activities that 
habituate individuals to excellence and virtue. In the following discussion, I will 
begin with the relationship between particular facts and excellent actions. 
74 See 1.1. 
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In EN 2.6, Aristotle describes excellence as a state concerned with choice, 
lying in a mean relative to us, with the mean itself determined by reason 
(1106b36-1107a2). However, he is extremely careful to point out that although 
we may speak of a mean in general terms, as a guideline for determining 
appropriate conduct, we must also take into consideration the individual facts in 
any given situation. On his view, general statements concerning human conduct 
apply more widely, but those that are particular are truer, since conduct has to do 
with individual cases (2.7.1107a28-32). 
Yet, even to state that conduct has to do with individual cases is to present 
little more than a broad outline, for both conduct and the evaluation of human 
conduct pertain to individual cases in several ways. First, a proper evaluation of 
an action must take into consideration the character of the agent who is 
performing it, and I will discuss this aspect below. Second, while one part of 
opinion concerns general beliefs, another concerns particular facts, and this latter 
aspect, represented by the minor premise in a practical syllogism, is both an 
opinion about a perceptible object and that which determines our actions 
(7.3.1147a24-1147b 17). 
We can see an application of this reasoning, for example, in the case of a 
soldier who holds the general principle "it is wrong to kill civilians during a time 
of war. " The principle alone will not be enough to determine the soldier's action; 
instead, he must both hold the principle and encounter a person whom he believes 
to be a civilian, in a situation in which he must choose whether or not to hold his 
fire. His choices and his actions will be determined by his opinions concerning 
the particular facts (e. g. the status of the individual. whether 
he poses any danger 
or threat regardless of status, etc. ). 
Moreover, it is these same opinions that will 
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be pertinent to a subsequent evaluation of his actions, for, in isolation, general 
principles or universal beliefs are insufficient for the purposes of prescribing or 
evaluating ethical action. A moral agent can only act in accordance with a 
specific general principle when particular circumstances both fall under its 
jurisdiction and warrant its application, and it is the perception of particular facts 
that make these determinations possible. 
This much, however, can be construed as trivial, for it is obvious that 
general principles are designed to be utilized and applied in particular 
circumstances, whether they are the result of inductive reasoning or entirely self- 
evident. It is perception of the particular, after all, that will move even the most 
conservative Kantian to act in accordance with a particular maxim, and it is 
perception of the particular that will determine whether or not his action was 
motivated by a good will alone. Notions concerning the role played by perception 
of the particular become less trivial, however, once it is recognized that perception 
of the particular not only determines action on this level, but determines action on 
the level of the principle as well. 
For example, it is perception of particular facts, interpreted in light of 
beliefs and values, that influence a moral agent's decision to uphold, revise, or 
reject a particular principle at a particular time, and it is the aggregate of just such 
facts that ultimately makes sense of and justifies the principle itself. It would 
seem, for example, that if civilians were perceived 
by soldiers as persons who 
consistently and reliably posed a serious threat to their safety or to the success of 
their overall mission, civilians would lose their protected status and general 
principles concerning them would 
be revised appropriately. In other words, the 
principles themselves become 
factors in determining action because they are 
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codified versions of collective human experience, and they make sense so long as 
they agree enough (i. e. to a high enough degree and on a consistent enough basis) 
with particular facts to provide reliable guidance. On this view, perception of the 
particulars influences action on two levels and it is as fundamental to formulating 
principles as it is to acting upon them at particular times and under particular 
circumstances. 
Even with principles in place, Aristotle claims that excellent action 
requires attention to particulars, since holding even a reliable and consistent set of 
principles is inadequate to insure excellent action. 75 Moral agents are faced with 
choices between incommensurate goods; they find themselves placed in situations 
that are unlikely to repeat; they are faced with moral dilemmas that fall under the 
jurisdiction of conflicting principles, and so on. An action that might be 
considered moral under a particular set of circumstances might be beyond 
justification under another, even if both actions fall under one principle and even 
if the motivation of the agent is identical in each case. It is the responsibility of 
the agent to consider what is appropriate to each occasion, just as it is the 
responsibility of the doctor to consider what treatment is appropriate to each 
individual patient, and it is the particular facts that make this consideration 
possible. 76 
This claim, which is complicated by the degree of responsibility it places 
on the judgment of individual agents, is further complicated by Aristotle's focus 
on the phronimos as the exemplar of excellent action. Indeed, the degree of 
personal responsibility, combined with Aristotle's 
discussion of the phronimos, 
75 See EN 2.3.1104b24-28; 2.6-1106b 19-23.2.9.1109a24-29. 
76 See EN 2.2.1 104a 1-9. 
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has led to claims of circular reasoning, raised objections concerning the feasibility 
of uniformly prescribing and evaluating ethical action, and raised objections 
concerning the number of actual human beings who would be capable of 
consistently acting in accordance with excellence. 77 These kinds of objections. 
however, can be addressed by an examination of what, very precisely, Aristotle 
means by a man of practical wisdom, or a phronimos, and by explicating the role 
that this exemplar is expected to play in the application of virtue theory. 
1.5 
In EN 6, Aristotle states that practical wisdom is concerned with the 
ultimate particular fact (tou gar eschatou estin), since the thing to be done is of 
this nature (to gar prakton toiouton) (6.8.1142a23-25). It is concerned with things 
human and with things about which it is possible to deliberate, and the person who 
is without qualification good at deliberating is the one who is capable of aiming in 
accordance with speculation at the best of things attainable for humans by action 
(6.6.1141 b8-14). The person of practical wisdom must recognize both the 
universals and the particulars, for practical wisdom, by definition, is practical and 
practice is concerned with the particular (1141b14-16). For this reason, and 
because particulars become familiar by way of experience, practical wisdom is 
rarely found in the young (6.8.1142a11-20). Indeed, the man of practical wisdom 
will be a man of practical experience who is capable of deliberating well about 
what is good and expedient for himself-not only in some particular respect, but 
also about the things that are conducive to the good life in general (6.5.1140a24- 
29). 
" See Introduction for examples of such objections. 
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Practical wisdom, as a reasoned and true capacity to act with regard to 
human goods, is an excellence of the soul, and it is an excellence that human 
beings have the capacity to possess (6.5.1140b20-30). Yet, while it is 
characteristic of the virtuous person to possess practical wisdom. the man of 
practical wisdom does not become an exemplar of virtue by the mere fact that he 
possesses practical wisdom. Instead, he is considered an exemplar because he has 
the capacity to recognize, comprehend, and act in accordance with objective 
standards78 through the possession of practical wisdom (in combination, of course, 
with the other internal virtues). 
For example, in EN 2.6, when Aristotle describes excellence as a state 
concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, he adds that this is 
determined by reason and in the way in which a man of practical wisdom would 
determine it (1106b36-1107a3). Here, he is not suggesting that the man of 
practical wisdom somehow determines the mean as it relates to specific 
individuals, nor that his judgments somehow constitute it. Instead, Aristotle is 
suggesting that the man of practical wisdom has the ability to recognize how an 
objective standard (i. e. the mean) can be applied to different individuals, taking 
into consideration their particular strengths and weaknesses. The mean itself 
remains an objective standard by which actions can be evaluated, and its value is 
based upon arguments concerning the characteristics of vice in general (excess 
and deficiency) and the characteristics of excellence in general (the intermediate). 
It becomes no less objective by being relative to each individual than do 
standardized medical treatments, even though the symptoms, lifestyle, and 
personality of each patient must be taken into consideration by the physician. 
78 See 4.3 for a full discussion of objective standards. 
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Thus, although acting in accordance with excellence requires virtue and 
habituation, it requires them, quite specifically, because they make it possible for 
human beings both to adhere to an objective standard of excellence and to 
exemplify it internally. The standard is set by the end (eudaimonia) and the man 
of practical wisdom is considered an exemplar because of his ability to accurately 
identify the constituents of this end. 
Indeed, prior to claiming that the mean is relative to individuals in a way 
that is determined by reason and by the man of practical wisdom, Aristotle 
describes excellence as a state that makes a man good and that makes him capable 
of doing his own work well (2.6.1106a21-23), and he outlines the methods by 
which this state is obtained (i. e. habituation and education) (2.1.1103a14- 
1103b26). He points out that excellence is concerned with the intermediate, 
relative to each individual, and that the intermediate, as it pertains to passions and 
actions, must be determined in regard to particular agents and their particular 
circumstances (2.6.1106b7-28). He claims that actions, if they are to be 
considered excellent, must be performed by an agent who has knowledge, who 
chooses the acts for their own sake, and whose actions proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character (2.4.1105a26-1105b4). He makes it clear, in other words, 
that excellence is defined by specific boundaries and limitations, and that living 
and acting within these boundaries and limitations requires both an understanding 
of objective standards and the internal characteristics necessary to abide by them. 
This line of reasoning applies equally well to other instances in which 
Aristotle holds up the good man, or the man who possesses virtue, as an exemplar. 
For example. in EN 10.5, while Aristotle is discussing pleasures and pains, he 
claims that, if the excellences and the good man are the measure of each thing, as 
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they appear to be, then what seems pleasant to the good man must indeed be 
pleasant (1176a4-29). Yet, he places this example within a medical context and 
he compares the good man to a healthy man. He points out that the same things 
do not seem sweet to a man with a fever and a healthy man, nor hot to a weak man 
and one in good condition (1176a 11-13 ). It is important to note here that he does 
not claim that a food is sweet because it is perceived as sweet by a healthy man; 
instead, he claims that the perception of a healthy man is more accurate 
concerning sweets than is the perception of a man who is ill. And health, as a 
condition of the body, is evaluated by an objective standard and measure, taking 
into consideration the internal functioning of the person being evaluated. In like 
manner, virtue, as a condition of the soul, is evaluated by an objective standard, 
taking into consideration the internal state of the person being evaluated. Just as 
we must already know what the term "health" describes in general before we can 
declare that a particular person is healthy, we must know what the term "virtue" 
describes in general before we can declare that a particular person is virtuous. 
Any appropriate evaluation of the character of a particular agent, including 
whether or not he is virtuous, must take into consideration specific objective 
factors and measures. 
Actions, then, are not good (i. e. they are not considered to be morally 
correct actions) because they are performed by a phronimos. 
79 Rather, a person is 
considered to be virtuous and good if he possesses specific internal traits and 
performs actions that accord with specific objective standards. Virtue (which will 
be discussed in length in Chapter 3) itself is meaningful for human beings as the 
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fulfillment of their function and telos, and as such it must be embodied by human 
beings and exemplified by human behavior. There is no such thing, on Aristotle's 
view, as disembodied courage or practical wisdom, and it is for this reason that the 
phronimos is utilized as an exemplar. The decisions and actions of the phronimos 
exemplify an understanding of the ultimate end for humans (eudaimonia) and the 
character traits, or virtues, necessary to both identify and attain the constituents of 
this end. The phronimos, then, is the sort of moral agent who possesses the 
internal characteristics and attributes necessary to contribute to his own well-being 
and to promote, enhance, or honor the ultimate end for himself and others. He is a 
model of the excellences of the soul, just as an athlete is a model of the 
excellences of the body. 
It is certainly true, however, that the character of the agent is a factor in 
determining the morality of a specific action and in providing evidence of the 
character of the action. In EN 2.4, for example, Aristotle states that although 
excellent actions themselves have a certain character, we cannot infer from the 
character of an action that it has been performed in a virtuous manner (1105a26- 
30). In order for an action to be considered moral, the agent himself must be in a 
certain condition when he performs it, namely, he must have knowledge, he must 
choose the action for its own sake, and the action must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable (bebaiös kai ametakinetös) character (1105a30-1105b1). While 
having knowledge counts in evaluating the condition of the agent, choosing 
actions for their own sake and acting from a firm and unchangeable character 
79 In other words, the fact that an action is performed by a phronimos is not the cause of the 
action's goodness. However, the fact that an action is performed b\ a phronimos can be appealed 
to as evidence of the character of an action (i. e. of its goodness). 
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count for nearly everything, since these are the very conditions that result from 
being properly habituated and educated. 
As Aristotle points out, just and temperate men become just and temperate 
by performing just and temperate acts, and agents are encouraged not merely to 
perform the same actions that just and temperate men perform, but to perform 
them as just and temperate men do. Indeed, Aristotle is encouraging human 
beings to become virtuous, through habituation and education, rather than to 
merely imitate the actions of virtuous men. Here too, the phronimos is being used 
as an example of what human beings should strive to become, through habituation 
and adherence to objective standards. The phronimos is a role model, the person 
whom moral agents are encouraged to envision when asking a question such as 
"What would so-and-so do? " and, like the phronimos, such agents should perform 
actions in a manner that demonstrates internal virtue and complies with objective 
standards. 
Although this cursory description of the phronimos suggests that he can be 
conceived as a role model, rather than as an ethical standard per se, a 
comprehensive evaluation of his role within Aristotelian virtue ethics, as well as 
within an induction-informed model, is dependent upon an understanding of 
human nature, telos, virtue, and the place of partiality and universal izabiIity. 
Without these elements in place, we are incapable of properly formulating a 
procedure for prescribing and evaluating human behavior, however adequate our 
notions of the relationship between general guidelines and particular facts might 
be. To this end, I turn first to human nature and telos. 
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Chapter 2 
Human Nature and Telos 
2.1 
In Aristotelian virtue ethics there is no conceivable way to neatly separate 
notions of human nature and ends from those of virtue and excellence. Values are 
embedded in Aristotelian ideas of human nature and Aristotelian facts concerning 
human nature are imbued with values and notions of virtue and vice. Therefore, 
although I will explore virtue more fully in the following chapter, this discussion 
will necessarily be as concerned with virtue and excellence as it is with human 
nature and telos. 
Moreover, this discussion will center on human nature as that nature 
pertains to human beings as moral agents. A comprehensive treatment of 
Aristotle's notion of what it is to be a human being and what it means to live a 
fully human life is beyond the scope of this work. With this in mind, we turn to 
Aristotle's famous function argument. 
In EN 1.7, Aristotle states that eudaimonia, above all else, is that which we 
choose for its own sake, rather than for the sake of something else (1097a34- 
1097b6), and he claims that, because of this, eudaimonia is complete (teleion), 
self-sufficient (autarkes), and the end of action (tön praktön ousa telos) (1097b20- 
1). Yet, even to claim that eudaimonia is the chief good seems, on his view, little 
more than a platitude and he claims that a clearer understanding of eudaimonia is 
necessary (1097b22-24). Such an account will only 
be rendered possible, 
however, once we ascertain the function (ergon) of human beings. for the good 
(tagathon) and the "well" (eu) are thought to reside in the function (1097b24-28). 
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On Aristotle's view, the good and the "well" reside in the function of each 
entity for the simple fact that he finds no difference in kind between an eye. for 
example, and a good eye. Both would be defined as eyes by a specific criterion 
that distinguishes an eye from all other entities (in this case. sight) and both would 
have the same function (to see). Eminence in respect of excellence may be added 
to the function without altering it, and so an eye and a good eye have functions 
that are identical in kind, if not, perhaps, in degree (1098a7-12). A good eye 
performs its function in accordance with the appropriate excellence and, in so 
doing, achieves its end and goal in a way that is impossible for an eye that 
performs its function badly. On this view, the function of the eye is to see; the 
end or goal of an eye is sight; and in order for an eye to fulfill its purpose and end 
in accordance with excellence, it must be capable of performing its function well. 
In like manner, the function of human beings is determined by a specific 
criterion that distinguishes human beings from plants and non-human animals (in 
this case, reason), and both a human being and a good human being have the same 
function (activity of the soul in accordance with, or not without, a rational 
principle) (1098a7-8). A good human being, however, performs his function well, 
or in accordance with the appropriate excellence, and it is the good and noble 
performance of his function that allows him to achieve his end or goal. The very 
nature of human beings, or that aspect of their nature which most defines them as 
human beings, determines their function and end, and these, in turn, determine the 
good for humans. On this view, human good turns out to be activity of the soul in 
conformity with excellence (1098a16-17), and eudaimonia becomes intimately 
associated with. and dependent upon. human excellence. 
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This outline of human good, which Aristotle believes is established by the 
facts and leads to first principles (1098a20-1098b8). is not as intuitively 
questionable as it might appear on first blush. Regardless of how curious it might 
seem to think in terms of human function, we do assign something resembling 
Aristotle's idea of function to artifacts and non-moral human endeavors. For 
example, we certainly believe that both a coffee maker and a good coffee maker 
have an identical function (i. e. to make coffee), and there is little to dispute in the 
claim that the good coffee maker performs its function in a more excellent fashion 
than does its counterpart. Indeed, when we set out to purchase a coffee maker, we 
generally attempt to choose one that performs its function well. 
In like manner, we can claim that both a sprinter and a good sprinter have 
the same function (i. e. to run a particular distance in the shortest period of time), 
and there is equally little to dispute in the claim that the good sprinter performs 
her function in a more excellent fashion than does her counterpart. Again, when 
we choose sprinters to represent us at competitions, we choose the ones who 
perform their function well. 
The issue becomes more complex, however, when we discuss either 
human function per se or human function as it pertains to moral behavior, human 
good, or human ends. The complexity arises, in part, because it appears naively 
reductionist to speak of a single human function and, in part, because we are 
deeply uncomfortable with the idea of imbuing facts about human beings with 
values. Yet, however uncomfortable we might be on a conceptual level, it is 
nonetheless apparent that we often act in a manner that suggests some degree of 
agreement both with the concepts themselves and with their interdependency. 
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It is certainly the case. for instance, that human beings find reason. or the 
ability to think rationally, as a defining characteristic of the species and. perhaps. 
as the defining characteristic. Arguments pertaining to personhood often focus on 
human self-consciousness, memory, and reason '80 and x\ e would generally 
be hard 
pressed to consider a mindless, vegetative human body as a full-fledged human 
being. Indeed, far less severe degrees of mental impairment are classified as 
"handicaps" and perceived not only as conditions that require treatment. societal 
intervention, and support, but also as ones that compromise the ability of affected 
individuals to live full and rich human lives. Human society often sanctions state- 
imposed elementary education and supports higher education, and it certainly 
demands a greater level of moral responsibility from adult citizens than it does 
from either children or those who suffer mental impairment. Legal rights and 
responsibilities correlate with a citizen's ability to comprehend and reason, and 
when a citizen loses this ability, s/he is awarded a guardian to manage her life and 
affairs. 8' The very act of living a complete and self-sufficient human life, it seems, 
depends upon the ability to reason. 
All of this is to say, in Aristotelian terms, that human beings seem to have 
a function (i. e. to live in accordance with a rational principle) that is different in 
kind from the function of plants and non-human animals. It is not to say that non- 
human animals are without reason-indeed, many humans seem to value certain 
animals and devalue others based on their respective intellectual abilities. Instead, 
it is to claim that human beings have a particular kind of reason and that it is the 
possession of such reason that defines us as human beings. On Aristotle's view, 
80 For a good compilation of articles pertaining to personhood and identitN. see Perl-ý, (1975) 
8' This clairn pertains specifically to citizens of the United States. 
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the function of an entity is determined by its most distinguishing characteristic, or 
by that characteristic without which it would no longer be an entity of a specific 
sort. 82 In the case of human beings, this determination neither reduces humans to 
mere reason nor negates the value of the body, the emotions, or any other human 
characteristic. It simply isolates and identifies that which is distinctly human from 
that which is shared with non-human animals, regardless of its origin (body, soul, 
or a combination), place (brain or soul), or terminus (death or beyond). 
Just as it is the case that we act as though reason is a defining 
characteristic of humans, it is also the case that we imbue facts about humans with 
value, in both the moral and non-moral spheres, as well as in their points of 
intersection. 83 We distinguish between those people who reason well, drive well, 
parent well, and so forth, and those who do not. We speak of good thinkers, good 
drivers, and good parents, and in so doing, we can be understood to differentiate 
between those people who function well at particular tasks and those who do not. 
We understand that tasks have definitive purposes or ends, and this understanding 
poses no intellectual quandary. For instance, we could easily describe the purpose 
of cleaning and we would generally find no difference in kind between a person 
who cleans and one who cleans well, although we would certainly find a 
difference in degree. Indeed, it is the function and ends of particular tasks, such as 
12 Another possible candidate for this characteristic might be human emotion. However, modem 
research seems to support the Aristotelian link between emotions and the beliefs upon which they 
are based, and such a link suggests that the emotional sophistication demonstrated by humans is 
part and parcel of their ability to reason. For some suggestive research, see Damasio (1994). In 
addition, see 3.3. 
83 For criticism of the distinction between facts and values, see Valdes, in Brinkmann. ed. (1999), 
73-81, Putman (1981), esp. chapter 6; Sturgeon, in Sayre-McCord, ed. (1988). Valdes, following 
Sturgeon, states "the fact that evaluative matters can enter, for example, into the explanation of 
non-moral facts has been taken as a sign that facts and values do not belong to two separate 
ontological realms" (74-5)- 
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cleaning and driving, that provide the measure. or scale, by which people engaged 
in such tasks may be judged, since comparison is built into such a model. 
Although the case is vastly more complex in the case of human beings, we Z-- 
comprehend and utilize terminology that suggests that we consider humans to be 
good or bad, better or worse, as humans. For example, we would probably not 
consider a human being to be a good human being per se if he happened to be 
morally wicked, even though we considered him to be a good mechanic or a good 
cook. In the moral sphere, as well as in the non-moral sphere, we live and act and 
make judgments in a manner that appears to acknowledge a scale of sorts, one 
which admits of degrees from the highly virtuous to the incorruptibly wicked, and 
one by which we judge humans as humans. 
It is this tendency of humans to judge one another as humans and to imbue 
facts about human nature with moral values, even though humans lack one 
specific and mutually accepted moral standard, which Aristotle recognizes and 
incorporates into his function argument. Likewise, he seems to recognize that this 
tendency also marks a point at which induction fails to provide a complete 
explanation for the various values that are embedded in the facts-values, for 
example, that relate to notions of healthy mental functioning, ideas of normalcy, 
and so forth. He hints at the problem in EN 1.7, when he claims that some 
principles come from induction, others from perception, and still others from a 
certain habituation, and when he states that all we can demand in such cases is that 
the fact itself is well established (I 098a20-10908). He has found a starting-point 
from which many aspects of human behavior and human understanding can be 
explored and explained by way of induction, but which might not be equally 
susceptible of explanation itself. Yet, by recognizing and acknowledging the fact : -n 
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that ideas about human nature are not cleanly separated from the values attached 
to human beings and human behavior. Aristotle bridges the gulf between facts and 
values in a manner that coheres with experience and avoids certain logical 
pitfalls. 84 
Whether or not we agree with Aristotle's approach to human nature and to 
its intimate connection to human good, we can anticipate his next move. Once he 
has tied both human function and human good into ideas of rational excellence. he 
must explicate his notions of excellence, or virtue, and show that human beings 
have both the capacity and the opportunity to achieve this sort of excellence. 
Experience suggests that human beings demonstrate widely differing degrees of 
moral excellence, from the incorruptibly wicked to the consistently virtuous. 
Therefore, he must not only adequately account for the endless variations in moral 
character,, but also for the fact that human nature seems susceptible of change 
from one state of moral character to another. He must account for the place of 
deliberation, choice, judgment, motivation, the influence of emotion, the effect of 
external circumstances, and so forth. And he must address questions concerning 
just how settled a disposition ethical agents actually possess and just how much 
responsibility lies with ethical agents-for their dispositions themselves and for 
their moral choices. 
In order to examine adequately Aristotle's approach to each of these 
interconnected aspects and questions, we must turn to the Rhetoric as well as to 
84 Particularly, the traditional "is-ought" problem raised by Hume. See Introduction for a fuller 
discussion. Also Maclntyre (1984). 58, who states, "Hence any argument which moves from 
premises which assert that the appropriate criteria are satisfied to a conclusion which asserts that 
*That is a good such-and-such'. where 'such-and-such' picks out an item specified by a functional 
concept, NNrill be a valid argument which moves from factual premises to an evaluative conclusion. 
Thus we may safely assert that, if some amended version of the 'No "ought" conclusion from "Is" 
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the Nicomachean Ethics. We must ascertain whether Aristotle's classification of 
virtue as a capacity (dunamis) in the Rhetoric might be helpful when modifying 
Aristotelian virtue ethics for the 21" Century, particularly in light of 20 th and 21 St 
Century neurobiological advancements. Although Aristotle classifies virtue as a 
state (hexis) in the Nicomachean Ethics, it seems that serious consideration of 
Aristotle's claims in the Rhetoric, specifically his classification of virtue as a 
dunamis in the context of rhetoric as an art,, might bear heavily on the salient 
features of human nature, help explicate the difference between the phronimos and 
the average ethical agent, and support Aristotle's focus on habituation and 
education. 
2.2 
It has been argued that Aristotle's description of excellence (arW) as a 
capacity (dunamis) in Rhetoric 1.9 is inconsistent with his treatment of excellence 
in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, where he specifically argues that arW is not a 
dunamis, but a hexis (i. e. a state or condition). 85 Certainly, the word that Aristotle 
uses throughout the Nicomachean Ethics to both describe and categorize arW is 
hexis, and he uses this word at Rhetoric 1.6.1362bl3, where he says that several of 
the virtues,, and all other such states (kai hai allai hai toiautai hexeis), are 
excellences of the soul. However, as part of his discussion of the ethical aspects 
of oratory, Aristotle states that aretý is "a capacity (dunamis) of providing and 
preserving good things, and a capacity of conferring many great benefits 
(euergetikff' (1.9.1366a36-1366bl). This discussion is set in language similar to 
prernises' principle is to hold good, it must exclude arguments involving functional concepts from 
its scope. " 
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that used to discuss excellence and goodness in Rhetoric 1362b-'1-4 and 1361a28- 
30; this suggests that Aristotle intentionally characterizes arW as a dunamis in 
this text and, to some degree at least, as a dunamis to benefit others. In the former 
passage, Aristotle claims that "the excellences, too, must be a good thing. for 
those who possess them are in a good condition, and they are productive of good 
things and good actions" (1.6.1362b2-4). In the latter, Aristotle states that honor 
(timý) can be paid, not only to those who have already done good, but also to 
those who have the capacity to do good (dunamenos euergetein) in the future. 
Indeed, in Rhetoric 1.9.1366b3-7, Aristotle further unites the concepts of 
excellence, capacity, and beneficence by stating, "If excellence is the capacity of 
conferring benefits (dunamis euergetiU), then the greatest virtues must be those 
which are the most useful to others. ) and, 
for this reason, justice and courage are 
the most honored; for the latter is useful to others in war, and the former both in 
war and in peace" (1366b3-7). 
Based on the fact that Aristotle's tenninology in the Rhetoric appears to be 
deliberate, I intend to argue that Aristotle's classification of aretO as a dunamis in 
the Rhetoric can be understood within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an 
art as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically, than would have been 
a classification of aretý as a hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain 
tensions and difficulties are created by the classification of aretO as a dunamis in 
the Rhetoric and as a hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle can be defended 
against the charge of inconsistency. 
15 For a discussion of the problem, see Grimaldi (1980), 194-95; in a wider context, Garver (1989), 
7-28, in a related context, Mirhady (1995), 405-9. 
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To this end, then, I begin by examining the implications of defining 
rhetoric as an art (techný) that has persuasion (pistis) as its end (telos) and 
function (ergon). 
2.2.1 
Rhetoric is an art and, as we know from EN 6.4, art is identical with a state 
of reasoned capacity to make, and all art is concerned with the coming into being 
of something that is (iapable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in 
the maker (I 140al-23). Art is a rational capacity, or a potency that moves 
according to, and involves, a rational fonnula (kai ta men kata logon dunatai 
kinein kai hai dunameis auton meta logou), and, as such, it is capable of 
producing contrary effects (Met. 9.5.1047b3l-1048a24). For this reason, and to 
negate the possibility of contrary effects being produced simultaneously, Aristotle 
states that a rational capacity not only involves the elements of agent and patient, 
but also a desire or choice on the part of the agent that moves him to act 
(1048alO). This necessary desire or choice, in fact, explains why an inference in 
the case of the arts (or of any rational capacity) can be made in one direction only: 
from effect to cause. We may, for example, upon encountering a well-built and 
attractive building, infer the skill of the artist and praise him accordingly. We 
may not, however, upon encountering a builder renowned for excellence, infer 
that he will subsequently produce fine buildings. He might, after all, choose never 
again to exercise his skill as a builder. even though he has both the ability and the 
means to do so. 
In addition, some rational capacities, unlike irrational capacities, are active 
powers whose forms are not embodied in the matter upon which they work 
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(Gen. Corr. 1.7.324b4-5). Now, this is not to suggest that the arts, or any other 
rational capacities, can be thought of as "some sort of disembodied spirits. "86 
Instead, Aristotle is saying that, while the forms of the 'arts exist in matter, they do 
not have the same matter as that upon which they work, and that the agent acts 
without being similarly affected (324a34). For example., both the doctor and 
wine,, Aristotle claims, are healing, but the doctor produces health without being 
acted upon in any way by the thing that is being healed. Conversely, the wine, in 
acting, is itself acted upon (by being heated or cooled or otherwise affected), and 
it corresponds to the last mover (which always imparts motion by being itself 
moved) (324a29-324b4). The art of healing, then, as a first mover, corresponds to 
an origin, and, in its presence, the patient becomes something (i. e. undergoes a 
change or movement that alters it in some way). The ends, however, or that for 
the sake of which the process takes place (in this case, health) are passive, and 
when the state is present (for forms or ends are a kind of state), the patient no 
longer becomes, but already is (324b 13-17). 
Now, if we put rhetoric in tenns of art in general, the orator is the active 
power which, as the origin or cause of the process of making, affects the passive 
object (the hearer) by, first, choosing one contrary over another (i. e. choosing to 
persuade), and then by performing his function as an orator well (i. e. determining 
the persuasive facts in each case, utilizing the appropriate modes of persuasion, 
and successfully persuading his audience). The hearer, if placed in the presence 
of a skilled orator, is moved or changed in some way so that she becomes 
persuaded. The end of this art, persuasion, is external to the listener, but the state 
86 Garver (1989), 20. This portion of my argument has been informed by Garver's treatment of the 
matter/form relationship in rational capacities. 
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of persuasion, if the orator has done his job well, becomes internal to the listener. 
It is, in effect, the product of the art, and praise or blame for this product is given 
to the orator himself Indeed, Aristotle claims that, -Rhetoric is useful because the 
true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that if the decisions of 
judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers 
themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly" (Rh. 1.1.1355a2l-24). Yet. at 
least in deliberative and forensic oratory, in order for this product to be complete, 
persuasion itself must entail more than a general sense of agreement; it must entail 
the accordance of desire and thought necessary to make it a determinate desire, or 
one which moves the hearer to action. Clearly, this scenario poses both 
metaphysical and ethical problems, since the product of oratory is represented by 
the desires, thoughts, and actions of human beings who must, surely, be given 
some degree of responsibility for these same desires, thoughts, and actions. 
This problem is complicated by the implications of considering human 
beings, who have rational capacities and states of their own, as the passive objects 
of an art. Yet,, in Metaphysics 9.5, Aristotle states that "everything which has a 
rational capacity (dunaton kata logon), when it desires that for which it has the 
capability, and in the circumstance in which it has it, must do this. And it has the 
capability when the passive objeCt87 is present and is in a certain state; if not, it 
will not be able to act" (1048al3-16). In order, then, to adequately address the 
issue of responsibility (both of the orator and the listener), we must ask at this 
point: (1) what is implied by considering a human being as the passive object of a 
rational capacity-, (2) what it means for a human being to be in a state conducive to 
87 For purposes of consistency, I am retaining Ross' use of "passive object" for pathetikos, 
although a more literal translation might be rendered "that which admits of being acted upon. " 
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being acted upon; and (3) how the concepts of making (origin in the maker) and 
acting (origin in the agent) can be reconciled when the product of the rhetorical art 
is persuasion and the choice which motivates action on the part of a hearer is 
based, at least in part, upon having been persuaded. The ans\x,, -ers to these 
questions will bear, as well, on the related issues of praise and blame, the 
implications of stating that persuasion is both the end and function of rhetoric, and 
the metaphysical and ethical reasoning behind classifying aretý as a dunamis 
rather than as a hexis within the context of rhetoric as an art. 
2.2.2 
In order for a listener to be the passive ob ect of an art, he must be in a j 
certain state,, or, in the case of rhetoric, he must have the capacity to be moved or 
changed in such a way as to become persuaded. He must have, that is, not only 
the capacity to be in a state of persuasion, but also the capacities that allow him to 
be acted upon, very specifically, by the modes of persuasion utilized by the orator. 
Additionally, he must be capable of being acted upon by the orator to the degree 
that the praise or blame for his subsequent decisions and actions rightfully belongs 
to the orator, even though he has the necessary attributes and rational capacities to 
originate these same movements himself In this, the listener in the art of rhetoric 
is analogous in certain aspects to the patient in the art of healing. For just as the 
patient must be capable of being in a state of health, he must also be capable of 
being acted upon by the healing methods utilized by the doctor to the degree that 
the doctor is either praised or blamed for the subsequent state of his health. 
Indeed, in Metaphysics 5.12. Aristotle implies that the patient must be receptive 
to, or a participant in, the art of healing in a way that is not necessary (or even 
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possible) for the inanimate passive objects of many other arts. Here, he compares 
the art of building, which is a capacity that is not in the thing built, with the art of 
healing, which is a capacity that may be in the person healed, but not in him qua 
healed (1019a15-18). 
It would seem, then, that in order for a human being to be in a "certain 
state, " or one which admits of being acted upon, she must not only have capacities 
that correlate very precisely with the modes and methods of a particular art, but 
she must also be capable of being brought to a state of conviction by the artist. 
All arts, as Aristotle points out in Rhetoric 1.2, can instruct or persuade 
(didaskalW kai peistW) about their own subject-matter, while rhetoric-because 
it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects-must have the 
means to persuade about almost any subject (1355b26-35). But there is a 
difference between being persuaded by a geometrician about the properties of 
magnitudes and being persuaded by a rhetorician to go to war. The former 
involves conviction concerning one's knowledge, while the latter involves 
conviction concerning one's actions. The doctor must often persuade the patient 
to cooperate with painful, inconvenient, or questionable treatments, and the 
rhetorician must persuade the listener to adopt a particular course of action. And 
this, as I discuss below, suggests that the passivity of the listener in the art of 
rhetoric (and, to a lesser degree, the patient in the art of healing) pertains. to one 
degree or another, to choice. However, at this point, it is important to examine the 
process that precedes and promotes the decision, on the part of the listener, to act. 
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2.2.3 
The three types of rhetoric--deliberative (sumbouleutikon). forensic 
(dikanikon), and epideictic (epideiktikon)-are distinguished by their ends and 
audiences,, and each relies,, in varying combinations and to differing degrees. on 
the interrelated modes of persuasion (&hos, pathos, and logos). Deliberative 
oratory is directed to an audience who must decide upon a future course of action, 
and the deliberative orator aims at establishing the expediency (sumpheron) or the 
hannfulness (blaberon) of a proposed course of action. Forensic oratory is 
directed to judges, and it typically aims at establishing guilt or innocence, with 
reference to past events. Epideictic oratory is directed to a general audience, and 
it is, superficially at least, concerned with praise or blame in the present. 
However, praising virtuous acts and censuring vicious ones can serve both to 
reinforce and celebrate traditional values, and to move the audience to admire and 
emulate praiseworthy actions. Thus, epideictic oratory, through its educative and 
ceremonial functions, has the potential-in principle at least-to motivate future 
actions. 88 
Since both deliberative and forensic oratory, and possibly epideictic 
oratory, are concerned with the choices and actions of the audience, the modes of 
persuasion must both presuppose and be capable of acting on the particular human 
capacities that are integral to the deliberative process itself As we can surmise 
from EN 6.2, the deliberative process involves the capacities to believe, to think 
and reason,, to feel the emotions, and to make judgments between opposite or 
contrary conclusions. In addition, it is the deliberative process that results in a 
choice (or determinate desire), and choice is the origin of action in humans 
84 
(I 139b4-5). The modes of persuasion, then, if they are to be effective (i. e. to 
effect a movement or change in the listeners), must either augment or replace, as 
constituents of an"'art, a process that human beings typically engage in, by way of 
their own rational capacities, without any art whatsoever. 
This augmentation or replacement, it would seem, is part of the function 
of rhetoric. In Rhetoric 1.1, for example, Aristotle claims, "It is clear, also, that its 
[rhetoric's] function is not simply to persuade, but rather to discover the 
persuasive facts in each case. In this it resembles all the other arts" (1355b9-12). 
Aristotle immediately clarifies this passage by comparing the art of rhetoric to the 
art of healing, and he implies that, just as it is the function of medicine to promote 
health as far as possible (even when the patient cannot be healed), it is the 
function of rhetoric to promote persuasion as far as possible (by discerning the 
real and apparent means of persuasion) (1355bl2-17). In 1.2, Aristotle 
specifically unites the art of rhetoric with the process of deliberation by stating, 
"The function of rhetoric is to deal with those things about which we deliberate, 
but for which we have no art" (13 5 7a 1 -2). 
In brief, then, we can identify the connection between each mode of 
persuasion and the deliberative faculty it must be capable of moving. For 
example, according to Aristotle, since we believe (pisteuomen) good men more 
fully and more readily than others, the personal character, or &hos, of the orator 
(as it is presented in the speech) may be the most effective means of persuasion 
that he possesses (Rh. 1.2.1356a6-13). Persuasion is also effected through the 
arguments themselves, when an orator has proven a truth or apparent truth through 
logical reasoning, or logos, which is comprehensible to the listener through her 
88 Cf. Sullivan (1993), 11 ' )-33, esp. 114-16. 
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own ability to think and reason. In addition. persuasion may come through the I 
listeners' ability to feel the emotions, when the speech stirs the emotions (pathos) 
and, thereby, influences the judgment of the audience, for as Aristotle points out, 
"the judgments (kriseis) we deliver are not the same when we are pained or happy, 
friendly or hostile" (1356al5-16). Indeed, our emotions are affected by our 
beliefs about both the orator himself and the information he presents, and they can 
both influence our judgments and motivate our actions. Finally, since rhetoric 
draws opposite conclusions, and since the audience must often decide between 
one political speaker and another, the orator, in order to be persuasive, must 
carefully combine the three modes of persuasion. Aristotle states, "Since the 
object of rhetoric is judgment, the orator must not only try to make the argument 
of his speech demonstrative and convincing, but he must also show himself to be 
of a certain character, and put his hearers, who are to judge, into a certain frame of 
mind" (2.1.1377b2O-24). It is clear that the orator, in order to successfully utilize 
the modes of persuasion, "must be capable of logical reasoning, of understanding 
human character and the excellences, and, thirdly, of understanding the emotions, 
that is, the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is 
produced" (1.2.1356a2l-25). 
Here, then, we see that the modes of persuasion have been selected and 
refined by Aristotle in strict accordance with the faculties necessary for 
deliberation, and that rhetoric persuades by affecting, through art, the same 
capacities that would be utilized in the decision-making process without the 
intervention of an art or system of guidance. Up to this point. this account seems 
relatively straightforward and reasonably non-controversial. However. choice, 
which is both the end of deliberation and the origin of action in humans. also 
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requires a moral character, and this brings us to Aristotle's decision to classify 
aretý as a dunamis, rather than as a hexis, in the art of rhetoric. It brings us, as 
well, to vastly more difficult metaphysical and ethical problems. 
2.2.4 
We know from EN 6.2 that the three things in the soul that control action 
are sensation, thought, and desire. Sensation, according to Aristotle, originates no 
action, and the intellect, in and of itself, moves nothing. Instead, choice is 
constituted by the practical intellect (which aims at an end), in combination with 
both desire (which aims at action, i. e. avoidance or pursuit) and a moral character 
(good action and its opposite cannot exist without intellect and character). And 
choice, which is either desiderative thought or intellectual desire, is the efficient 
cause of human action (1139al6-1139b5). In addition, moral excellence in its 
most complete form is a state concemed with choice (hexis prohairetike). 
Human excellence in this most complete or ideal form is distinguished by 
certain characteristics. First excellent actions are undertaken by the phronimos 
not only for the sake of an external end, but for the sake of an internal one as well. 
Excellent actions are undertaken for their own sake, and they proceed from the 
character of an agent who has produced just such a character by repeatedly 
perfon-ning excellent actions (EN 2.1.1103b6-26). Second, excellent actions are 
accompanied by pleasure, or are pleasurable in and of themselves, for excellent 
actions are by nature pleasant and they are in accordance with reason and right 
desire (1.8.1099a5-25). Third, excellent actions are the result of deliberation and 
choice, and it is for our choices that we are either praised or blamed (which is why 
praise and blame are bestowed only on voluntary actions) (3.1.1109b3O-34). Any 
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voluntary action, then, which proceeds from a moral state is attributed to the agent 
himself, and praise or blame is bestowed upon the agent accordingly. Finally, 
since excellent actions proceed from a stable and well-establi shed state of 
character, they are-to some degree at least-predictable. For example, while we 
cannot witness a courageous act and infer that the character of the agent is 
virtuous,, we can infer that a fully virtuous person will act courageously when 
confronted by a fearful or dangerous situation. 
A phronimos, then, who has a settled disposition for choosing, will never 
choose to act viciously, for the ends of a hexis prohairetike are internal to the 
hexis itself, as are the act of choosing and the objects of choice. A hexis 
prohairetike both motivates and enables excellent action, and it is a state of 
character that is well-related to passions and actions, and a state of character that 
is equally well-related to choice. 89 
Choice. ) as a part of a 
hexis prohairetike, and as the deten-ninate desire that 
results from an internal process of deliberation, does not pose the same difficulties 
that arise when it is considered to be part of the product of an art. These 
difficulties become even more considerable in light of Aristotle's discussion of 
choice in EN 3.3. Here, he states that the same object is deliberated upon and is 
chosen, since the object of choice is that which has been decided upon as a result 
of deliberation,, and, as such, it becomes a determinate desire, for everyone ceases 
to inquire how he is to act once a decision has been reached through deliberation, 
and each person then desires in accordance with his deliberation. Within this 
discussion, Aristotle does point out that the inquiry ceases when the moving 
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principle is brought back to the person himself, and to the ruling part of himself. 
for this is what chooses. But this is assuming an internal process of deliberation, 
and it does not take into consideration the complicating factor of an art whose 
product is persuasion (I I 13a3-14). 
2.2.5 
In Rhetoric 1.9, however, Aristotle does not classify aretý as a hexis, but 
as a dunamis, and very specifically as "a capacity (dunamis) of providing and 
preserving good things, and a capacity of conferring many great benefits 
(euergetikO)" (1366a36-1366bl). As I pointed out above, although he does refer 
to arW as a hexis at Rhetoric 1.6, we have every reason to suppose that 
Aristotle's classification of aretý as a dunamis is intentional in this text. In fact, it 
is only when the moral state of a listener is classified as a dunamis, rather than as 
a hexis, that persuasion can meaningfully be called the product of an art. 
A dunamis, unlike a hexis,, is a rational capacity that can produce 
opposites, and, as such, it is not a settled disposition for choosing. Unlike the 
phronimos, who will choose only in accordance with reason and right desire, the 
average person (and Aristotle does make it clear that he expects most audiences to 
be composed of average citizens)90 will often choose in accordance with personal 
advantage. Since it is certainly possible for an average citizen to perceive his own 
advantage as being opposed to, or in conflict with, the advantage of others, it is 
only the listeners' capacity to benefit others that the orator may safely assume, and 
to which he must appeal. For it is the capacity to benefit others to which the 
'9 Cf. Garver (1989) 7-28, esp. 24-5. Here, Garver makes the interesting suggestion that 
prohairetike does not fit comfortably in either virtue's genus or its differentia because it is the 
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orator must appeal if he wishes to persuade the average citizen to choose against 
his perceived personal interest for the sake of others. Indeed. Aristotle spends a 
good deal of time in Rhetoric 6 and 7 uniting the concepts of goodness and utility 
(agathou kai sumpherontos), as they are understood by the general populace. in 
order to instruct a deliberative orator (whose aim is utility). 
The orator, further, must understand that all human beings aim at 
happiness (eudaimonia), or at the real or apparent good, and he must also set 
before his audience an external and intermediate end that is either the most 
expedient way to reach this final end or that appears to be the most expedient-for 
all deliberation is practical and it aims at finding the most expedient means to a 
given end. But a complete understanding of the final end as happiness, 
understood as living well in accordance with excellence and reason, and acting for 
the sake of this end, is itself a part of excellence. As Aristotle argues in Eudemian 
Ethics 3.11, the end is the object of action (for all choice is of something and for 
the sake of some object), and the object of virtuous action is the mean, and it is 
excellence itself which makes this object the aim (1227bl3-1228a7). In other 
words, excellence is the cause of the aim, rather than of the things that contribute 
to this aim, and a person will choose objects that are in accordance with his degree 
of virtue. It is from a person's choices that we judge his character, and either 
praise or censure him, but it is from the object for the sake of which he acts that 
we determine whether or not he has chosen virtuously. And it is only for a limited 
number of people that this choice will be integral to, and determined by, a hexis 
prohairetike. For the others, the average citizens to whom an orator would appeal, 
connection between the two. 
90 See Rh. 1.2.1 357a 1 -5,1357a 10- 14; and 1.1.1354b9-14. 
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the inten-nediate objects and ends would be subject to persuasion. This, as I argue 
below, is made possible by the fact that, for the average person, unlike the 
phronimos, aretO is a dunamis and not a hexis. 91 
2.2.6 
As Aristotle states in EN 2.1, the virtues, or human excellence, neither 
arise in us by nature nor are contrary to human nature; rather, humans are adapted 
by nature to receive them, and they are perfected by habit. By way of one's 
activities throughout life, virtue is both produced and destroyed, and states 
eventually arise out of like activities (I 103al4-1103b25). In other words, 
humans, by nature, have certain dunameis that make them capable of perfonning 
virtuous actions, and it is in this way that humans are adapted by nature to receive 
the virtues. Few people, however, will be habituated by their activities either to 
perfect virtue or to utter wickedness, and they will continue, like a young or 
immature individual,, to be capable of inconsistent or opposite types of behavior. 
Based on Aristotle's metaphysical claims, it is clear that this sort of behavior must 
result from a dunamis rather than from an established hexis. A hexis is incapable 
of producing opposites; so incapable, in fact, that an inference may be made from 
a hexis prohairetike to the types of behavior that will flow from it. 
By claiming that aretý remains a dunamis for the majority of human 
beings, I am not suggesting that vice is produced from virtue. This is an area of 
difficulty, however, for it seems that if aretý is classified as a rational capacity- 
and all rational capacities are capable of producing opposites-then we must 
91 Further, it is this claim that will help us to modify Aristotelian virtue ethics for the 21" Century. 
particularly in light of modem neurobiological advancements. See 3.2. 
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accept the related claim that a capacity for virtuous behavior may also produce 
vicious behavior. Moreover, we cannot solve this problem by classifying aretý as 
an irrational capacity, for in the case of an irrational capacity. the active power 
will automatically and inevitably act upon the passive object whenever the two are 
placed together. Virtue, as we know, does not occur automatically and inevitably 
whenever a person with a capacity for virtue is placed in a situation that admits of 
virtuous behavior. While a flame, for example, when placed in the presence of a 
flammable object, will automatically and inevitably cause it to bum, a capacity for 
virtue must not only have an object on which it can be exercised, but it must be 
accompanied by desire or choice as well. If aretý is classified as a capacity, then, 
it must be classified as a rational capacity. Yet, even the idea that vice could be 
produced by a capacity for virtue seems to contradict everything that Aristotle 
claims concerning virtue itself 
However, Aristotle gives us a way out of this dilemma in Metaphysics 
10.41, by claiming that there are human beings who are neither good nor bad, and 
by arguing that this intermediate state is caused by privation (steresis). Here, 
Aristotle describes a primary contrariety (enanti6sis) as one between state and 
privation, and he states that, in this primary sense, vice is the privation of 
excellence (1055a33; 1055b2O). Yet, he distinguishes between types of 
opposition-contradiction (antiphasis), privation (sterýsis), contrariety 
(enantiWs), and relation (ta pros)-and he states that, if contradiction does not 
admit of an intennediate (metaxu), while contraries sometimes do. then 
contradiction and contrariety are not the same (1055a37-1055b3). 
Aristotle further explains that privation is a kind of contradiction, because 
something which suffers privation (either in general or in some determinate ývay) 
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is either incapable of having some attribute, or, although it has the nature to have 
the attribute, nevertheless does not possess it (1055b3-5). Privation, then, is either 
a contradiction or an incapacity (antiphasis ý adunamia) and it is for this reason 
that, while contradiction does not admit of an intermediate, privation sometimes 
does. All contrariety is a privation, but not all privation is a contrariety (1055bl4- 
15). While, in the former case we simply say that a thing suffers from privation, 
in the latter case we mean that a thing suffers privation at a certain time, or in a 
certain part, or at a certain age (1055b2O-23). This is the reason, according to 
Aristotle, that there are some cases in which there is something in between state 
and privation (humans who are neither good nor bad), and others in which there is 
no intermediate (a number is either even or odd) (1055b23-24). 
Based on Aristotle's claims concerning privation, then, it becomes 
possible to consider a dunamis of virtue, not as a capacity that can produce vice, 
but as a capacity that remains part of a "state'., 92 of character that is neither fully 
virtuous nor entirely wicked. This "state" can admit of greater or lesser degrees of 
privation, at various times and for various reasons, and a person with such a 
'(state" of character is capable of behavior that is neither fully virtuous nor entirely 
vicious. While virtue and vice are contraries (like the equal and the unequal), 
degrees of virtuous behavior involve privation, but not contrariety (like the equal 
and the not equal). In other words, all human beings are adapted by nature to 
receive the virtues, but because virtue is both produced and destroyed by the same 
thing (actions), if a human being does not always act virtuously, then some degree 
of privation will be part of her "state" of character. She will be neither in a state 
92 The terrn "state, " when it appears in quotation marks, is being used in a general sense to signify 
a condition of character, rather than in an Aristotelian sense to signify a settled disposition. 
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of perfect virtue nor in a state of utter wickedness, and she will have a -state- of 
character that admits of both types of behavior. She will retain the dunamis for 
virtue, but she will not arrive at a hexis prohairetike. Human excellence, in its 
most complete form, is identified with a hexis prohairelike. and it is this state of 
virtue that contains its own internal ends, ways of choosing, and objects of choice. 
If vice could be produced from this state of virtue, then we would haN, e a 
metaphysical contradiction. But a dunamis for virtue is simply a capacity for 
virtuous acts; it is not virtue itseýf Therefore, even if we are reduced to claiming 
that the same capacity can produce both virtue and vice, we are not committed to 
accepting the claim that virtue produces vice. 
2.2.7 
It remains to tie these various aspects together into an adequate, if not 
ethically satisfying, explanation of how human choice and action can be 
considered to be the product of an art. In order to do this, however, it is important 
to recall that, for Aristotle, no gap exists between thought and action in either 
theory or practice: an agent makes a choice for reasons, and thought, in the form 
of choice, is the efficient cause of human action. In other words, thought is not 
considered to be motivationally inert, and so nothing (like the concept of the 
human will, perhaps) must be wedged between thought and action in order to 
account adequately for action. On this model, agents perform actions for reasons, 
and, although Aristotle is not suggesting that reasons somehow "mechanically 
determine action, " he is claiming that "an action is performed for its reasons and 
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fbr nothing else; the reasons and nothing else rationalise (i. e. make rational sense 
of) the action. , 
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This being the case, we can move directly from choice to action (the 
reason, of course, why Aristotle places praise and blame on an agent's choices, 
rather than on his actions per se). Moreover, we must note that, in the art of 
rhetoric, both the choice and the object of choice originate with the rhetorician. 
From the perspective of the audience, the natural process of deliberation is 
reversed in this art (and also, at times, in the art of healing): the choice, in the 
form of an external and intermediate end, is made by the rhetorician in advance of 
its defense before the audience. Both the choice and the object of choice are 
contained in the reasons for choosing, and the reasons are (originally, at least) 
internal to the rhetorician. If the listeners accept the reasons, they have also 
accepted the choice. The modes of persuasion, as noted above, have been selected 
and refined to guide the reasoning process of the audience, and to bring the 
listeners to a state of persuasion (or one in which their reasons and choices accord 
with that of the orator). Even when the listeners have to choose between 
opposites, as in the case of forensic oratory or deliberative oratory, which 
proposes opposing courses of action, each choice is set before the audience in 
advance and the reasons for the choice are provided by the orator. The most 
convincing orator, or the one who most adequately guides the reason and emotion 
of the listeners, will-theoretically, at least-prevail. This is not to suggest that 
the members of an audience or jury have somehow lost the ability to reject the 
orator's reasons, choice, or both. If this occurs, however, then the listeners have 
failed to become persuaded, and, while the blame for this failure is assigned to the 
93 Gaskin (1990), 7, italics in original. 
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orator,. the praise or blame for the listeners' subsequent choices belongs to them 
entirely. 94 
In addition, although rhetoricians should aim at truth and justice, according 
to Aristotle, rhetoric is an art that draws opposite conclusions, and so not all 
rhetoricians do aim at truth and justice (Rh. 1.1.1355a22-1555b7). Indeed, it is at 
this point that Aristotle's classification of aretý as a dunamis seems entirely 
appropriate within the context of rhetoric. For a dunamis for virtue, particularly 
one that is primarily a capacity to act on behalf of others, requires merely a "state" 
of character that is neither good nor bad, and it does not require an end that is 
internal to the action itself. In other words, unlike a fully virtuous action that 
flows from a hexis prohairetike, an action that is merely made possible by a 
capacity to benefit others need not contain an internal end (i. e. perfon-ning the 
action for its own sake), but only a determinate desire to benefit others. An orator, 
if confronted by a phronimos, could not "persuade" him to do something that he 
would not have done,, under the same conditions, anyway. The art of rhetoric, in 
order to be successful and to have a meaningful product, is dependent upon an 
audience composed mainly of stereotypes (i. e. the average person) and not of the 
ideal (i. e. the phronimos). 
The dunamis for virtue, then, which is a rational capacity internal to the 
listeners that requires a choice to be set in motion, is supplied with that choice by 
the orator. As they become persuaded, the listeners internalize the choice, the 
94 This is to say that, if a listener fails to become persuaded, then his reasons for choosing 
(whatever subsequent actions he takes) can be said to originate with him, rather than with the 
orator, and the praise or blame for his choices (and actions) belongs to him. The case is more 
complex with a listener who is asked to choose between opposite courses of action. However, if 
the listener rejects both proposed courses of action (i. e. he fails to become persuaded by either 
orator), the praise or blame for his subsequent choices (and actions) belongs to him, since the 
reasons for choosing originate with him. 
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object of choice, and the reasons for choosing for which the orator argues. 
Thereby, choice, or a determinate desire to act, is contained within the internalized 
and completed state of persuasion. All deliberation ends once the agent has 
internalized the rhetorician's choice, and he now desires in accordance with this 
choice. The orator's choice has become a determinate desire on the part of the 
listener, and the orator, as the person who originated the choice, is subject to 
praise or blame. 
Although Aristotle's characterization of persuasion as the product of an art 
poses numerous metaphysical and ethical difficulties, this line of reasoning does 
account for Aristotle's decision to classify aretO as a dunamis in this context. It 
also accounts for his willingness to place praise or blame on the rhetorician for 
actions that flow from a state of persuasion on the part of the listeners. The 
choice, it would appear, is being identified with the rhetorician, and, if this is 
correct, then Aristotle is coming dangerously close to placing the subsequent 
actions of the listeners into the category of the non-voluntary, for voluntary action 
is distinguished by choice on the part of the agent (EN 3.1-2). However ethically 
questionable it might be to assign choice to the rhetorician, this move would have 
been entirely impossible if Aristotle had classified arW as a hexis prohairetike, 
and had, thereby, made choice internal to, and the direct result of, the character of 
the agent himself 
2.3 
If we seriously consider Aristotle's claims in the Rhetoric, and classify 
aretý as a dunamis for the average agent, we arrive at a picture of ethical agents 
that agrees. at least to some extent, with our experience and expectatlons. On this 
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view, human nature has the capacity to admit of both virtue and vice. and. since 
virtue and its opposite are actualized by way of an agent's actions, most agents 
will be habituated to an intermediate "state rather than to a state of either perfect 
virtue or utter wickedness. Such an understanding makes room for both the range 
of ethical behavior that is actually demonstrated by different human beings and 
the fluctuation in ethical behavior that is often demonstrated by a single agent 
over the course of his lifetime. By claiming that human beings have specific 
capacities, and by acknowledging that the development of these capacities is not 
identical in each agent, we are incorporating into our argument the basis for the 
kinds of comparisons and judgments that we actually apply. As soon as we 
identify abilities and capacities that are the same in kind but different in degree 
(i. e. dunameis), or different in kind (i. e. hexeis and dunameis), we have identified 
a situation in which comparison is built into our understanding. Indeed, it is by 
way of just such comparison that we once again encounter the phronimos. 
If we examine the Nicomachean Ethics in light of the Rhetoric, it is 
consistent to argue that the phronimos is being held up by Aristotle as an exemplar 
and role modell rather than as a standard per se. Indeed, it is Aristotle's 
classification of excellence as a dunamis in the Rhetoric, at least for the average 
ethical agent, that helps clarify the role of the phronimos in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Here is the person who has achieved a hexis prohairetike and who is being 
cited as an example of human achievement at its best and most excellent. In order 
for this achievement to be recognized and acknowledged separately from that of W 
the average ethical agent, however, there must be an objective standard by which 
they are both judged. While this standard will be explicated in Chapter 4, we can 
see here that without such a standard, there would be no basis for regarding one 
98 
person as a phronimos with a hexis prohairetike and another as an average agent 
with a dunamis for virtue. Indeed, since the good and the reside in the 
function, the phronimos is recognized as having eminence added in regard to 
excellence. This is to say that while we may admire and attempt to imitate people 
like,, say, Mother Theresa, we neither expect nor demand that all ethical agents 
achieve her level of excellence. Moreover, we comprehend that Mother Theresa's 
level of excellence is praised because it has been judged by an objective standard, 
not because it sets one per se. 
Regardless of the precision and accuracy with which any conceptual ization 
of human nature and human capacities is put forth, however, it is entirely unlikely 
that we will reach a consensus concerning either these notions or their relation to 
the good for humans. This being the case, I wish to stress that only a small 
number of very basic assumptions need to be accepted in order to advance an 
induction-informed normative theory. These assumptions, as I stated earlier in 
regard to human ends,, 95 are advanced as regulating notions, rather than as 
absolute truth, and their status is that of inductive conclusions. In order. ) 
however, 
to work from inductive conclusions concerning both human nature and its relation 
to ethical theory, we need accept, as regulating notions, 96 (1) that reason is a 
distinguishing aspect of human nature; (2) that reason bears on all other distinctly 
human characteristics; (3) that facts about human nature are imbued with values 
(whether or not we agree with the specific values); and (4) that human nature 
admits of both virtue and vice. 
95 See Introduction. 
96 See n. 52. 
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Such regulating notions must be combined with those pertaining to human 
happiness and human ends before their relevance to induction- in formed normative 
theory, as well as their connection to the good for humans, can be fully explicated. 
It is to this task that I turn next. At this point, however, it seems clear that 
inductive conclusions concerning human nature must be incorporated into any 
formulation of ethical theory that purports to take human excellence and the good 
for humans into serious consideration. 
2.4 
Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle both presupposes and 
defends the view that human beings, like all other natural beings and all arts, are 
teleological in nature (i. e. they aim at a specific end that is determined by their 
form and function). On his view, every human action and choice is thought to aim 
at some good, and he identifies the good that is worthy of pursuit for its own sake 
as eudaimonia (1.7.1097a34-1097b6), or as activity of the soul in confon-nity with 
excellence (1098al6-17). That is, humans seek happiness as a complete and self- 
sufficient end., and happiness itself can be understood, very brbadly, as the 
satisfaction of rational desire and the noble performance of human activity. It is, 
in more modem terminology, the activity of living life well and of flourishing as a 
human being. 97 
It is one thing, however, to give an account of the complete end for 
humans in outline fonn; it is another thing entirely to describe the various goods 
that give substance to the concept of eudaimonia. Indeed, Aristotle merek; 
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sketches the human good and reminds us that we should not look for precision in 
all matters alike, but only insofar as the subject-matter allows (1.7.1098a20-29). 
He seems acutely aware of the impossibility of detailing the content of 
eudaimonia,, including all of the possible internal and external goods, as well as 
their various combinations, and he makes no attempt to do so. Instead, he 
discusses such things as the means by which virtuous and vicious behavior can be 
distinguished, the necessary conditions for the formation of a virtuous character, 
and human relationships at their best and worst. He attempts, thereby, to give a 
detailed sense of the kinds of goods that comprise eudaimonia, and of the ways in 
which these goods can be both attained and nurtured. But he falls short-as he 
must-of offering a rigidly formulated description of the content of eudaimonia. 
At this point, I wish to make it clear that, although I will continue to 
differentiate between the formal aspects of eudaimonia, as the end towards which 
all humans move, and the content of eudaimonia, as the goods that are the 
constituents of the end, I am not suggesting that eudaimonia is something over 
and above the goods that comprise it. Eudaimonia, as the activity of living well 
and flourishing, is the aggregate of goods that contribute, in various ways and to 
differing degrees, to such activity. The form and content of eudaimonia can be 
separated in thought in a way that they cannot be separated in fact, for while 
eudaimonia, as the formal end of human action, is not due to the goods that 
comprise it (except by way of analogy with material cause), it does not come to be 
without them. 
97 For an alterriate approach to Aristotelian teleology, see Macintyre (1984). esp. 148,158,162-3, 
175,184,196-7,20 1. While Maclntyre rejects Aristotle's "metaphysical biology. " he argues for 
the retention of a teleological approach, in the form of a "socially teleological" account. 
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For example, in Physics 2.9, Aristotle defines the necessar), in nature as 
matter, the changes in matter. or that which stands as matter in the definition or 
account of a thing (20001-2007). He uses the example of a house and a sa,, N-, 
and he states that while a house is not due to the materials out of which it is built 
(except as its material cause), or a saw to the iron, the house and the saw could not 
come to be without these materials (200a5-14). Both the house and the saw come 
to be for the sake of an end, in this case sheltering and dividing respectively, and 
they are due to the end. The end does not exist because of the matter. but neither 
will the end be realized in the absence of the matter: the house and the saw cannot 
exist at all in the absence of stone and iron, or in the absence of the matter relative 
to the end (200a24-30). Likewise, if the end is to be realized, a particular 
arrangement of the material is necessary. In the case of the saw, for example, it 
must not only be made of iron, but it must also have teeth of a certain kind 
(2004-7). The principle starts with the definition or essence-in nature, artificial 
products, and human beings-but since each thing is of such and such a kind, 
certain other things must necessarily come to be or be in existence already in 
order for the end to be realized (20004-2004). But, we cannot claim that a 
house that has realized its end, or that is giving shelter, is something over and 
above the materials that comprise it. We can separate the fon-nal end of a house 
from the materials that allow the end to be realized in theory only; in fact, the 
house is giving shelter only if it is composed of the necessary materials. 
In like manner, theform of eudaimonia can be separated from the content 
in theory only, but this theoretical distinction is of great importance to the 
formulation of ethical theory. For example, it is one thing to claim that human 
beings seek eudaimonia as their ultimate end, and that they so do from their nature 
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as human beings. It is quite another to claim that eudaimonia can be analyzed into 
the specific constituents and goods of which it is composed, and that it can, 
thereby, provide us with a comprehensive understanding of human happiness. 
Indeed, it is the absence of this distinction between theform and content of 
eudaimonia that seems to have resulted in certain objections against virtue-based 
ethical theory. For example, it is argued that, even if human beings do seek 
eudaimonia by nature, without some general agreement on what the good for 
humans is,, it seems impossible to suggest that the virtuous person will, in all 
circumstances and with utter consistency, act to promote human good. 98 And 
without a shared and specific understanding of the good for humans, and of the 
ends and goals of human action, it seems equally impossible to suggest that a 
virtue-based ethical theory can claim focus and normative force. For, surely, in 
the absence of a shared understanding of the good for humans, both the human 
good and the virtues will be defined in merely subjective or intuitive ten-ns. 
However, it is not the content of eudaimonia that must be included in a 
general agreement on what the good for humans actually is. Such agreement 
would not only be impossible to attain, it would also place unacceptably narrow 
confines on the concept of eudaimonia and, ultimately, on the ethical agents who 
seek it. Instead, it is the form of eudaimonia that would be valuable as a 
regulating noti . on 99 and that would provide a basis for a general or shared 
understanding of the good for humans. Indeed, we are apt to do less damage if we 
conditionally accept the form of eudaimonia as a regulating notion and xve are 
eventually proven wrong in our assumptions concerning human ends, than if we 
98 See Pellegrino (1995), 262-4. 
99 See n. 52. 
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fail to accept it and humans do indeed seek eudaimonia as their ultimate end. For 
an ethical theory that takes the human desire to live 'well and flourish as 
foundational, and that encourages character development and virtuous activity. 
also encourages active engagement on the part of individual agents. It is not the 
sort of ethical theory which, even if based on erroneous assumptions concerning 
human good, can result in stagnation and blind adherence to dogmatically rigid 
principles and guidelines. Yet, if the form of eudaimonia is rejected as a 
regulating notion, and if human beings do indeed seek happiness as their ultimate 
end, the resulting ethical theories are likely to be frustratingly ineffective, beyond 
adequate justification, and ultimately hannful to the human condition. 
At this point, then, we can postulate that the necessary level of general 
agreement concerning the human good pertains to the form of eudaimonia and to 
its relationship to human nature. That is, we need agree only to the notion that 
human beings are inclined by nature to seek happiness as their ultimate end, and 
we must recognize that some values are embedded in the mere ideas of human 
nature and human ends. It is also clear, however,, that we must examine what this 
level of agreement might mean in practical terms and how a general lack of 
agreement concerning the content of eudaimonia would impact an induction- 
informed ethical theory. 
2.5 
While the prescriptive and evaluative elements of induction-in formed 
ethical theory will be discussed in Chapter 4, it is evident that an agreement 
concerning the form of eudaimonia will affect the formulation of general 
principles and singular moral judgments. However, in order to avoid the 
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possibility of content-less moral principles and general guidelines. we must 
examine the implications of an acknowledged lack of agreement concerning the 
content of eudaimonia before we proceed ftirther. 
Although it seems possible to identify (and agree upon) some of the 
various goods that comprise the content of eudaimonia for most people (e. g. 
health,, sufficient financial resources,, companionship, freedom from fear, and so 
forth), the formulation of a comprehensive list of goods is out of the question. As 
stated above, it would not only be impossible to enumerate the goods that 
comprise the content of eudaimonia, along with their various combinations, it 
would be unwise as well. The endless variation in human preferences and 
circumstances precludes any such enumeration and the risk of confining 
eudaimonia to a single conception or description is unacceptably damaging both 
to the concept itself and to the conceptualization of the agents who seek it. 
We will be left, ' then, with some degree of agreement and disagreement 
concerning the content of eudaimonia. For our present purposes, we will ignore 
the necessary degree of agreement concerning the virtues and the degree to which 
we must be capable of defining virtuous behavior. These elements will be 
discussed in the following chapter. Instead, we will confine ourselves here to an 
examination of the implications of the lack of agreement or definition concerning 
the content of eudaimonia, whatever that content might contain or imply. 
It is clear that the lack of one, mutually agreed understanding of the 
content of eudaimonia will impact the formulation of general principles, at least to 
some extent. While we are certainly capable of rendering acceptably accurate 
inductive generalizations concerning human ends and the constituents of those 
ends, these generalizations will be, by their very nature, only broadly suggestixe 
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of the content they might contain or imply. For example, human beings generally 
place a high degree of value upon human life and attempt to incorporate the 
preservation and protection of human life into both their moral principles and civil 
laws. Yet, while a general moral precept of the sort "it is always wrong to take a 
human life,, except in cases of self-defense or in times of war" may be grounded in 
notions of human ends and eudaimonia,, it is unlikely that we will be capable of 
identifying each human good contained in and implied by such a generalization. 
In like manner, although we may reach a general consensus concerning various 
values and their relationship to the form of eudaimonia, and from that consensus 
formulate general principles, it is unlikely that we will reach a similar consensus 
concerning the precise human goods contained in or implied by these shared 
values. 100 
If this is a weakness, however, it is a weakness shared by every ethical 
system that utilizes broad general principles. It is one thing, for instance, to claim 
that all human beings should be treated as ends and never as mere means. It is 
another thing altogether to flesh out the assumptions concerning the dignity of 
human life upon which this principle is based, and still another to suggest that 
there is one, mutually agreed understanding of these assumptions and of their 
relationship to human good (or, for that matter, to right action). In like manner, 
while it might be reasonable to suggest that the goal of moral action is to secure 
the greatest happiness of the largest number of people, it is entirely absurd to 
100 For example. while human life might be a shared value (i. e. preserving and protecting human 
life), it is unlikely that a general consensus concemin,, _,, 
the goods contained in or implied by the 
value could be reached. These goods might include such things as preserving and protecting both 
the quantity and the quality of human life, nurturing human life, respecting the dignity of life, 
appropriate times and means of ending human life, and so forth. Clearly, even if Nýe could reach a 
consensus as to the list of goods contained in or implied by the value (which is unlikelý, ), , N, e would 
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suggest that humans have reached one, mutually agreed upon understanding of 
what constitutes this sort of happiness, either in general or in any given situation. 
All general principles, whether ascertained by deductive reasoning or L- 
arrived at through induction, codify the means to a particular end, and ffieN are 
based on a shared understanding of theform of this end. While there is not a strict 
analogy between the general principles adopted by each ethical system, 
particularly as these principles relate to form, there is a thought-provoking 
similarity. A good utilitarian, for instance, is guided by an understanding of the 
form of human happiness, particularly as it relates to securing the happiness of the 
greatest number of people, rather than by an ability to enumerate the content of 
this happiness. Likewise, a good Kantian is guided by an understanding of the 
form of duty, not by an ability to enumerate every act and attitude that constitutes 
an adherence to duty. Adhering to duty is not something over and above the 
attitudes and actions of the Kantian agent, any more than eudaimonia is something 
over and above the goods that comprise it. Yet, just as inductive moral principles 
must be formulated in accordance with an understanding of the form of 
eudaimonia, moral principles that codify notions of duty must be formulated in 
accordance with an understanding of theform of duty, or that at which the Kantian 
agent must aim in order to act in a moral fashion. 
In an induction-informed ethical system, however, there is a strength that 
is not shared by either utilitarian or Kantian ethical approaches. The general 
moral principles utilized by an inducti on- informed ethical system are adopted on 
the basis of their strength as inductive conclusions and retained just so long as the 
surely fail to reach a consensus on what each good on the 
list entailed or implied. See 4.3 for a 
discussion of moral values. 
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effects of upholding such principles accord with our experience, our beliefs about 
the world, and our overall intentions. They never attain the status of inviolable 
moral precepts. As the content of eudaimonia is broadened or altered, perhaps by 
advancements in psychology, medicine, social and political theory, and so forth, 
the general principles that imply or contain such content can be suitably altered, 
differently understood, or entirely overhauled. For example, ideas of human 
flourishing and well-being, when applied to women, are significantly different 
today than they were even fifty years ago. Thus, general principles that are 
formulated to protect, preserve, or nourish human life must be as applicable to 
females as they are to males, and this would certainly require a revision of certain 
principles, a rejection of others, and a revised understanding of still others. Ben 
if we cannot enumerate each good that comprises eudaimonia for females, we can 
make significant and appropriate adjustments to the broad general principles that 
we look to for moral guidance. 
We find a more significant manifestation of a general lack of agreement 
concerning the content of eudaimonia in the formulation of singular moral 
judgments than we do in the formulation of general moral guidelines. It is here, if 
anywhere, that objections concerning subjectivity and intuitiveness become 
problematic for induction-informed moral theory. However, these objections can 
also be leveled at deduction-based moral theories since, in the real world, it is 
particular persons in concrete situations who make the final decisions on what it 
means to act in accordance with, say, either utility or duty. 
For example, if deliberating upon and choosing an action that will increase 
the ability of another person or group of persons to live Nýell and flourish is 
subjective or intuitive to some degree, then 
deliberating upon and choosing an 
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action that will increase the happiness of the largest number of people is 
subjective or intuitive to the same (or, possibly. a larger) degree. The content of 
eudaimonia, as this content might be perceived by another, is no less possible to 
ascertain than some sort of collective view of happiness-or worse. the individual 
views of happiness held by numerous persons within a designated group. Again. 
even the most stringent Kantian must make a subjective decision as to the 
requirements of duty in a given situation, taking into consideration the particular 
circumstances and the given individuals who will be affected by such a decision. 
Because it is human beings that make singular moral judgments, it is impossible to 
eliminate all subjective or intuitive aspects from the decision-making process, 
regardless of the underlying ethical framework. Moreover, as I will argue in 
Chapter 4, partiality is not only inherent to ethical decision-making. it can be 
understood as a strength rather than as a weakness as well. 
The claim, then, that virtue ethics, or in this case induction-informed virtue 
ethics, places too great a burden on individual agents to ascertain the human good 
with precision and regularity poses more of a theoretical difficulty than it does a 
practical one. It is certainly true that individual agents will occasionally err in 
their estimation of how a particular action NA-ill impact their own well-being or the 
well-being of others. It is equally true that they might be entirely unable to 
explicate the content of eudaimonia in either their own case or the case of others. 
However, it is fantastic to claim that either a lack of general agreement concerning 
the content of eudaimonia or a lack of complete individual knowledge will 
paralyze moral agents or leave them incapable of making reasonably precise and 
regular moral judgments. Evei-y moral agent ý, vill be just as equipped to make 
singular moral judgments. i-c(-, ardless of the moral system to which she adheres. as 
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her habituation, education, level of involvement with others. previous InductIve 
conclusions, and so forth have left her. Indeed, each individual agent will 
continue to acquire information, and to adjust her previous conclusions 
accordingly, throughout her lifetime. 
In addition,, while a complete description of human good might be 
impossible to ascertain, and while ideas of human good may be continuously in 
flux,, humans beings simply do have notions of happiness and of a life well lived 
at any given time. Moreover, no socialized adult will face a moral dilemma that is 
so far removed from human experience that it is either entirely unique or exists in 
isolation. Even advancements in technology, such as the invention of weapons of 
mass human destruction, do not pose moral dilemmas that extend beyond 
reasoning concerning the value of human life, the concept of an enemy, ideas of 
nationalism, notions of self-protection, and so forth. Indeed, it is just such 
advancements that highlight the need for adequately flexible moral guidelines and 
informed singular judgments. We require enlightened inductive conclusions and 
contemporary empirical evidence if we are to deal adequately with the effects of 
such issues as modem warfare, the reproductive rights of women, human cloning, 
and so forth on human happiness. 
Even with all of the above in mind. it is correct to claim that the lack of 
general agreement concerning the content of eudaimonia will result in questions 
concerning the acceptability of particular singular moral judgments. For this 
reason, and because a normative ethical theory must incorporate standards for 
prescribing (or recommending) and evaluating singular moral judgments, I intend 
to suggest guidelines for what might count as evidence for the acceptability of 
singular moral judgments. This section xvill be necessarily incomplete. as it is 
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merely a preface to the thorough discussion of prescriptive and evaluative 
elements that will follow in Chapter 4. 
2.6 
At this point, I will be examining what might count as evidence for the 
acceptability of singular moral judgments as those judgments accord with and 
bear on the idea of human ends. In other words,, if we are to take the idea of 
eudaimonia seriously, at least as a regulating notion, then we must examine 
singular moral judgments in the light of their contribution to, and advancement of, 
such ends. Clearly, singular moral judgments must be made with particular 
perceptions of the content of eudaimonia in mind, as well as the form, since they 
are made by particular persons in specific situations. Also, if singular moral 
judgments are to be considered acceptable, they should promote, enhance, or 
honor the ultimate end. 
suggest that there are four conditions that would have to be met by a 
singular moral judgment in order for that judgment to be considered acceptable. 
Each of these conditions would count as evidence for the acceptability of a 
singular moral judgment and each would be weighted equally in theory. In 
practice, of course, in order to resolve a dispute concerning the acceptability of 
singular moral judgments, one condition might necessarily be given more 
consideration than another in particular situations. The four conditions, then, that 
would count as evidence are as follows: (1) accordance with accepted general 
principles or general guidelines01; (2) accurate identification and comprehension 
of the relevant specific facts, (3) informed application of accepted general 
principles or general guidelines (i. e. informed by specific facts); and (4) 
consideration of human nature, as that nature pertains to human ends. I xvill 
discuss each condition below. 
The first condition, accordance with accepted general principles or 
guidelines, is fairly straightforward. In an induction-informed normative theory. 
general guidelines would never be more than hypothetical conclusions, but as 
guidelines, they would be of value in recommending and evaluating moral 
behavior. Regardless of the degree of alteration and revision that general 
guidelines might experience through time, at any given moment there will be a set 
of accepted (i. e. generally accepted within a given society) general guidelines by 
which the acceptability of a singular moral judgment may be assessed. 
For example, let us say that we have an accepted general guideline of the 
sort "it is always wrong to take a human life, except in self-defense or times of 
war. " In this case, a particular act of killing, and the singular moral judgment that 
is presented in explanation or defense of this killing, must be evaluated in light of 
this accepted general guideline. It is certainly true that all four conditions must be 
examined before the acceptability, or lack thereof, of the singular moral judgment 
can be ascertained, particularly given the relevance of specific facts to the 
morality of an action, at least on this view. But it is unlikely that a singular moral 
judgment that flies in the face of accepted general guidelines will be susceptible of 
justification. 
101 The precise distinction between general principles and general guidelines will be explained in 
3. For our present purposes, the temis "general principles" and "general guidelines" may be 43 
11? 
The main problem here seems to be one of circularity. For example, 
general guidelines are justified on the basis of inductive arguments from singular 
moral judgments, and singular moral judgments are found to be acceptable, at 
least in part, by their accordance with accepted general guidelines. On this 
presentation, it seems to follow that we have no basis for utilizing accepted 
general principles in our evaluation of singular moral judgments, at least without 
invoking objections of circularity. 
The objection is interesting, but it is an oversimplification both of the 
actual fon-nulation of accepted general guidelines and of their use. General 
guidelines are certainly justified on the basis of inductive arguments from singular 
moral judgments, but they are justified only if they uphold the same value or 
values that underlie the singular moral judgments from which they are induced. 
For example, if the above general guideline, "it is always wrong to take a human 
life, except in self-defense or times of war, " has been found acceptable, it is 
because some value' 02 pertaining to human life underlies the numerous singular 
moral judgments from which the general rule has been induced. It is this value, 
which has been manifested in the singular moral judgments, that is represented by 
the general guideline. It is the acceptance of this same value that justifies our 
examination of singular moral judgments in light of general principles. If the 
value itself is revised or rejected, clearly there will be tension between singular 
moral judgments and general principles, at least for a time. This tension,, 
however , is a necessary 
factor in the evolution of moral thought. 
used interchangeably. 
102 1 have discussed the values embedded in human nature in 2.1, and a discussion of the "origin" 
of values appears in 4.3. 
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The second condition, accurate identification and comprehension of the 
relevant specific facts, is related to the Aristotelian conceptualization of action, 
namely, that action pertains to the particulars and is the result of deliberation and 
choice. In ethical decision-making, humans deliberate about, and make choices 
based upon, the agreement or tension between the relevant particulars and general 
guidelines. It is one thing, for example, to hold the general principle that 
euthanasia is murder and is,, therefore, ethically blameworthy, particularly if one 
has never faced the application of theory. It is another thing altogether to watch 
the slow, tortuous death of a parent and to feel the tension between the particular 
facts and the general guideline. We would be apt, in such a situation, to find the 
daughter who administers a lethal dose of morphine to her dying mother less 
morally blameworthy than a person who administers a lethal dose of poison to a 
healthy stranger. Regardless of moral culpability, however, it is the relevant 
particulars that will prompt the daughter to act, in one fashion or another, for it is 
the relevant particulars that bring about a situation in which action is necessary. 
Also, particular facts and concrete situations form the basis for the 
conclusions that will be manifested as singular moral judgments and, eventually 
perhaps, codified into general guidelines. It is, to continue the above example, 
reasoning pertaining to the value of human life that has led to the legalization of 
euthanasia in various nations. While the underlying value, in this case the value 
of human life, might remain intact, an altered understanding of the implications 
and responsibilities of holding such a value will necessarily affect both singular 
moral judgments and general guidelines. Indeed, ethical advancements, or at least 
ethical developments, are possible only when inductive conclusions concerning 
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both relevant particulars and accepted general guidelines are given adequate 
ethical status. 
The third condition, infon-ned application of accepted general principles or 
general guidelines (i. e. informed by specific facts), is not, as might appear on first 
blush, a mere synthesis of the first two conditions. The first two conditions may 
be necessary prerequisites to the application of this condition, however, since an 
agent must have knowledge of both the accepted general guidelines and the 
relevant particulars in order to accomplish this condition. Yet, in a strict sense, 
while it counts as evidence for the acceptability of a singular moral judgment that 
the judgment accords with accepted general guidelines, there may be 
contradictory general guidelines or concerns pertaining to the appropriateness of 
applying one guideline over another, particularly in a hierarchy of guidelines. 
Then, too, while it counts as evidence for the acceptability of a singular moral 
judgment that the agent has identified and comprehended the relevant particulars, 
the relationship of those particulars to the general guideline might be obscure or 
questionable. 
While this condition cannot eliminate the above possibilities, it can serve 
as a means of clarification and dispute resolution. For example, using the case of 
euthanasia mentioned above, the daughter who administers a lethal dose of 
morphine to her dying mother cannot adequately justify her decision by presenting 
evidence that she adhered to conditions one and two. Her singular moral 
judgment is not thoroughly explained or defended by claiming that, for instance, 
(1) she abided by a general guideline that states that murder is wrong, and (2) she 
accurately identified and comprehended the fact that her mother was dying a slow, 
tortuous death. Her singular moral judgment must also show evidence of the 
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application of an informed general guideline, such that her choice, emendation. or 
rejection of a general guideline becomes evident from the introduction of relex-ant 
particulars. In the above case, for example, the daughter might claim that the 
death cannot be classified as murder, or that the general guideline was instituted to 
preserve life rather than to protract death, or that the value codified in the general 
guideline was upheld in an entirely different manner altogether. Regardless of 
whether the daughter's singular moral judgment is found to be acceptable or 
unacceptable in the end, the evidence on which such a decision must be made is 
clarified and made vastly more complete by an examination of exactly how a 
general principle is informed by the relevant particulars and subsequently applied. 
Finally, the fourth condition, consideration of human nature, as that nature 
pertains to human ends, does not require a higher degree in either human 
psychology or sociology. In a primary sense, it is the requirement that singular 
moral judgments, in order to be considered acceptable, be made in accordance 
with the form of eudaimonia. This is to say that acceptable singular moral 
judgments must promote, enhance, or honor the ultimate end for human beings, 
understood as a regulating notion. 
In a secondary or subordinate sense, the content of eudaimonia will come 
into play here as well as the form. for it will generally be the content of 
eudaimonia, as constituents of the end, that is altered or impacted in some way by 
the practical application of a singular moral judgment. Indeed, it is the content of 
eudaimonia, or the goods that constitute a life well lived, that will be chosen 
between, adopted, or abandoned in the practice of carrying out a moral decision 
that aims at the form of euddimonia. Moreover, it is the content of eudaimonia 
that is more likely than the form to present opportunity for error and 
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miscalculation, for even if an agent attempts to promote. enhance, or honor the 
ultimate end, it is certainly possible to err in calculations concerning the 
consequences of a particular judgment or action. 
For this reason, it is consideration of human nature as it pertains to human 
ends that counts as evidence for the acceptability of singular moral judgments. If 
a singular moral judgment can be reasonably expected to increase the human 
good, or to increase the ability of the agent to live well and flourish, then this 
reasonable expectation must count as evidence. It is neither perfect consistency in 
identifying the human good nor utter regularity in increasing the human good that 
is expected of moral agents. Instead, it is an eye to the end that must be 
demonstrated by an agent's singular moral judgments. 
However carefully one attempts to leave questions of agent motivation, 
habituation!, education, and so forth out of this condition, it is clear that 
elimination of these aspects will be virtually impossible. In any evaluation of a 
singular moral judgment that might reasonably be expected to have varying 
consequences, the obvious initial question would be: "What did the agent intend? " 
And perhaps this is how it should be. The character of an agent is the basis from 
which moral decisions proceed and, for this reason alone, it seems an oversight to 
attempt to eliminate the significance of character from moral theory and ethical 
evaluation. 
In order to adequately examine character, however, we must first examine 
virtue and vice, habituation and education, and the relationship between virtue and 
human nature. It is to this task that I turn next. For now, it must suffice to say 
that human character will remain an aspect of condition four, at least to some 
degree and to varyino extents. depending upon particular circumstances. L- 
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Certainly. singular moral judgments can be evaluated in isolation and. just as 
certainly, they will have characteristics that serve to demonstrate the end towards 
which they aim. However, it is naYve to suggest that the character of the agent 
will never enter into an evaluation of whether a singular moral judgment shoxN-s 
consideration of human nature, as this nature pertains to human ends. Even the 
word consideration belies this claim. For this reason. ) we turn now to 
human 
virtue. 
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Chapter 3 
Virtue 
3.1 
On an Aristotelian view, although moral agents, right passions and actions, 
and the human good can all be described in terms of aretý., the relationship 
between them poses certain tensions. For example, while the movement of human 
beings towards their natural end is accomplished by way of excellence, excellence 
does not arise in human beings by nature. Indeed, although all human beings aim 
at eudaimonia, or at activity of the soul in accordance with excellence, only those 
persons who are habituated to excellence, and who choose and act in accordance 
with excellence,, will achieve eudaimonia. Such a scenario seems to suggest that a 
large number of human beings will never attain eudaimonia and, indeed, a group 
of objections centers on both the internal and external difficulties supposedly 
inherent to virtue-based ethics. ' 03 Such difficulties, it is argued, call into question 
the feasibility of utilizing an Aristotelian framework for general moral theory. 
For example, as stated in the Introduction, Pellegrino argues that, in the 
face of moral and practical luck, genetics, environment, fortune, and the like, 
expecting human beings to sustain an internal adherence to, and an understanding 
of. excellence is both unrealistic and unfair. 104 Humans are neither created equal, 
at least in their genetic predispositions, nor subject to equal environmental forces 
and pressures (e. g. luck, advantage, disadvantage, etc. ), and they cannot be 
expected to have an equal opportunity to achieve excellence. It is vastly more 
103 See Introduction. Also see Pellegrino (1995), 253-277. 
104 Pellegrino (1995), 2633. 
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realistic and fair. so runs the objection, to demand adherence to a system of rules, 
maxims, and directives-that need not be entirely understood in order to be 
consistently followed-than it is to assume that each and every human being is 
equally capable of comprehending and possessing virtue. and of acting in 
accordance with excellence at all times and under all circumstances. 
However, I intend to argue that an Aristotelian model, as supported and 
enhanced by modem neurobiological advancements, provides a framework for 
moral theory that is superior to systems of rules, maxims, or directives. Indeed, 
once a neurobiological perspective is advanced, I intend to suggest that, if the 
expectations placed on human beings by a moral theory are to be realistic and fair, 
such expectations must accord with the development of human character. Further, 
I intend to argue that, because systems of rules, maxims, and directives fail to 
adequately account for important aspects of human character, they are inadequate 
for guiding human behavior. Finally, I intend to explicate and define the moral 
virtues in tenns of both human character development and the end for humans, 
and show their place in induction- informed normative theory. 
In order to make this sustained argument, I discuss various aspects of 
Aristotelian theory, both individually and in relationship to one another, which 
cannot be fully integrated until the final section of this chapter. I begin with 
Aristotle, and with a discussion of arW and its relationship to activity, external 
advantages and disadvantages, and achieving eudaimonia. In 3.2,1 discuss the 
relationship of aretý to human character development, habituation, and 
neurobiology. Finally, prior to offering a definition of the moral virtues in 3.6,1 
discuss emotion in 3.3 and 3.4. 
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In EN 1, Aristotle characterizes the good life for human beings as 
eudaimonia and he further characterizes eudaimonia as excellence of the soul. 
Human good is activity of the soul in conformity with excellence (7.1098al5-17) 
and human happiness is loosely defined as living well and faring well (8.1098b2O- 
22), with the understanding that the "well" here indicates eminence in respect of 
excellence. In all cases,, the emphasis is on activity, and the person who acquires 
happiness will be the one who acts and acts well, for, as Aristotle states, it is not 
the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned at the Olympic Games. but 
those who compete (8.1099a3-4). 
Indeed, Aristotle emphasizes that it makes no small difference whether we 
place the chief good in the possession (Wsis) or use (cWsis) of excellence, in the 
state (hexis) or the activity (energeia), since it is quite possible for the state to 
exist without producing any good results (8.109032-10990). A person who 
possesses excellence, but who is either asleep or entirely inactive (as, for example, 
a virtuous Rip Van Winkle or Sleeping Beauty), has no opportunity to act in a fine 
or noble manner, or to achieve eudaimonia. Eudaimonia itself is an activity, a 
way of choosing and acting, and while it depends upon the possession of 
excellence, it is actualized by excellent activity. 
This focus on activity can be understood in several interrelated ways. 
First, it would seem strange indeed if the good life for human beings was a life 
devoid of pleasure, and Aristotle argues that excellent activity is pleasant in itself, 
or pleasant by nature, and that the person who acts virtuously is without need of 
adventitious pleasures (1.8.1099a5-16). On this view, because each person finds 
pleasure in those things and activities that he loves, the lovers of excellence find 
pleasure not only in fine and noble actions. but also in their own nature and their 
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own lives. This kind of pleasure is an inherent aspect of excellent action and. for 
those who live in accordance with excellence, there is no need for additional, 
perhaps fleeting, pleasures. In contrast, without excellence. pleasures may 
conflict and result in regrets or self-recriminations, and while these sorts of 
pleasures may fulfill a specific desire at a specific time, they are not pleasant by 
nature. 
Second,, Aristotle claims that activity is necessary to eudaimonia in that it 
would be impossible to call any person good who did not participate and rejoice in 
excellent actions (1.8.1099al6-21). On what grounds, for example, would we 
label a person just if he failed to act justly, found no enjoyment in his own just 
actions, or failed to celebrate the just actions of others? On this view, it is not 
enough to say that one is a lover of justice; in order to be considered just,, one 
must enjoy acting justly. While it might seem that adding the condition of 
enjoyment to an excellent act is an unnecessary or unrealistic burden, Aristotle 
seems to be suggesting that the pleasure that supervenes upon an action appears to 
differentiate between internal and external motivation. For example, if a man 
happens to be a skilled pianist, but detests playing, avoids practice, and finds no 
enjoyment in music, and only plays to satisfy the desires of an external audience, 
we would be hard pressed to call him a lover of music. Pleasure seems to 
accompany the actions of those people who have internalized excellence and who 
act in accordance with this internal state. 
Finally, we find a link to Aristotle's focus on habituation and, although 
this topic will be discussed more thoroughly below, 
"' it is important to note here 
that the average citizen, or one who is neither entirely virtuous nor entirely 
I -)-) 
wicked, will continue to develop excellence only through excellent actions. The 
potential for excellence is actualized only through excellent action and, for the 
person with a capacity for virtue, the gradual movement towards the end, or 
towards eudaimonia,, ceases at the place where activity ceases. For the 
phronimos, or the person with a hexis prohairetike, the voluntary cessation of 
excellent activity would be a contradiction in terms. 
However, Aristotle is not blind to the fact that excellent action requires 
certain external goods and opportunities, as well as personal virtue. Indeed, he 
goes so far as to say that ugliness, poor birth, thoroughly bad children or friends, 
or the loss of good children or friends by death can mar happiness (1.9.1099b 1 -6) 
and, hence,, excellence. It is clear that external goods-whether in the form of 
prosperity, propitious placement and timing, and so forth-are important as 
instruments and equipment. In like manner, bodily goods, such as health and 
physical strength, might be equally necessary for both excellent action and a full- 
fledged enjoyment of life. 
This situation is not unique to Aristotelian virtue ethics, however, for 
while it is true that acting in accordance with excellence may require the presence 
of external goods, it is equally true that acting in accordance with either utility or 
duty may require external goods to a commensurate degree. Indeed, it would be 
highly questionable to assume that while poverty, illness, or lack of advantage 
might hinder an Aristotelian agent from accomplishing virtuous actions, these 
same external circumstances would have little or no bearing on the ability of a 
utilitarian or Kantian agent to carry out ethical actions. 
105 See 3.21. 
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For example, if an act of financial generosity accords with utility or dutv 
or excellence, then the respective agents must possess the necessary financial 
resources to carry out the act. In such a case, action requires appropriate 
motivation and deliberation, a choice, and external resources. Indeed, the external 
resources of the agents would enter into both their deliberation and their choice, 
regardless of whether they are utilitarians, Kantians, or Aristotelians. It would be 
unreasonable to claim that while external goods play a disturbing or unsatisfactory 
role in Aristotelian virtue ethics, at least insofar as they pertain to action, they play 
no such role in either utilitarianism or deontological theories. 
Aristotle sets his discussion of external goods within a context, however, 
that shifts the focus from actions to agents, and the point to which he continuously 
returns is whether, or to what degree, external circumstances impact the agent 
himself, rather than merely the ability of the agent to perform virtuous actions. 106 
This shift, ' 
it seems, is intended to moderate the potential impact of disadvantage 
or misfortune on a person's ability to achieve or maintain excellence and 
eudaimonia. While Aristotle highlights the steadfast nature of excellent agents, he 
also suggests that persons of developing character can achieve excellence without 
unusual advantage. 107 For example, he points out that while certain external 
goods are necessary and others are naturally useftil as instruments, (1.9.1099b26- 
28), all people who are not maimed as regards excellence' 08 may achieve it 
106 See, especially, EN 1.10.11 OOa3 1 -1101 a2 1. 
107 See 3.2 for extended treatment of becoming excellent in the first place. Becoming excellent, it 
might be argued, may be considerably more a matter of contingency than remaining excellent in 
the face of misfortune. 
108 The phrase "maimed as regards excellence, " or pep&6menois pros aretM, is open to some 
question as it concerns habituation. It is one thing, for example, to claim that someone is 
incapacitated as regards excellence by reason of a mental or physical defect. It is another to claim 
that someone is incapacitated as regards excellence by the negative circumstances into which s 'he 
is born or is raised. Both aspects will be discussed below. See 3.2. 
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through study and care (1099bl8-19). The emphasis here is on the idea that 
human beings have the capacity for excellence and the opportunity for happiness 
even if they are not provided with every external good or advantage. Aristotle 
wishes to avoid the notion that excellence and eudaimonia are arrived at by 
chance or contingent upon chance. Moreover, he argues against the idea that, 
once achieved, excellence and eudaimonia are subject to the slightest turns of 
fortune. In fact, it is the person of excellence who is most capable of maintaining 
his happiness through misfortune and of recovering from life's ordinary 
misadventures. On Aristotle's view, it takes many great misfortunes to deprive an 
excellent person of eudaimonia and, even under such miserable circumstances, 
such a person will not act in the kind of hateful or mean fashion that would make 
him a miserable human being (1.10.11 OOb22-1 I 01al. 3). 
Here, Aristotle is suggesting that a person of developed and excellent 
character will have both the motivation and the ability to act with dignity and 
virtue in difficult and challenging circumstances. He will have the attributes that 
are necessary, both in isolation (in theory, at least) and in combination, to cope 
with and survive the vicissitudes of fate. For example, even under ordinary 
circumstances, a mother who is without internal excellence will be incapable of 
exercising the courage, care, practical judgment, honesty, and so forth that are 
necessary to successfully shelter, raise, and educate a child. Once extraordinarily 
difficult circumstances are added, or even a succession of moderate 
misadventures, it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine that such a mother will 
not only act in a consistently excellent manner, but will also maintain her personal 
sense of well-being. Indeed, on this view, excellent motivation and action, as well 
as personal happiness. proceed directly from excellence of character. 
12 5 
This view accords, at least indirectly, with both our experience and our 
ideas of what might be required to adhere to any ethical theory. For example, in 
order for an adult utilitarian to abide by the Greatest Happiness Principle. she 
must have developed certain interrelated attitudes and abilities. First. she must be 
motivated to increase the general happiness, even if her own happiness may be 
compromised in the process. Second, she must have the practical judgment 
necessary to ascertain, with some degree of precision, the constituents of this 
general happiness and the means of accomplishing them. Finally, she must have 
the capacity to act in such a way as to increase the likelihood of her intended 
effects and consequences. In other words, the desire to live in accordance with the 
tenets of utilitarianism and the ability to act in accordance with them would 
proceed from a firm and excellent character. It seems unlikely at best that an 
entirely wicked person, or even one with a weak and inconsistent character, would 
steadfastly approach her own happiness and that of others "as strictly impartial as 
a disinterested and benevolent spectator. " 
109 
In like manner,, it would be difficult to say, in practical terms, exactly what 
it might mean for a person without virtue or excellence of character to be 
motivated by duty, or to act in accordance with a good will, or to act in such a 
manner that his maxims could become universal principles of action. Without 
some recognition of the importance of character development, identifying what 
this person might draw upon for motivation and constancy of action seems 
entirely open to speculation. 
It is one thing to discuss the importance of human character development, 
however, and another thing entirely to argue for a particular theory of moral 
109 Mill, in Cahn (1999), 898. 
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development. Indeed, Aristotle both supports his position on moral de-velopment 
and opens it to criticism by arguing that moral virtue is achieved through 
habituation. For example, on Aristotle's view, if a person is not maimed as 
regards excellence, he has every hope of becoming habituated to excellence and of 
achieving eudaimonia. He must, of course, have access to some external goods as 
instruments and he must be raised, educated,, or influenced by virtuous human 
beings. Through the process of habituation, his potential for virtue is gradually 
actualized and, as he becomes more virtuous, he has an ever-increasing ability to 
withstand the vicissitudes of fate. Yet, a person who has no opportunity to be 
habituated to virtue-through circumstances of birth, a complete lack of external 
goods, or great misfortune that precedes the actualization of his potential-seems 
to have no opportunity for moral excellence or eudaimonia. This being the case, 
we must examine habituation and its relationship to excellence, external goods, 
and chance. Moreover, we must examine Aristotle's notions of habituation in 
light of modem neurobiology, both to ftirther support an Aristotelian framework 
for induction-informed normative theory and to argue for a modem definition of 
the moral virtues. 
3.2 
As we know from EN 2.19 moral excellence does not arise in human 
beings by nature, for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its 
nature (I 103a2O-21), and human beings are certainly capable of forming morally 
vicious habits. In contrast, sense perception does exist in human beings by nature 
and may be recognized as such by the characteristics of the sense organs. For 
example, an eye, which is by nature an organ of sight, cannot be trained to become 
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an organ of, say, hearing, however persistent the training, since hearing is contrarN, 
to the nature of an eye. Moreover, the senses do not arise by way of activity (i. e. 
it is not by often seeing or often hearing that we acquire these senses). but the 
activity of perception proceeds from a preexisting capacity to perceive (I 103a26- 
30). Except in the case of damage, disease. or defect of the sense organs, humans 
have the faculty of sensation at birth (Met. 1.1.980a27-29), by nature and prior to 
exhibiting the activity of perception. 
The situation is more complex in the case of the excellences, however, 
than it is with the faculty of sensation. Although excellence does not exist in 
humans by nature, we are adapted by nature to receive it and we are perfected by 
habit. We have the capacity for moral excellence and it is by way of our actions 
that excellence is both produced and destroyed (EN 2.1.1103b7-8). One must play 
the lyre, for example, to become either a good or bad lyre-player and one must act 
in a just manner to become a just person, or in a brave manner to become a 
courageous person. While we have sensation before we exercise it, we acquire the 
excellences by first exercising them, just as we acquire the arts. 
In like manner, we acquire viciousness by first exercising vicious activity. 
The human capacity for virtue is a rational capacity, susceptible of producing 
opposites, "O and the fact that human beings possess a rational capacity for 
excellence implies that we are equally adapted by nature to receive both the 
virtues and the vices. This understanding, of course, eliminates the possibility of 
categorizing vice only as a privation of excellence, or as something that results 
from either the destruction of virtue or from failing to have virtue at the time and 
age at which one would naturally have it (Met. 5.22.1022b22-3 2). Such a 
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categorization would rest, first, on the notion that human beings have a stock of 
excellence, as a natural attribute, that can be damaged or destroyed, and Aristotle 
emphatically argues that excellence does not exist by nature. Thus, while it is 
certainly the case that wicked activity can weaken or destroy the excellence that 
one has acquired through virtuous activity, particularly if that excellence is 
incompletely or poorly developed, it is not the case that viciousness arises onh, as 
a privation of existing excellence. Instead, we are also adapted by nature to 
receive vice and we are "perfected" by habit. 
All of this underscores Aristotle's focus on habituation and excellent 
action. If a person has the capacity for excellence and its opposite, then that 
person will actualize the potential for these opposites and their intermediary by 
way of activity. The main thrust of this argument is that all "normal" human 
beings will be actualized to something by way of their actions. Habituation 
determines what that something will be-excellence, wickedness, or an 
intermediate-and provides us with a means by which to influence the moral 
development of individual agents. A child, for example, who is taught not to 
steal., will initially refrain from stealing only for reasons of external sanctions. 
Eventually, with proper study and influence, along with actions that comply with 
the sanctions, he will come to comprehend and internalize the abstract values (e. g. 
respecting the property of others) that ground the concrete actions. At this point, 
he will begin to consistently act from internal values rather than external 
sanctions, and he can be said to have actualized his potential for excellence in this 
particular area. If, however, he fails to fully comprehend the implications of the 
value, or fully abstract from individual concrete instances, his potential will not be 
110 See 2.2.6. 
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entirely actualized and he will remain in an interinediate state. While he say, 
shrink from burglarizing a home, he might cheat on his taxes or pad an otherwise 
legitimate insurance claim. 
This picture of moral development, as a slow process of gradual 
habituation to a particular state of character, is supported by modem cognitive 
neurobiology. For example, according to Paul M. Churchland, moral knowledge, 
like all other forms of knowledge, can be characterized as a set of skills 
"embodied in a vast configuration of appropriately weighted synaptic 
connections"' within the brain. " Such skills are the result of trained neural 
networks, and training any neural network takes place by gradually imposing a 
specific function onto its input-output behavior. Churchland states: 
The network thus acquires the ability to respond, in various but 
systematic ways, to a wide variety of potential sensory inputs. In a 
simple, three-layer feedforward network with fixed synaptic 
connections ... the output 
behavior at the third layer of neurons is 
completely determined by the activity at the sensory input level. In 
a (biologically more realistic) recurrent network ... the output behavior is jointly determined by the sensory input and the prior 
dynamical state of the entire network... [T]he acquired cognitive 
capacity actually resides in the specific configuration of the many 
synaptic connections between the neuronal layers, and learning that 
cognitive capacity is a matter of slowly adjusting the size or 
"weight" of each connection so that, collectively, they come to 
embody the input-output function desired. ' 12 
On this view, a trained neural network has acquired a specific skill in that "it has 
learned how to respond, with appropriate patterns of neural activity across its 
output layer, to various inputs at its sensory layer. !, 1113 Accordingly, Churchland 
characterizes a morally knowledgeable adult as one who has acquired a 
sophisticated family of perceptual or recognitional skills, along with a complex set 
... Churchland (1998), 85. 
112 Ibid., 84. italics in original. I 
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of behavioral and manipulational skills. These skills are typically acquired over 
long periods of time "with repeated exposure to, or practice of, various examples 
of the perceptual or motor categories at issue... [and] in the repeated adjustments 
of one's myriad synaptic connections, a process that is also driven by one's 
ongoing experience with failure. " 
114 
Such learning is the building process with which we are familiar, 
particularly if we have raised a child: the simplest skills must be learned first and 
the more sophisticated skills are learned later, only after the elementary ones are 
in place. Indeed, since moral virtues are skills on this view, they are acquired 
slowly and they can continue to develop as long as individuals have the 
opportunity and the intelligence necessary to refine them. In like manner, vices 
are also skills-in the sense that the morally wicked have learned a particular set 
of skills that might serve them within their specific environment, but that tend to 
disadvantage them within the larger social context. These individuals, if they are 
to become morally knowledgeable adults, must not only learn new skills, but must 
also do a significant amount of unlearning. Unfortunately, this process of 
unlearning and learning anew becomes increasingly difficult once the cognitive 
plasticity of the young is lost, and once their unequaled capacity for leaming-a 
result of neurochernical and physiological factors that decrease with age-has 
faded. 
This neurobiological view of the acquisition of moral virtues leads 
Churchland to some interesting suggestions that intersect with Aristotle's notions 
of habituation and that are worth quoting in full: 
Ibid 
Ibid., 87, italics in original. 
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This view of the assembled moral virtues as a slowly-acquired 
network of skills also contains an implicit critique of a popular 
piece of romantic nonsense, namely, the idea of the -sudden 
convert" to morality, as typified by the "tearful face of the 
repentant sinner" and the post-baptismal -born-again" charismatic 
Christian. Moral character is not something-is not reniolely 
something-that can be acquired in a day by an Act of Will or by a 
single Major Insight. 
The idea that it can be so acquired is a falsifying reflection of one 
or other of two familiar conceptions of moral character, herewith 
discredited. The first identifies moral character with the 
acceptance of a canonical set of behavior-guiding rules. The 
second identifies moral character with a canonical set of desires, 
such as the desire to maximize the general happiness, and so on. 
Perhaps one can embrace a set of rules in one cathartic act, and 
perhaps one can permanently privilege some set of desires by a 
major act of will. But neither act can result in what is truly needed, 
namely, an intricate set of finely-honed perceptual, reflective, and 
sociornotor skills. These take several decades to acquire. 
Epiphanies of moral commitment can mark, at most, the initiation 
of such a process. Initiations are welcome, of course, but we do 
not give children a high-school diploma for showing up for school 
on the first day of the first grade. For the same reasons, "born- 
again" moral characters should probably wait a similar period of 
time before celebrating their moral achievement or pressing their 
moral authority. 115 
The recent strides in neurobiology, then, suggest that skills (or virtues, understood 
as skills) require a lengthy time to acquire, and that repeated exposure to examples 
of such skills are a necessary condition of the learning process. Once acquired, 
these skills become long-standing traits that are difficult to alter, particularly as an 
individual ages and loses the malleability of the young mind. Trained neural 
networks become part of the structure of the mind and individuals respond to 
stimuli in the manner and with the means that are programmed into their neural 
pathways. The process, in Aristotelian terms, is one of actualizing the human 
potential for excellence. 
Ibid., 89, italics in original. 1. 
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If this scenario is correct. then Aristotle is also correct in arguing that the 
virtues, or the vices for that matter, are the result of a slow process of habituation 
and that all individuals, if they are to become virtuous persons. must be exposed to 
virtuous behavior and trained in the excellences. In like manner, on this 
neurobiological view, Aristotle is also correct in arguing that the phronimos would 
be the least likely person to become wicked in the face of great and continued 
misfortune. Indeed, if the phronimos has acquired a hexis prohairetike, or a fixed 
state for choosing in accordance with virtue, it would require an extremely lengthy 
process of unlearning and relearning in order for his neural networks to be trained 
anew. Apparently, the behavior with which we greet sensory input is a result of 
the prior state of our entire neural networks. In order for the phronimos to achieve 
a state altogether different in kind from a hexis prohairetike, the size or "weight" 
of each of his synaptic connections would have to be altered, so that collectively 
they would embody a new input-output function. This transformation, it seems, 
would be extremely difficult. 
Here, too, we find a connection between Aristotle's focus on habituation 
and the problems posed by the need for external goods, at least insofar as external 
goods are thought to serve as the necessary instruments of virtuous action. As we 
have seen above, Aristotle claims that performing excellent actions is necessary to 
habituation. Moreover, he suggests that the ability of an individual to perfonn 
excellent acts may be enhanced or compromised by the availability, or lack 
thereof, of external goods. While all of this is correct, modem neurobiology 
suggests that all anatomically normal brains 116 possess the same types of neural 
116 In Aristotelian terms, such a person would not be "maimed as regards excellence" by reason of 
a mental or physical defect that interfered with the performance of her neural networks or synaptic 
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networks and the same sorts of synaptic connections. Habituating the brain to 
excellence, rather than to vice,, depends upon being in the presence of virtue and 
upon having the opportunity to exercise virtue. Under such circumstances, 
individuals would require, at least in the most formative years of their training. 
merely good examples and adequate opportunities to act in accordance with 
external requirements and prohibitions. They would not require unusual 
advantage to carry out acts of honesty, caring, and compassion, or to refrain from 
such acts as stealing, lying, cheating, and so forth. In time, particularly in adult 
ventures, individuals might require specific external goods in order to perform 
complex tasks within the larger social context. However, if these same 
individuals have been habituated to virtue, and if the necessary skills already 
reside in their neural networks, their responses to sensory input would be 
consistently in accordance with virtue to whatever degree they are enabled by 
external goods to act. A lack of instrumental goods would limit their noble 
activities, surely, but it would not move them to act in a wicked or base manner. 
It could be objected here that requiring a child, if she is to become virtuous 
and eventually achieve eudaimonia, to have access to virtuous human beings, the 
opportunity to perform virtuous actions, and some degree of external goods still 
leaves virtue and happiness in the hands of chance. For, obviously, all children do 
not have the same opportunity to be raised and educated by excellent adults or to 
make use of external goods. 117 However, few children are born into perfectly 
connections. However, such a person might still be incapacitated as regards virtue by other mental 
or physical defects. A full discussion of potentially incapacitating factors is beyond the scope of 
this work. 
117 And such children might be considered, at least bý analogy, "maimed as regards excellence" by 
the circumstances into which they are born. However, as my argument suggests, such a claim 
would be difficult to sustain, particularly if one argues that a child is literally incapacitated as 
regards excellence by external circumstances, rather than merely disadvantaged. While such 
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virtuous families or perfectly wicked families, and even fewer have no 
opportunity whatsoever to be influenced by human beings of all sorts: those who 
are virtuous, those who are wicked, and those who are intermediate between the 
two. Even children who are born into the most fortunate of circumstances \Nill 
rarely, if ever, perform only virtuous actions and, thereby, be habituated to perfect 
virtue. The neural networks of most individuals will be trained by actions that 
include varying degrees of virtue and vice, and the skills that emerge will reflect a 
mixed bag of moral knowledge. Most individuals, as I argue above' 18 and as 
experience suggests, will retain a dunamis for virtue, but will never achieve a 
hexis prohairelike. 
If this is a weakness-and Aristotelian virtue ethics has certainly been 
criticized for being overly demanding of ethical agents and entirely unrealistic 
about the potential for the average person to achieve eudaimonia 119 -the 
weakness may be one of human biology and human society, rather than one of 
virtue theory. Aristotle clearly recognizes the need for habituation and training, 
and he recognizes the need for social conventions and institutions that encourage 
the development of virtue. His arguments aim at creating the best possible 
citizens, not perfect citizens, particularly given the limitations of the human mind 
and human society. He begins with habituation, as do modem neurobiologists, 
and he suggests that rules and guidelines are supplementary to the development of 
character (though, of course, they also help develop character). He seems to 
understand that the most over-demanding and unrealistic theory would be one that 
demands strict adherence to canonical rules without, first and foremost, 
possible claims, especially in combination with notions of mental and physical incapacitation, 
suggest future implications, a detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this work. 
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habituating moral agents, from earliest childhood, to the rules themselves. the 
values that they represent, and, most importantly, the skills necessary to abide by 
them. Clearly, no ethical theory can promise equal success for everý' agent. 
However, one that begins with training the mind, which will inevitably occur in 
one fashion or another anyway, has the potential to develop agents who are better- 
equipped to handle misadventure, a lack of external goods, and the strains of 
human existence than one that begins by imposing rules. 
For Aristotle., habituation and the development of virtue require activity, 
and activity requires choice. Choice, as we know from EN 6.2, is desire and 
reasoning with a view to an end. Since excellence is concerned with both actions 
and passions, and since desire is an integral aspect of choice, we must next 
examine the relationship between the passions and virtue. Indeed, we cannot fully 
explicate habituation or virtue, or formulate a definition of the moral virtues, 
without examining emotion. 
3.3 
On Aristotle's view, emotions are not bogeymen that threaten to overthrow 
reason and weaken moral fortitude. Instead, they are necessary components of 
judgment and choice, and the emotions that motivate or accompany an action 
must be appropriate in order for the action itself to be deemed morally 
praiseworthy. Choice, for Aristotle,, is desiderative thought or intellectual desire 
(EN 6.2.1139b4-5),, and choice cannot exist without thought and intellect or 
without a moral state (I 139a33-34). Virtuous action and its opposite cannot exist 
118 See 2.2.6. 
119 See I ntroduct 1 on and 
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without a combination of intellect and character (I 139a34-35). and both 
thought-at least insofar as practical judgment and beliefs are concemed-and 
character depend, in large measure, on the development of the emotions. While I 
will discuss some of the roles played by emotion in Aristotelian virtue ethics- 
namely, as a necessary aspect of action, judgment, choice, evaluation, and self- 
evaluation-I begin with the mean and with its dependency upon the notion that 
emotion is a universal and cross-culturally human experience. 
As we know from EN 2.3, the excellences are concerned with actions and 
passions, and since every action is accompanied by pleasure or pain, moral 
excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain as well (I 104b 13-15). For most 
passions, like most actions, there is an excess or deficiency, and human beings are 
capable of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain to either excess or (more rarely) 
deficiency. On this view, the virtues can be understood as intermediates between 
excess and deficiency, and each one relates to a particular passion, pleasure, or 
pain. For example, courage is the intermediate between rashness and cowardice, 
and it pertains to fear. Liberality is the intenuediate in regard to the giving and 
taking of wealth, and it pertains to the pleasures and pains of hoarding, spending, 
or sharing wealth or material goods. Even justice, as an intermediate, pertains to 
pleasure and pain insofar as the unjust man seeks more than his equal, lawful, or 
proportional share of pleasure (prosperity) and less than his share of pain 
(adversity). The common factor is passion, with an emphasis on attraction or 
avoidance, and human passion crosses the barriers of language, culture, or era. 
Indeed, Aristotle himself finds it difficult to name many of the virtues. the 
excesses, and the deficiencies, in part because his conceptual ization of human 
passion exceeds both his traditions and his language. He is attempting to describe 
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human passion and action, and to describe virtue in reference to specific 
individuals facing concrete situations, with the mean as a guideline by which 
virtuous states can be recognized and evaluated by all individuals. This is a 
daunting task at best, and one at which he is not entirely successful, but it has a 
more universal scope than is often recognized. 
For instance, human beings, spanning oceans and centuries, can be said to 
have experienced (at the very least) bodily appetites, pleasures and pains, fear of 
death and of the unknown, and affection or sympathy towards members of their 
own species. No human being who has survived infancy has been entirely without 
a relational context,, one in which he is an interdependent being, and no physically 
normal human being has failed to experience hunger and thirst, or attraction and 
avoidance. There are analogous experiences and features that characterize a 
human life and it would be difficult, at best, to argue that cross-cultural 
differences make some lives unrecognizable as human lives. Humans simply do 
experience emotion, pleasure and pain, and they also experience, as I will argue 
below, the impact of emotion on their beliefs, judgments, choices, and actions. 
Certainly, diverse societies may have starkly different understandings of, say, 
courage, but every human society recognizes both fear and responses to fear. 
Individuals and societies might understand virtuous states in a cultural ly-based 
and contextualized manner, but the fact of human passions, pleasures, and pains 
provides a universally familiar starting-point for cross-cultural dialogue and 
comparative assessments. To understand the mean in this manner, then, as a tool 
by which we may prescribe and evaluate human actions and states, in light of 
human passion, moves us beyond objections of cultural relativism into a more 
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fertile and dynamic discussion of human psychology. cognition, and 
neurobiology. 
It is important to note, however, that emotions are vastly more for Aristotle 
than feelings or sensations to which we respond. Emotions are also integral 
components of judgment and action, and Aristotle suggests that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between emotion and belief, specifically. that emotion can 
influence belief and that emotion occurs in response to a belief already held 
concerning particular persons and events. For example, in Rhetoric 2.1, Aristotle 
suggests that a thorough understanding of emotion is necessary for any orator who 
wishes to influence the judgment of his audience, for, on his view, beliefs are 
affected by emotional states (1377b2l-1378a6). He argues that a person who is 
feeling friendly and placable will think one sort of thing, and one who is feeling 
angry or hostile is likely to think something entirely different or with a different 
intensity (1377b3l-1378al). Moreover, while emotion is attended by pleasure 
and pain, it is not reducible to the physical sensations that accompany it. It is the 
belief upon which the emotion is based,, rather than the sensation it produces, that 
must be negated or moderated if the emotion is to be altered. For instance, if I am 
angry, then I am angry with a particular person for having wronged me in a 
particular way. If I later discover that the act was committed by someone else, or 
that it never happened at all, the change in my belief will alter my emotional state. 
If, then, the rhetorician is to successfully influence the judgment or action of an 
individual, he must influence both his emotions and his beliefs. 
Indeed, emotion is critical to Aristotle's conceptualization of judgment and 
action in that the major premise of the practical syllogism is a value judgment that 
often involves an emotional stance. For Aristotle, voluntary action schernatized 
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under the practical syllogism implies a sense of purpose: I do x in order to 
accomplish y, based on my particular beliefs (MA 6.7OOb 14-28). 12() That is, 1,,, valk 
because I believe that every man ought to walk (e. g. to promote health or 
longevity), or because I believe that it is pleasurable to walk. In theory at least, 
and whether conscious or unconscious, there is a sense of purpose to my action 
that I could explain or to which I could assent if questioned, and desire forms part 
of this sense of purpose. For example, desire forms part of the value judgment in 
the major premise of the practical syllogism (i. e. what is good, seemingly good, or 
pleasurable), and desire may figure in the minor premise insofar as it pertains to 
perception of the particular (e. g. that this option is attractive to me, or that this 
drink is pleasurable when I am thirsty). 
Moreover,, emotion is often critical to action in that it can be emotion 
itself, rather than desire within the context of deliberation, that first prompts 
correct action-even emotions such as fear and anger, which are often thought of 
in their most negative sense. For example, Aristotle does not praise the utterly 
fearless person, or the person who feels no anger, precisely because it may be the 
presence of either fear or anger that first motivates an agent to take correct action 
(EN 4.5.1126a4-6). This is to say that an agent, in encountering a new situation, 
may first realize that a problem exists by way of his emotional response to the 
circumstances, rather than by careful deliberation. 
Within the context of deliberation,, Aristotle states that the person who is 
without qualification good at deliberating is the one who is capable of aiming in 
accordance with calculation at the best things for humans attainable by action (EN 
6.7.1141b12-14). If deliberation is to involve good practical judgment and result 
120 Cf. Sherman (1997), 69. This part of my discussion has been informed bN her text. 
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in a good choice, both the reasoning must be sound and the desire right. Indeed, 
while sound practical judgment may require trained and habituated emotions, it is 
impossible that it could be accomplished, on Aristotle's view, in the complete 
absence of emotion. In order to moderate the negative or harmful aspects of 
uncontrolled emotion or irrational desires, however, Aristotle states that the 
desiring element in the soul must listen to and obey reason, in the sense that one 
pays heed to one's father or one's friends (1.13.1102b3l-32). Quite sign i ficantly, 
this directive is intended to establish an appropriate balance between emotion and 
reason,, or to aid in the struggle between rational and irrational desires, and it 
suggests that reason should infonn and advise the desiring element, rather than 
dominate and suppress it. 
Moreover, on Aristotle's view,, by the fact that choice requires both 
intellect and a moral state, good action and its opposite cannot exist without a 
combination of intellect and moral character (6.2.1139a33-35). The act of making 
a choice involves reasoning skills, of course, and it involves some moral state or 
another, or some sort of inclination towards one thing and aversion of another. 
For, as Aristotle claims,. what affirmation and negation are in reasoning, pursuit 
and avoidance are in desire (I 139a2l-22). When we choose, we choose between 
alternatives, even if one of those alternatives is to do nothing whatsoever, and our 
moral state, involving as it does our responses to perceived pleasure and pain, is as 
critical to our decision-making process as is our intellect. In fact, even this 
division of intellect and desire is inherently flawed, since emotions appear to 
affect thoughts and beliefs, at least on a practical level; thoughts and beliefs 
appear to influence emotions. and the major premise of the practical syllogism is a 
value judgment that often involves desire. Thus. ý, vhile we might be capable of 
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mathematical or abstract reasoning without either emotions or desires. we would 
be incapable of making sound practical judgments. 
Interestingly, this claim is supported by modem neurobiological study and 
research. In his book, Descartes' Error, neurobiologist Antonio R. Damasio 
discusses research pertaining to the connection between reason and emotion, and 
to how this connection appears to affect the decision-making process. The 
subjects of his study, who all suffer a type of brain damage that interferes with 
their ability to experience emotion, are able to reason quite competently on an 
abstract or entirely intellectual level-for example, "in domains concerning 
objects, space, numbers, and words. " 121 However, these patients, who Damasio 
describes as knowing but notfeeling, and who discuss themselves and their lives 
in an utterly detached manner, as if they are "dispassionate, uninvolved" 
spectators, have lost the ability to make personal and social choices in the context 
of their daily lives. 122 For example, a patient named Elliot, who had both a large 
brain tumor and some damaged frontal lobe tissue removed, demonstrated above- 
average intellectual ability on numerous tests. Yet, his decision-making skills are 
so impaired that he is incapable of making an effective plan for the hours, let 
alone the days and weeks, ahead of him. He cannot be counted on to perform an 
appropriate action when it is expected, he is incapable of following a schedule, 
and he no longer learns from his mistakes. Elliot, who had attained "an enviable 
personal, professional, and social status" before the appearance of the tumor is 
now "unable to reason and decide in ways conducive to the maintenance and 
121 Damasio (1994). 43. 
122 Ibid., 44. 
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betterment of himself and his family, [and he is] no longer capable of succeeding 
as an independent human being. " 123 
The results of numerous tests that were performed on all of Damasio's 
patients suggest that this inability to make choices in the social and personal 
domains is not due to a "lack of social knowledge, or to deficient access to such 
knowledge, or to an elementary impairment of reasoning, or, even less, to an 
elementary defect in attention or working memory concerning the processing of 
the factual knowledge needed to make decisions in the personal and social 
domains. " 124 Instead, "the defect appeared to set in at the late stages of reasoning, 
close to or at the point at which choice making or response selection must occur, " 
and it appeared to result from an inability to experience emotion. ' 25 
Although Damasio's research cannot be expected to give conclusive 
evidence concerning the role of emotion in practical reasoning, he suggests that 
"certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for 
rationality" and that "emotion, feeling, and biological regulation all play a role in 
human reason. 
026 He states: 
The strategies of human reason probably did not develop, in either 
evolution or any single individual, without the guiding force of the 
mechanisms of biological regulation, of which emotion and feeling 
are notable expressions. Moreover, even after reasoning strategies 
become established in the fon-native years, their effective 
deployment probably depends, to a considerable extent, on a 
continued ability to experience feelings. ' 27 
If Damasio's preliminary conclusions are supported by further research, then 
Aristotle's conceptualization of the relationship between emotion and reason-as 
11 - -, Ibid., 35-8. 
121 Ibid., 50. 
125 Ibid., italics added. 
126 Ibid. xiii. 
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one which is reciprocal, mutually dependent, and essential to practical judgment, 
action, and moral choice-will be supported as well. Just as Damasio suggests 
that emotion is crucial to practical reasoning, rather than to purely intellectual 
speculation, Aristotle argues that there is a distinct difference between speculative 
reason, which is purely intellectual and concerned with abstract concepts and 
universals, and practical reason, which involves emotion and is concerned with 
things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate (EN 6.7.114 1 b8- 
9). Indeed, practical action for Aristotle, schernatized under the practical 
syllogism, requires the presence and integration of reason and desire. 
To conceive of emotion and reason in this way, as mutually dependent and 
inseparable aspects of the human person, is also to suggest that human beings are 
unified and integrated organisms that cannot be separated into neat, dichotomous 
parts. Once this initial conception is fleshed out by introducing the biological 
aspects of emotion and reason, such as both the physical sensations that 
accompany emotion and the fairly obvious connection between the brain and 
human thought, then the implausibility of breaking up the human person into 
separately analyzable and dichotomous parts (e. g. mind/body, reason/emotion) 
becomes increasingly apparent. 
This sense of integration, it seems, is part of the reason that Aristotle 
includes the character and motivation of an agent in his evaluation of the morality 
of an action. In EN 2.4, for example, Aristotle claims that, while an action itself 
might accord with excellence, it does not follow that the action was done in an 
excellent manner (I 105a29-30). In other words, although an act might be just or 
temperate in and of itself, it does not follow that the action vvas done justly or 
Ibid., xii. 
144 
temperately. In order for the action to have been done justly or temperately. it 
must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character and from one that exhibits 
the virtues of justice or temperance (I 105a32-1105bl). Unlike the products of the 
arts, actions do not have their goodness in themselves; rather, the agent must also 
be in a certain condition when he performs the actions (I 105a27-31 ). Of course. 
possessing a finn and unchangeable character is only one aspect of this "certain 
condition,. " along with having knowledge and choosing the actions for their own 
sakes. But possessing a firm and unchangeable character counts (along with 
choosing the actions for their own sakes) for nearly everything in determining the 
morality of the action (I 105a3O-llO5b4). And it is the aspects of human character 
that can be habituated, namely, desire, passion, practical judgment, and choice- 
making, that involve emotion to the greatest extent. A firm and unchangeable 
character, or one that exemplifies moral excellence, is one in which the reasoning 
is sound and the desires are habituated to excellence. In like manner, in the theory 
set forth here, desires and emotions play a central role in evaluating agents and in 
defining the moral virtues. "8 
Insofar as the evaluation of either an action or an agent is concerned, 
emotions are also valuable tools in self-evaluation, and one of the most critical 
emotions in self-evaluation is shame. For Aristotle, shame is a passion that 
presents itself when one's virtue is in question and when one needs to perform a 
self-evaluation. Moreover,, although shame brings the kind of disgrace that makes 
us call ourselves into question, the disgrace is, in one sense or another, always 
before others. Shame, with its attending fear and pain, occurs in regard to our 
relationship with other individuals and with our community, and it links our well- 
'2' See 3.5. 
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being with that of other human beings. Because of the often over-looked 
importance of shame, Particularly as it pertains to self-evaluation. we must next 
examine its role in an Aristotelian conceptualization of virtue and we must 
analyze its place in a modem virtue theory. 
3.4 
In EN 4.9,, Aristotle states that shame (aid6s) is not an excellence (aretý), 
for it is more like a passion (pathos) than a state (hexis), and it produces the sort of 
bodily affects that one experiences with passions, but not with states (I 128bl 0- 
11). In the case of shame, the passion is a kind of fear of disgrace (phobos tis 
adoxias) and it produces bodily effects similar to those produced by the fear of 
danger (I 128b I 1- 12). People who feel disgraced blush, for example, and those 
who fear death turn pale, and these kinds of bodily manifestations are associated 
with the passions (I 128bl 2-16). In like manner, in Rhetoric 2.6, Aristotle defines 
shame as a pain or disturbance (lupO tis ý taracW) in regard to bad things, past, 
present, or future, that seem likely to involve us, or those we care for, in disgrace 
(1383bl5-16). In both cases, shame is regarded as a passionate response to the 
imagination of disgrace, particularly disgrace before people who matter to us, and 
it is a response to voluntary actions. 
Shame, for Aristotle, is never unconditionally good, since it is consequent 
upon bad actions and an excellent person will never voluntarily perform such 
actions, but shame does have conditional goodness (EN 4.9.1128b22-30). If, for 
example, a good person perfonns a wicked action, it would be appropriate for him 
to feel shame. Likewise, if a person, particularly a young person, is tempted to 
perform a wicked action, it would be appropriate for him to be restrained by 
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shame. Even this conditional goodness is further qualified as agents age. for 
shame is particularly unbecoming to older persons who should no longer be 
constituted to require shame as a restraint or to commit acts that bring a sense of 
disgrace. Shamelessness (anaischuntia), however, or a sense of contempt 
(olig6ria) or indifference (apatheia) in regard to bad actions (Rh. 2.6.1383b]6- 
17), is bad (EN 4.9.1128b3l-33), and it would be characteristic of a wicked person 
to voluntarily commit vicious actions without a feeling of shame. 
For Aristotle, we are ashamed not only of actual shameful conduct, but 
also of the signs (semeia) of such conduct (Rh. 2.6.1384bl8-19). He suggests, for 
example, that we are ashamed of the signs of sexual misconduct, as well as of the 
misconduct itself, and of disgraceful talk as well as disgraceful acts (1384bl9-21). 
In keeping with Aristotle's use of sýmeion (sign) in Rhetoric 1.2.1357a33, Prior 
Analytics 2.27.70al 1, and even Sophistical Refutations 5.167b9. we can 
understand his claims concerning the signs of misconduct to be logical in nature 
and to refer to propositions (concerning our behavior, appearance, etc. ) that lead 
to an inference regarding our conduct. If the sign is not necessary, the inference 
will be refutable, of course, but Aristotle seems to be referring here to true 
propositions that lead to accurate assessments of our actual misconduct. For 
example, in Rhetoric 1.2, Aristotle suggests that the fact that a woman is giving 
milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child (1357bl5-16). If we wish to place 
this example into a context that involves shame, we can say that the woman ,. N-ho 
is giving milk is a Catholic nun and that it is her physician and friend of man), 
years who discovers her milk. In this scenario. Aristotle would argue that the nun 
would feel shame upon the discovery of the milk, as the sign of sexual 
misconduct, as well as upon discovery of the misconduct itself. 
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Notice, here, as well as in the entire discussion thus far. that shame 
involves some sort of relationship between the person ýN-ho commits the 
disgraceful act and at least one other person, and that the disgrace itself is ak\ays 
before others. Aristotle consistently places shame within a relational context and 
he claims that we feel more shame about an action if it has been perfon-ned 
openly, or before the eyes of others, and he attributes the proverb "shame dwells 
in the eyes" to this phenomenon (Rh. 2.6.1384a33-35). 129 On his view, we are the 
most disgraced before people who matter to us-such as those who love or admire 
us, those whom we love or admire, those by whom we stand to profit, those whose 
opinion we respect, and so forth (1384a22-1385al5). Generally, we are ashamed 
of different things before strangers and intimates (i. e. of conventional faults before 
strangers and of genuine faults before intimates), and we are not disgraced at all 
before those of less stature than ourselves, such as animals, children, and persons 
whose opinions we find untrustworthy (1384b23-27). Moreover, we not only feel 
shame in connection with our own actions, but also in connection with the actions 
of our family members, or our students, or those who model themselves after us 
(1385a2-7). On this view, our actions can disgrace us before others by reason of 
the fact that actions reflect our character and our moral agency. 
It is important here to recall that actions do not exist in isolation for 
Aristotle. The origin of action is choice and choice itself requires intellect, desire, 
a moral state, and a view to an end (EN 6.2.1139a3l-35). It is for our choices that 
we are praised and blamed, since these are the representations of our desires, 
thoughts, character, and ends, and our voluntary actions are nothing more than our 
129 Williams (1993), 78, says, "The basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen. 
inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition. " 
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choices made manifest. We are disgraced by inappropriate actions because these 
actions reflect who we are, as human beings. on the level of our beliefs, emotions, 
and character. We are shamed by the fact that our actions betray our flawed and 
imperfect character to those whose opinion of us matters. Shame is the emotion 
that forces us to call ourselves into question and suggests that we areflawed. 
This deep-seated awareness of our own inadequacies is less evident in a 
modem rendition of guilt, particularly in its purely objective or legal sense. We 
can feel guilty for our actions, of course, and this kind of subjective guilt might 
make us call ourselves into question as persons and moral agents in a manner 
similar to that of shame. But we can also be legally or objectively guilty of 
actions that might arguably involve our circumstances, such as our economic, 
political, or social situation, as much as they do ourselves. A man might, for 
example, be guilty of committing fraud on his income taxes, but argue that he, as a 
perfectly good and moral agent, is rightfully acting in opposition to an inherently 
flawed economic and political system. Here, while he is clearly guilty of the 
action in the objective or legal sense, he might feel no guilt whatsoever. Or, if he 
normally accepts and adheres to a standard forbidding fraud, he might feel that, 
while he has failed to live up to this particular standard and has, thereby, 
committed a wrong action, he is still someone of whom he generally approves. 130 
"0 "According to Gabriele Taylor, the identificatory belief in shame is that I am not the person I 
thought I was or hoped I might be. It is not simply, as in embarrassment, that I wish I hadn't been 
seen doing something (even though I don't think I've done anything wrong) or, as in guilt, simply 
that I have failed to live up to a standard I adhere to. If I thought the latter, I could still entertain 
the possibility that I can set the record straight, for in such a case what troubles me about what I've 
done is quite local: I've done something I don't approve of, but I'm not someone I don't approve 
of. As Gabriele Taylor puts it: 'When feeling guilty ... the view I take of myself is entirely 
different from the view I take of myself when feeling shame: in the latter case I see myself as 
bein all of a piece, what I have just done, I now see, fits only too well what I realJN am. But when 91 
feeling guilty I think of myself as having brought about a forbidden state of affairs and thereb% in 
this respect disfigured a self which otherwise remains the same"' (Spelman, in Card, ed., 199 1, 
2`15, italics in original. quoting Taylor. 1985,92). 
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There can be a meaningful divorce between the person (on a deeply intimate 
level) and his action (particularly if it rests upon some principle) that is entirely 
impossible to achieve on an Aristotelian view. Indeed, on an Aristotelian viexý of 
action, the choice to commit fraud, and thereby to steal, suggests a lack of internal 
excellence, regardless of any principle that might be utilized as justification. 
Although a separation of the person from his action might provide some 
measure of comfort, it can be accompanied by long-lasting consequences. In a 
scheme in which legal or objective guilt takes center stage, each person remains 
guilty of his inappropriate actions forever, however changed he might become as a 
moral agent in the intervening years. 131 For example, if one steals, then one is 
guilty of having committed theft forever (and the focus often involves violating a 
particular standard and victimizing particular others). The action stands by itself, 
regardless of the opinion of others. Conversely, a person who is disgraced by 
shame can become honorable once again in the eyes of others by consistently 
acting in an honorable manner. Because disgraceful actions were committed, they 
remain in some sense,, 132 but since the locus of shame is the person himself, just as 
the locus of honor is the person himself, there is a continuous spectrum of praise 
and blame that remains focused on the character of the person. The man who runs 
from the battlefield can pick up his sword and win praise for his courage and glory 
131 Moreover, Williams (1993), 89, discusses the thought that guilt would follow one, even if one 
disappeared. He says that "the expression of shame, in general as well as in the particular form of 
it that Is embarrassment, is not just the desire to hide. or to hide my face, but the desire to 
disappear, not to be there. It is not even the wish, as people say, to sink through the floor, but 
rather the wish that the space occupied by me should be instantaneously empty. With guilt, it Is 
not like this, I am more dominated by the thought that even if I disappear, it would come with me. " 
132 For the Greeks, of course, miasma (pollution) could result from the killing of a person, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, and this (supernatural) effect could remain long after the shameful 
action. See Williams (1993). 59-61.70-1,15 1. 
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in battle. The cowardly action remains, of course, but the man himself can be 
called courageous without contradiction. 
This brief discussion is meant only as a note on one possible difference in 
emphasis between guilt and shame. 1 33 It is not an argument for the superiority of 
one emotion, label, or cultural standard over the other. Such an argument is 
beyond the scope of this work and, fortunately, it is not necessary to the task at 
hand. At most, we need only establish that, on an Aristotelian view, shame 
attaches to the character of the agent himself, rather than merely to his actions, 
and that claim is established by Aristotle's renditions of choice and action. It is 
this aspect of shame, namely, that it is an emotion that calls the person who 
experiences it into question, which is important here. 
It is also important to note that, even on Aristotle's view., it is at least 
possible for a person to feel the pain or disturbance of shame if he has committed 
an inappropriate act in secret. Clearly, Aristotle's focus is on the disgrace that one 
feels before others, and the bulk of his discussion of shame involves the public 
aspects of the emotion. But, in Rhetoric 2.6, Aristotle claims that we feel more 
shame about an action that is done openly, or before the eyes of others (kai ta en 
ophthalmois kai ta en phaner6i mallon), and that we feel more shame before those 
persons who will always be with us or who attend to what we do, because in both 
cases eyes are upon us (dia touto tous aei paresomenous mallon aischunontai kai 
tous prosechontas autois, dia to en ophthalmois amphotera) (1384a34-1384b1). 
His use of more (mallon) here sets the discussion in comparative terms and 
suggests that we feel some sense of shame when the eyes of others are not upon 
us. At the very least, his terminology allows for the possibility of feeling pained 
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by one's actions on a purely internal level, perhaps under the gaze of an 
internalized other, 134 rather than merely experiencing the fear of public disgrace. 
However, Aristotle's use of comparative terminology is set within a 
discussion that involves, first, a definition of shame and a discussion of the deeds 
that might rightfully prompt the emotion and, second, a list of all the persons 
before whom we might feel shame (1383bl3-1385al5). He makes it clear that 
shame involves our relationship with others and with society, and, by so doing, 
leaves himself open to the criticism that shame is not a psychologically developed 
or mature emotion in that disgrace depends upon the opinion of others more than 
it does upon self-awareness or self-criticism. ' 35 However,, shame can be viewed 
as a valuable moral asset and it can coexist quite peacefully with guilt, however 
one classifies or conceptualizes guilt. 136 For if character can be meaningfully 
linked with choice, and choice with action, then disgrace never applies merely to 
our actions, but also to ourselves. Disgrace asks that we call our character into 
question and that we face the possibility that we are flawed. Moreover, shame 
"' For a ful I discussion see Williams (1993); Taylor, G. (1985). 
134 See Williams (1993), esp. 82-6. He states, "Even if shame and its motivations always involve 
in some way or other an idea of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations 
the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do ... The 
internalisation of shame does not simply 
internalise an other who is a representative of the neighbors ... 
The internalised other is indeed 
abstracted and generalised and idealised, but he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and 
somebody other than me. He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live 
if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my relations to 
the world about me" (82-4). Also, see Gill (1996), 66-7,74-5. 
115 Williams (1993), 94, argues against such criticisms of shame. He states, "To the modern moral 
consciousness, guilt seems a more transparent moral emotion than shame. It may seem so, but that 
is only because, as it presents itself, it is more isolated than shame is from other elements of one's 
self-image, the rest of one's desires and needs, and because it leaves out a lot even of one's ethical 
consciousness. It can direct one towards those who have been wronged or damaged, and demand 
reparation in the name, simply, of what has happened to them. But it cannot by itself help one to 
understand one's relations to those happenings, or to rebuild the self that has done these things and 
the world in which that self has to live. Only shame can do that, because it embodies conceptions 
of what one is and of how one is related to others. " 
136 Williams (1993), 93, argues that shame can help us understand guilt. He states, "The structures 
of shame contain the possibility of controlling and leaming from guilt, because they give a 
conception of one's ethical identity, in relation to which guilt can make sense. Shame can 
understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself. " 
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relies on fear, as does pity, and on our interconnectedness with others, and, by this 
reliance, it has the potential to restrain and direct our actions. Indeed, it reminds 
us that disgrace before others matters. By its juxtaposition with honor. shame also 
reminds us that honorable lives depend upon honorable character and. even if we 
mean nothing more by honor than a life without shame, we can use the word to 
describe a condition that requires (at the very least) personal development, 
acknowledgment of others, and a critical understanding of social roles, tensions, 
and values. 
At this point in the discussion, it seems clear that an Aristotelian model 
encourages character development and critical self-evaluation, even in the face of 
varying external circumstances and differing natural abilities, and that an 
Aristotelian conceptualization of habituation accords with modem neurobiological 
arguments. Such a model seems to encourage both intellectual and emotional 
development, and, as a framework for moral theory, it appears to have the 
flexibility to integrate modem perspectives and developments. However, it 
remains to provide a definition of the moral virtues that both accords with an 
Aristotelian framework and incorporates modem neurobiological perspectives, as 
well as to explicate the relationship between virtue and induction. 
3.5 
It is one thing to discuss Aristotelian ideas of virtue and another thing 
altogether to explicate the moral virtues and give them a place in a modem ethical 
theory. Indeed, although Aristotle describes several moral virtues at length, he 
does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of the virtues. and perhaps the 
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characteristics of the virtues themselves rule out such a list. HoxN ever. a 
defensible definition of the moral virtues must be included in any formulation of 
virtue ethics and the role of virtue must be explicated in terms of this definition. 
This being the case, I intend to define moral virtue in stages, first. by offering a 
basic definition and, then, by limiting it. 
To begin, I turn back to modem neurobiology, 137 specifically the version 
offered by Paul Churchland, and to its identification of the moral virtues with 
skills, which are acquired slowly and which can be understood in tenns of trained 
neural networks. On this view, a morally knowledgeable adult is one who has 
acquired a sophisticated family of perceptual or recognitional skills, along with a 
complex set of behavioral and manipulational skills. Significantly, to categorize 
moral virtues as skills-which human beings have the capacity to develop over a 
long period of time, with repeated exposure to, and practice of, various examples 
of these skills-accords with and strengthens the Aristotelian conceptual ization of 
virtue. For the time being, then, in agreement with Churchland, I will define the 
moral virtues merely as skills and briefly place neurobiology and Aristotle side by 
side. 
First. ) neurobiology offers a scientific explanation 
for Aristotle's claim 
that, although human beings do not possess the virtues by nature, they are adapted 
by nature to receive them. Through the human capacity to acquire virtue, 
understood as the neural networks within an anatomically normal human brain, 
individuals can be habituated to either virtue or vice and , in either case, they will 
develop specific skills. Second, neurobiology supports Aristotle's claims that the 
moral virtues are acquired slowly through habituation and practice, and that the 
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process of actualizing the human potential for excellence is a gradual one. 
Finally, it supports and strengthens his claim that, after a time, human beings are 
so habituated to either virtue or vice that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
for them to become the opposite. 
Since human beings develop all sorts of skills, however, and since even 
vices can be defined on a neurobiological view as skills. it is necessary to limit the 
definition. A moral virtue, then, will be temporarily defined as a skill that 
promotes, enhances, or honors the end, or eudaimonia, for human beings. 138 if 
we were to continue in this fashion, in the hopes of achieving purity of definition, 
we might define a non-moral virtue as a skill that promotes. enhances, or honors a 
specific, non-moral end, art, or craft. An example of such a skill might be typing 
and this skill might be acquired to promote the art of copy editing. However, as 
we have seen in Section 1.2, there is a strong intersection between the acquisition 
and utilization of moral and non-moral principles, and this intersection may be 
dependent upon the intersection of moral and non-moral skills. In other words, at 
the level of skills,, any sharp demarcation between the moral and non-moral realms 
must be considered arbitrary and we will remain on firmer theoretical ground if 
we grant the possibility that certain moral and non-moral skills may depend, at 
least in part, on the same neural networks. 
This is not to claim, however, that the possession of a moral virtue, 
understood as a particular skill, prepares one to act virtuously and to act viciously. 
Once the end for human beings, understood as eudaimonia, is included in the 
definition of a moral virtue, there can be no arguments concerning, say. a 
137 See 3 
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courageous murderer. 139 The family of perceptual or recognitional skills, along 
with the complex set of behavioral and manipulational skills, that prepare a person 
to murder under a given set of circumstances are a sufficient explanation for the 
murder's ability to commit such an act. The prior state of the murderer's neural 
network,, when confronted with particular sensory input, would promote murder, 
rather than some alternate response. Nothing resembling the idea of courage need 
be added to explain the murderer's ability to kill. Courage would be a separate 
skill altogether and, if the circumstances surrounding the murder happen to 
involve fear, the possession of courage might allow the (potential) murderer to 
refrain from murdering, even though s/he was so inclined. While courage assists 
in performing certain actions (e. g. walking onto a battlefield), it also assists in not 
perfort-ning certain other actions (e. g. refraining from fleeing from the battlefield 
when one is inclined to flee). In other words, courage assists in perfonning an 
action that one is not predisposed to performing and in refraining from an action 
that one is predisposed to performing. In any case, even if courage is not 
necessary for refraining from murder, it need not be tacked onto an already 
adequate explanation of the skills that prepare someone to murder. And 
murdering alone, seen as a distinct skill or family of skills, fails to promote, 
enhance, or honor the ultimate end for human beings. 
Again, human beings may develop or possess numerous skills that 
promote or enhance their ultimate end, but many of these skills would still fail to 
qualify as moral virtues. A volunteer firefighter, for example, may be highly 
138 , Human beings" here indicates the agent or others. See Chapter 4 for the agent in relation to 
others. 
139 Providing, perhaps, that theform of eudaimonia is accepted as a regulating notion and that the 
values necessary for achieving eudainionia are also accepted. See 4.3 for a discussion of the 
relationship between eudaimonia and values. 
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skilled at putting out fires and these skills might save the lives and property of his 
fellow citizens. But fire-fighting skills per se would not be categorized as moral 
virtues simply because they happen to promote or enhance the end for liuman 
beings as a secondary effect. Instead, we might say that the firefighter possesses 
several moral virtues if he volunteers out of a desire to help others, and if he is in 
control of potentially negative emotions, such as fear and anger, and if his actions, 
as the manifestations of his choices, are noble. For if the moral virtues are to be 
described in terms of the character of the person who possesses them, and if they 
are to retain Aristotelian content, they must directly pertain to reason and emotion. 
Indeed, on this view, we must be adapted by our nature to receive the moral 
virtues,, and we must be able to explain the virtues both in terms of our distinctive 
nature as humans and in terms of the formulation and manifestation of human 
character. Fortunately, on a neurobiological view, skills are the manifestations of 
trained neural networks and, given adequate information, the character of a 
particular individual could be explained, at least in part, in terms of the aggregate 
of these skills. In general, virtuous persons possess a certain type of family and 
set of skills, skills that pertain to and direct their desires, emotions, and choices, 
and these skills are moral virtues. 
On this view, then, a complete definition of the moral virtues would be: 
Skills, pertaining to the formulation and manifestation of desire, emotion, and 
choice that promote, enhance, or honor the ultimate end for human beingS. 140 
Thus, in the case of desire, the morally knowledgeable or virtuous adult will 
possesses the skills necessary to either develop desires that are in accordance with 
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the ultimate end or moderate those that are not. Likewise, she will have the skills 
necessary to recognize, moderate, or control any potentially han-nful emotions that 
may accompany desire. Finally, she will possess the skills necessary both to make 
choices that accord with the ultimate end and to act in accordance with her 
choices. 
Clearly, the relationship between desire, emotion, and choice can be 
complex and an agent may have a wide array of emotions and desires to contend 
with simultaneously. Even in the case of a single emotion, where the relationship 
is initially between the agent and an event (e. g. the agent encounters a fearful 
situation and experiences fear), the agent's reaction to the emotion may involve an 
element of desire. Strong emotion, for instance, may prompt the agent to choose 
an action that will moderate or eliminate the emotion, and that action would then 
result, at least in part, from the desire to escape, alter, or satisfy the emotion. For 
example, let us say that a man encounters his adulterous wife and her lover. He 
would be likely to feel shock, anger, grief, fear for his marriage and future, and so 
forth, and these emotions,, or some combination of them,, would result in a desire 
or a combination of desires. The desire might be for vengeance, or an end to the 
affair, or reconciliation with his spouse, or a quick divorce, or some combination 
of these possibilities. In any case, the original and subsequent emotions, in 
combination with the resulting desire(s), will affect the man's choices and actions 
and, if he is to act virtuously, he will need a combination of skills. 
Virtuous choices and actions, then, require a family or set of skills. which 
work in conjunction with one another, and which cannot necessarily be cleanly 
140 With this definition of the moral virtues in place, we might be able to move to a definition of 
the intellectual virtues. However, an adequate discussion of the intellectual virtues is beyond the 
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delineated. Without practical wisdom, for example, it is unlikely that a person 
could consistently identify and choose the best means to, or the constituents of. a 
desired end. Likewise,, without courage, temperance, and justice, it is equally 
unlikely that a person could consistently carry out even the most virtuous of 
choices. In the same way that a craftsman is enabled by a particular family and 
set of skills to choose and to act in accordance with the end of his craft. a moral 
agent is enabled by the possession of the moral virtues to choose and to act in 
accordance with the ultimate end for humans. To a vastly larger degree than the 
craftsman, however, the moral agent can expect to face broadly conflicting 
desires, competing means to a given end, choices between incommensurate goods, 
and great emotional upheavals, and he must possess a proportionately larger and 
more diverse set of skills. 
This scenario not only accords with modem neurobiological views, but 
also it both parallels Aristotle's notion of the moral virtues and helps to further 
reconcile Aristotle's classification of aretý as a dunamis in the Rhetoric and as a 
hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics. 141 Indeed, on this view, a family and set of 
skills are part of arW in the same sense that Aristotle's moral virtues are part of 
arW. For example, Aristotle claims in Rhetoric 1.9.1366a36-1366b3, 
"Excellence, it would seem, is a capacity of providing and preserving good things, 
and a capacity of conferring many great benefits, of all kinds in all cases. The 
parts of excellence are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, 
liberality, practical judgment, and wisdom" (aretj d'esti men dunamis h6s dokei 
poristW agath6n kai phulaktW, kai dunamis euergetW poll6n kai megal6n, kai 
scope of this work. 
... See 2.2 for the full argument. Zý, 
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pantön peri panta. - mer2 de aret& dikaiosuný, andreia, yöphro. s-iiný, 
megaloprepeia, megalopsuchia, eleutheriotJs', [note: some manuscripts include 
praotes, gentleness, in this list], phron0sis, sophia). In like manner, I am claiming 
that for the average agent aretO is a dunamis and that the virtues (i. e. skills) are 
parts of excellence. For the phronimos, of course, arW is a hexis and the virtues 
are part of this state of character. Yet, no one moves directly from being adapted 
by nature to receive the virtues (i. e. from possessing a capacity for acquiring 
excellence in the first place, understood in light of modem neurobiology as the 
neural networks within an anatomically normal human brain), to possessing a 
hexis prohairetike. For some period of time after first acquiring some degree of 
excellence,, each person (who will become excellent) continues to acquire, 
develop, and perfect excellence and, during this period of time, arW remains a 
dunamis. For without acquiring some excellence, it would be impossible for an 
individual to act from excellence or to act in a virtuous manner; yet, without 
perfecting excellence and, thereby, fully actualizing the human potential for 
excellence, it would be impossible for an individual to possess a hexis 
prohairetike. Thus, it is by way of aretý as a dunamis, including the moral virtues 
as Parts of excellence, that each agent (prior to achieving a hexis prohairetike) 
both further develops and acts from excellence. On this view, aretý is, first, the 
dunamis of developing and acting from excellence, and for those people who 
acquire some degree of excellence, but who fail to fully actualize their potential 
for excellence, aretý remains a dunamis. The moral virtues, as a particular family 
and set of skills, enable an individual who possesses them to chose and act in 
accordance with the ultimate end for humans. In the ideal case, the process of 
actualizing excellence would involve, first, the capacity to acquire excellence (i. e. 
160 
humans are adapted, by nature, to receive the virtues), second. the capacity to 
further develop and act from excellence (i. e. arW as a dunamis); and, finally. the 
development of a stable state of character, from which excellent decisions and 
actions proceed (i. e. arW as a hexis). 
Even in this ideal case,, we can recognize and discuss particular parts of 
virtue (e. g. temperance, courage, liberality, and so forth), and, in like manner, we 
can recognize and discuss particular skills. Given the dependency of some skills 
on others, however, and the general need to exercise certain skills in conjunction 
with others, the moral virtues can be separated for purposes of discussion in a way 
that they cannot in practice. Moreover, just as I have declined, quite intentionally, 
to define or describe the content of eudaimonia, I am intentionally declining to 
provide an exhaustive list of the moral virtues, even for the purpose of discussion. 
For while the moral virtues must promote, enhance, or honor the ultimate end for 
humans, they are closely related to the content of eudaimonia. For example, the 
relationships that we have with others, our ability to make effective decisions,, the 
formulation of our desires, our ability to handle emotion, adversity, and the 
turmoil of daily life, our personal tastes and needs, and so forth are all intimately 
bound up with our particular family and set of skills. We cannot possibly claim 
that if X possesses Y skills, then X will achieve eudaimonia, for this claim would 
limit eudaimonia to the same extent that it would be limited by a comprehensive 
and exhaustive list of its content. The best that we can hope for is to link the 
moral virtues with moral values and to further link both of these elements with the 
ultimate end for human beings. 
Such a link does not depend, however, upon a complete, cross-cultural 
agreement as to the definition and delineation of values. It depends more upon the 
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fact that certain values accord with the end in a manner that others do not. 142 For 
example, if we value human life (since eudaimonia is an activity of the living), 
and if by that value we imply that human life should be protected and preserved, 
we are likely to consider such things as courage, generosity, beneficence, 
compassion, kindness, and justice to be moral virtues. It is the ultimate end that 
provides the starting-point for discussion or argumentation concerning what 
should or should not be considered a value, and it is the values that provide the 
starting-point for discussion or argumentation concerning what should or should 
not be classified as a moral virtue. Even classifying the ultimate end for human 
beings as eudaimonia provides evidence for the necessity of the moral virtues, 
particularly when they are understood as aspects of human character. For while 
we may never reach a general or cross-cultural agreement on what, very precisely, 
is meant by the phrase "human flourishing, " or by the description "living well and 
faring well, " we can identify some of the components that would be necessary to 
achieve these things and we can argue that moral virtues are necessary on several 
fronts. 
For example, whatever else human flourishing may entail, it seems to 
include some kind of internal contentment satisfaction, or balance, for it would be 
difficult to describe someone who is consistently besieged by internal conflict and 
turmoil as flourishing. It seems, as well, that Aristotle is correct in claiming that a 
person who is without virtue will experience conflicting desires, guilt, hasty 
emotional responses, and the pursuit of fleeting pleasures. In like manner, if 
human flourishing requires the ability to make good choices and act effectively 
upon those choices, then an individual who lacks the moral virtues will be 
142 See 4.3 for a full discussion of moral values. 
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incapable of flourishing. For even if an individual is not overtly wicked. but 
simply lacks courage, compassion, justice, practical wisdom, and so forth. it 
seems that she will flounder in her choices and fail in her efforts frequently 
enough to be at the mercy of her own inadequacies. If this is the case, we can 
argue for the necessity of moral virtue, as the development of a certain type of 
character, even if we cannot name or agree upon each and every moral virtue. 
At this point, we can also attempt to explicate the relationship between the 
moral virtues and inductive reasoning. We will not be capable of claiming that 
every value is a result of inductive reasoning, or even that inductive reasoning 
alone is enough to show that every moral virtue supports a particular value. But 
we can argue that the moral virtues, along with the actions that involve these 
virtues,, can be shown to support or uphold a particular value by way of induction 
and experience. For example, if we value human life and human success, we 
might be able to decide through reason and the definition of generosity that 
generosity should be considered a moral virtue. But such a classification would 
be without content and it would be difficult, at best, to describe what it might 
mean to be a generous person. Human beings learn through experience that 
generosity has numerous manifestations, from generosity of spirit to financial 
generosity, and we know that generosity entails a willingness to give of one's 
personal or financial resources. We learn what works in a pragmatic sense, for 
individual people in concrete circumstances, by seeing numerous examples of 
successes and failures and by teasing out the common elements in both. We 
experience the generosity of others and we come to know, through personal 
experience and the narratives of others. which instances of generosity helped the 
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recipient, which harmed the giver, which harmed the recipient, and which resulted 
in a combination of help and harm. Hopefully, we subsequently make our own 
choices about generosity, and about the correct time and way to give to particular 
others, based on an inductive familiarity with the content of generosity. 
At the very least, it is the content of the moral virtues, like the content of 
general principles, that is arrived at through inductive reasoning, experience, and 
attention to particulars. Then, too, moral virtues do not exist in abstraction, but 
are attributed to specific individuals and exercised in particular situations, and this 
aspect also argues for an ethical eye to the particular. Although I discuss 
universality and partiality in the following chapter, I wish to note here that we 
often make particular decisions based on induction and attention to particulars. 
We do not change our babies' diapers when we hear a particular cry, for example, 
and feed them when we hear another based on some formula that unites infant 
distress with discomfort. We know that there are particular forms of discomfort 
and particular cries of distress and we have learned, through the trial and error of 
repeated instances, how to respond effectively to each. In like manner, it is 
difficult to imagine that humans could achieve an understanding of such moral 
virtues as compassion without experiencing particular instances of compassion. 
In the end, although it is both impossible and unwise to offer an exhaustive 
list of moral virtues, these virtues remain central to the evaluation of an agent and 
important to the evaluation of an action. If moral virtues are classified as skills, 
and a morally knowledgeable adult as one who possesses a certain type of family 
and set of skills, then an evaluation of an agent must take into consideration both 
the degree to which she possesses these skills and her willingness to utilize them. 
Whether or not we consider a person to be virtuous would depend upon her 
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behavior, insofar as her behavior reflects her choices and her choices reflect her 
skills, and we could gauge the motivation of an agent by way of her history, as 
well as her actions. Each agent would have a context into which actions could be 
fitted and through which actions could be understood, and the overall character of 
the agent would affect the understanding of her intentions and goals in performing 
a given action. 
143 
On this view, and as argued in 2.3, the phronimos would represent an 
ideally habituated agent and a role model, or exemplar, for others. Individual 
agents might measure themselves against this ideal, as perhaps Christians do 
against their conceptualization of Christ, and they might strive for this ideal in an 
effort to further develop both their skills and their understanding of the ultimate 
end. The phronimos would not, however, represent an ethical standard or a 
measure by which an action could be evaluated. Nor would the phronimos 
represent a standard against which an agent could be effectively evaluated, except 
by positive analogy. The evaluation, for example, "Agent X is not as 
compassionate as Phronimos Y, " tells us preciously little about Agent X. We 
have no idea how far short of a particular ideal Agent X falls, or under what 
circumstances, or even whether Agent X is a compassionate person at all. 
Conversely, the evaluation -Agent X is as compassionate as Phronimos Y*' gives 
us a starting-point for understanding Agent X, assuming that we are familiar with 
the compassionate nature and actions of Phronimos Y. A positive analogy gives 
more content to the description of Agent X's moral virtue than does the simple 
assertion "Agent X is compassionate, " and for this reason it may be useful. 
Overall, however, the role of the phronimos in the theory presented here is as 
143 See 4.1 for agents in context. 
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exemplar and, perhaps, as a mental aid in the decision-making process, such that 
an agent might ask himself "What would so-and-so, the phronimos, do in this 
situation? " 
The moral virtues, however, would play a role in the evaluation of singular 
moral judgments. In 2.6,1 discussed four conditions that would count as evidence 
for the acceptability of a singular moral judgment and, although practical wisdom 
might be a factor in every condition, the moral virtues are most closely aligned 
with the fourth condition: consideration of human nature, as that nature pertains to 
human ends. 144 By this condition, if a singular moral judgment is to be found 
acceptable, it must aim at the ultimate end for human beings as that aim is 
determined by human nature. However, since some singular moral judgments can 
reasonably be expected to have varying consequences, depending upon how the 
particular circumstances unfold, the intentions of the agent must be brought into 
the evaluation. 
For example, as noted in 2.6, if a singular moral judgment can result in 
varying consequences (and even if it appears to have an obvious aim and only one 
possible consequence), an obvious question in evaluating it would be, "What did 
the agent intend9" If the agent's intentions include an eye to the end, and if the 
action relies on the moral virtues (e. g. the action involves courage, justice, 
compassion, and so forth), these elements would count as evidence of 
consideration (by the agent) of the end. By the definition above, the moral virtues 
themselves promote, enhance, or honor the ultimate end, and so an action that is 
144 The conditions are (1) accordance with accepted general principles or general guidelines, (2) 
accurate identification and comprehension of the relevant specific facts; (3) informed application 
of accepted general principles or general guidelines (i. e. infon-ned by specific facts), and (4) 
consideration of human nature. as that nature pertains to human ends. 
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performed in a virtuous manner would aim at the end to the degree (at the very 
least) that the skills utilized in performing it aim at the end. 
In evaluating an action separately from the agent, the character of the 
action itself would have to be taken into consideration. For example, if an action 
has a particular character, and if that character can be described in terins of a 
moral virtue (e. g. the action is just), or if it can be shown to promote or enhance 
the end for humans, then the action itself would meet condition four, even if the 
agent had no intention of aiming at the end. 145 In like manner, if an action results 
in an unintended consequence (i. e. one that promotes or enhances the end for 
humans) or has an unintended character (i. e. it can be described in terms of a 
moral virtue), then the action itself would meet condition four, regardless of the 
agent's motivations. In these cases (and others like them), the action itself might 
be deemed acceptable if it meets all four conditions, while the agent might be 
evaluated in less positive terms. In other words, it is important to differentiate on 
some level between actions and agents, so that praise or blame may be rightfully 
attributed to the agent. A wicked agent, for example, might accidentally perform 
an action that increases the human good and, although such an action might be 
acceptable, the agent would remain wicked. We could, without contradiction, 
evaluate the action as acceptable and the agent as blameworthy. 
Even with a definition of the moral virtues in place, and even with an 
understanding of how-this definition affects the evidence for the acceptability of a 
singular moral judgment, our evaluations (and recommendations) must take place 
"' In evaluating an action separately from an agent, the phrase "consideration of human nature, as 
that nature pertains to human ends" in the fourth condition might be replaced by "in accord ýk ith 
human nature, as that nature pertains to human ends. " In this way, an action can be evaluated, 
even if the agent's intentions are unknown. See 2.6 for a full discussion of the meaning of 
"consideration of human nature, as that nature pertains to human ends. " 
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within a theoretical context that prioritizes either partiality or universalizability, 
that includes a more detailed examination of values. and that reexamines 
"normativity" in Aristotelian terms. Therefore, I turn first to Aristotle and to his 
views on partiality and particular others. 
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Chapter Four 
Partiality and Universalizability 
4.1 
For Aristotle, although some actions and passions are unconditional ly bad, 
in that they are by nature excesses or deficiencies (EN 2.6.1107a9-26), excellence 
in the other actions and passions is dependent upon feeling and acting in particular 
ways under particular circumstances. With regard to the passions, Aristotle 
claims that to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, 
towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way is both in accord 
with the mean and best, and that this is characteristic of excellence (I 106b 19-23). 
Likewise,, with actions there is excess, deficiency, and a mean, and finding the 
mean, and thereby excellence, is dependent upon the abilities and resources of the 
agent and upon the particular circumstances. The mean is relative to specific 
individuals, the agents who must feel and act appropriately towards particular 
others in concrete situations, and moral excellence is situated within the active and 
rich interplay between an agent and his environment. 
In this picture of moral excellence, each agent is contextualized within a 
narrative that spans and includes her experiences, degree of habituation, skills and 
talents, social and political affiliations, tastes and desires, emotions and activities, 
and relationships with others. 146 The act of becoming a virtuous person. of living 
well and excellently, is a life-long endeavor and it takes place within, and is 
dependent upon, this narrative. Such a view makes room for the notion of morally 
significant, yet non-repeatable, events and persons, and it holds open the 
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possibility that each agent participates not only in her own moral development, 
but also in the direction and development of the narrative itself. It is the picture of 
a life lived, replete with choices, responsibilities, relationships, turmoil, hardships, 
pains, and pleasures, and replete with the kinds of deliberation and decision- 
making that is characteristic of a life lived in the company of others. 
To understand life in this manner, as a narrative within which each agent 
develops and through which each agent relates to others, is to place moral 
significance upon particulars-as the details without which there would be no 
coherent narrative-and to recognize the ethical responsibilities generated by 
specific kinds of relationships. On this view, although there are two main kinds of 
particulars, the agents and the circumstances, there is the sort of relationship 
between the two that would make it somewhat farcical to describe a solitary agent 
as virtuous or vicious (except, perhaps, in regard to her own appetites). For this 
reason, I will discuss the agent and her circumstances, as integral aspects of a 
narrative., in relation to one another. 
The mean, for Aristotle, is relative to each individual and each individual 
is responsible for accurately assessing his own abilities, skills, and talents. This is 
to claim that,, while each agent is expected to act virtuously and in accordance 
with excellence, each agent is not expected to act identically under identical 
external circumstances. For example, an action that could be described as 
courageous, if perfon-ned by a trained and experienced soldier under the fearful 
conditions of the battlefield, might be described as rash if performed by an 
146 Cf. Maclntyre (1984), 204-225. 
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average citizen. Virtue is always in relation to specific individuals and one size 
does not fit all. 
Although virtue is embodied by individuals, the development and exercise 
of moral virtue require a relational context. For example, because each agent is 
habituated to virtue or its opposite by others, the initial development of virtue 
depends upon personal relationships and social interaction. Moreover, although 
each person seeks the ultimate end for himself, Aristotle claims that the best 
person is not he who exercises his excellence towards himself, but he who 
exercises it towards another (5.1.1130a5-8). Indeed, achieving eudaimonia 
depends, at least in part, on the quality of an agent's relationships with others, 
since each agent's happiness is affected by the choices and circumstances of 
others, particularly those with whom he shares a close, personal relationship. 
More to the point, many of the moral virtues themselves suggest an agent in 
relation with others, for an agent could not possibly act in a generous, liberal, 
compassionate, or just manner if he existed in complete isolation. Excellence is 
actualized through activity and activity itself is often dependent upon some 
relationship between the agent and another. 
Moreover, agents have personal and social desires that involve others, 
which must be right and appropriate if the agents are to become virtuous, and they 
feel emotions in regard to others and to the circumstances brought about by others, 
to which they must respond rightly and appropriately. Even when we place virtue 
in terms of internal harmony and a coherence between our desires. emotions, and 
actions, we find that the kind of balance we are describing depends, at least in 
part, on the character of our relationships with others. 
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Indeed, once the idea of a life lived in the company of others is understood 
as an ongoing narrative, into which particular others are placed and through which 
they have moral significance, moral choice-making and moral action cannot be 
cleanly separated from the narrative. For example, each agent is. say, generous 
towards someone, or courageous under some circumstances, and a careful 
assessment of the particulars is necessary if the agent is to act in a generous or 
courageous manner, or to be generous or courageous. If an agent's action is to be 
accurately classified as generous, for instance, it must be directed towards a 
particular person (or group) in need. It must provide resources that the agent 
possesses and that the person (or group) needs, and it must take place when the 
agent has the resources and the person (or group) has the need. Finally, it must be 
intentional, rather than either accidental or involuntary. In other words, the action 
must be directed towards the right person, with reference to the right objects, at 
the right time, and with the right aim. Actions are virtuous because they are for 
the sake of, or on behalf of, or appropriate to particular persons or circumstances, 
and their moral significance is part and parcel of the narrative that surrounds and 
includes them. Without such a narrative, it seems impossible to decide how one 
would act generously or become generous. For to become generous an agent must 
consistently act in a generous manner under the appropriate circumstances, and 
once an agent has become generous, she will recognize and respond appropriately 
to the circumstances that require generosity. The particulars here not only matter. 
but they also seem to belie the notion that a virtue such as generosity could exist 
in abstraction. 
In eudaimonia, as well, there is a strong focus on narrative and on the 
particulars. Certainly, thefiorm of eudaimonia, as the ultimate end for human 
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beings, can be abstracted in thought in a way that it cannot be in practice and. in 
that abstracted form, it depends largely on human reason. But, eudaimonia, as I 
have argued above, 147 is not something over and above the goods that comprise its 
content, and the content itself is composed of particulars. We have relationships 
with specific individuals, carry out specific actions. have specific skills or moral 
virtues,, act under specific circumstances, suffer specific losses, and so forth. We 
love this person, or we train for that career, or we show compassion to those 
individuals under these circumstances. Moreover, as Aristotle suggests, our 
ability to achieve eudaimonia is affected by our particular circumstances, as well 
as our level of personal virtue, and our circumstances are little more than a series 
of specific events and conditions involving ourselves, our relationships with 
others, and our environment. 
For this reason, although each individual seeks his own happiness, 
common sense alone would promote other-regarding virtues. It would be 
counterproductive, for example, for a person who seeks a secure environment to 
disregard the education and moral development of his fellow citizens. In like 
manner, if a person seeks freedom of choice in his education, career, and family 
life, it would be counterproductive to disregard the political state of his 
community. In other words, each agent serves his own interests by encouraging 
and creating the sort of enviromnent in which he can personally flourish. 
While this much might be obvious, there is considerably more to the 
relationship between particular others and both eudaimonia and moral virtue than 
is contained in an egoistic account of other-directed virtues, particularly as this 
relationship affects the ethical standing of partiality. Indeed, I intend to argue that 
147 See Introduction and 2.4. 
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other-regarding virtues, including many of the desires and intentions that promote 
or accompany virtuous actions, are outgrowths of particular relationships and that 
they depend upon partiality in a morally significant manner. Further, I intend to 
argue that particular relationships generate both moral responsibilities and moral 
claims, and that certain other-regarding moral virtues only make sense in light of 
particular relationships, whether those relationships involve two individuals, an 
individual and his/her community or group, an individual and his/her supreme 
being or religious ideology, or any other relationship in which the participants 
share a particular bond, tie, or common purpose. Such virtues might include, inter 
alia, loyalty, fidelity, and certain degrees of honesty, and they point to a kind of 
morally significant partiality wherein one participant has a moral responsibility to, 
as well as a moral claim on, another participant by reason of the relationship 
alone. 
In order to explicate and support this position, it will be helpful to examine 
Aristotle's idea of virtuous friendship and to move, through ever-widening 
concentric circles, from the moral claims of those with whom we share 
relationships to the moral sentiment that we feel for particular strangers. On this 
view, strict impartiality is neither possible nor morally praiseworthy, for such 
impartiality implies a failure to apprehend, appreciate, and act upon the 
responsibilities inherent in the relationships themselves and in the narrative that 
contains them. 
4.2 
As we know from EN 9.4, Aristotle claims that friendly relations with 
others and the characteristics by which friendship is defined seem to have 
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proceeded from a man's relationship with himself (I 166al-2). That is, humans- 
particularly those who are good or who believe themselves to be good-love 
themselves for their own sake and wish themselves well. They enjoy their own 
company, relishing memories of the past and looking forward with expectation to 
the future, and they hope to protect and preserve their own lives. They make 
choices on behalf of their own interests, and they grieve and rejoice most over the 
events that happen to them, very directly. They desire good and fulfilling lives, 
and they take pleasure in their own choices and actions. 
Aristotle claims that, since each of these characteristics belongs to a good 
man in relation to himself, and since a man is related to his friend as to himself 
(for a friend is another self), complete friendship will be characterized by these 
same attributes (116600-33). On this view, a man will love his friend for his 
own sake,, wishing him well and having the desire to protect and preserve his life. 
He will wish to spend time with him, sharing his joys and sorrows alike, and he 
will make choices on his behalf He will take pleasure in the choices and actions 
of his friend, and he will rejoice in his good fortune. He will love his friend as a 
mother loves her child, extending to him all of the goods in which he shares and 
seeking for him the same good fortune that he seeks for himself 
Here, Aristotle is characterizing love as a passion that human beings (at 
least the good ones) both feel for themselves and have the ability, as inherently 
social creatures, to extend to others. 148 If human beings were incapable of loving 
148 Annas ( 1993), 254ff., argues that self-love has psychological primacy in Aristotle's account of 
friendship. This means, on her view, that, as a matter of psychological fact, we begin with self- 
concern and, also as a matter of psychological fact, we can come to extend to others the relevant 
aspects of that concern. and so come to care about their good for their own sakes. She points out 
that psychological primacy does not imply that we care for others only in a manner that makes 
them instrumental to our own concerns, or that we should put our own concerns first, or even that 
it is morally permissible to do so. However, Sherman (1997), 216 n. 85, notes that it is important 
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themselves, they would be equally incapable of loving others and, therefore, 
incapable of extending true and complete friendship to others. Indeed, it is for this 
reason that Aristotle claims that thoroughly wicked men are incapable of true 
friendship. It seems impossible, on his view, for a man who is at odds ýý-ith 
himself, whose desires are in conflict, and who grieves over his own actions to 
love himself for his own sake and to take pleasure in his own existence. Internal 
conflict and regret characterize the thoroughly wicked man and, because he lacks 
the quality of being lovable, he has no feeling of love for himself. This being the 
case, he is incapable of extending love to others and of being a true friend 
(I 166b 1 -29). 
Aristotle admits that, because entirely virtuous people are rare, and 
because these are the people most capable of loving themselves, complete 
friendships are equally rare. Loving is the characteristic excellence of friendship 
and,, since friendship depends on loving, only those who are capable of loving 
have true and enduring friendships (I 159a34-1159bl). All others participate in 
friendships that are based on utility or pleasure, or they participate in relationships 
that resemble friendship to varying degrees, but that are incomplete in some 
measure, for love is a passion that can be felt fleetingly or even for lifeless things. 
The mutual love that is characteristic of friendship, however, is a state involving 
choice, and choice itself is accompanied by responsibility (I 157b28-32). 
This responsibility is part and parcel of the relationship itself and it cannot 
be cleanly separated from it. Complete friendship involves equality, in that a 
to add to this account that Aristotle primarily has in mind the connection between the good 
person's self-love and the love of others. She takes this to suggest, first, that not anv self-love can 
be a condition for loving others and, second, that healthy self-love is not something that happens 
without habituation. On Sherman's view, both moving outward to others in the right way and 
loving ourselves in the right way requires proper ethical training, 
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friend is another self, and it involves reciprocity and proportion. In other words, 
.r --- * 
149 
friendship asks a man to do what he can to repay a friend either in kind or in 
appropriate measure for his love, kindness, beneficence, loyalty. support, 
compassion, and so forth. The gifts of friendship are on loan, lio so to speak, and 
friends can rightfully expect to receive as much as they have given. Likewise, 
friendship implies ethical responsibilities and claims, such that a man would be 
acting incorrectly if he fed a famished stranger while his friend starved to death, 
or even if he failed to come to his friend's assistance under less desperate 
circumstances. 
Friendship is accompanied by these responsibilities and claims by the fact 
that, on Aristotle's view, friendship and justice 15 1 are concerned with the same 
objects and are exhibited between the same persons (I 159b25-27). All 
communities have some form of justice, as well as some form of friendship and, 
while the extent of the various associations between individuals is the extent of 
the friendships, the extent of the friendships is the extent to which justice exists 
between them (I 159b27-31). States form friendships to increase their respective 
advantage, fellow-citizens form friendships to further their mutual concerns, 
fellow-voyagers share a common endeavor,, family members share blood and 
ancestry, husband and wife share love and life, and true friends share mutual love. 
Each of these relationships is an association and the claims of justice concerning 
149 See 1163b] 5. 
150 See 1162b3O-35. Even though this section is discussing friendship of utility, some of its claims 
are relevant to complete friendship as well. 
15 1A proper treatment of justice would include discussion of Aristotle's classification of types of 
justice in EN 5, the political constitutions discussed in the Politics (along with their suitability for 
achieving both justice and the good life in general), the relationship of institutional justice to 
justice as a moral virtue, and so forth, and it would take us well beyond the scope of this work. 
Thus, I will be discussing the relationship ofjustice to friendship in a very limited sense. 
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them are based on the specific relationship and they differ depending upon the 
extent of the friendship. 
For example, the duties of parents to children differ from those of sibling 
to sibling, and the duties of comrades differ from those of fellow-citizens 
(115%35-11600). Then, too, acts of injustice differ according to the degree of 
friendship, such that the degree of injustice increases in proportion to the degree 
of friendship. On this view, while a particular act of disloyalty to a parent might 
be unjust, the same act of disloyalty to a fellow-citizen might be acceptable. 
Likewise, it would be more unjust to defraud a sibling than a fellow-citizen and 
more unjust to refuse to aid a son than a stranger (11600-6). 
Clearly, this view stretches the definition of "friendship" beyond common 
English usage, but it relies upon a familiar concept of association and upon the 
degrees of association with which we are equally familiar and by which we often 
feel ethically bound. It does not seem extraordinary, for example, to argue that we 
owe something more to our parents and children than we do to total strangers, or 
to suggest that the association of fellow-soldiers, fighting for a common cause, 
carries explicit duties and obligations. Indeed, it seems as though Aristotle's use 
of the word "friendship" in reference to these various associations is meant to 
underscore the ethical obligations that are generated by specific relationships, 
even if these relationships cannot be correctly classified as complete friendships. 
Aristotle is arguing here that to offer less than is demanded by a particular 
relationship, or to turn living, breathing human beings into ethically equiN, alent 
abstractions, would be to fail to apprehend, appreciate, acknowledge, and act upon 
ethical responsibilities and claims. Each individual with whom we deal, or 
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towards whom we act, is a particular other with whom we share a given 
relationship, even if that relationship is little more than fellow-humans. 152 
For example, when we donate money to aid the victims of famine, ý%e 
imagine starving individuals who will die particular deaths if strangers fail to 
contribute. It is because we can imagine (and fear) facing starvation ourselves 
that we feel pity for those individuals who are experiencing it. Yet, precisely 
because we recognize all individuals as particular others with whom we share 
widely differing associations, we will feed our own starving children before we 
feed strangers. 
At first blush, this view seems at odds with notions of "blind" justice, or 
with the idea that justice must be entirely impartial and, theoretically at least, 
utterly universalizable. However, Aristotle recognizes two forms of justice, one 
unwritten and one legal (to men agraphon to de kata nomon), and the relationships 
that he describes correspond to these forms of justice by being either moral 
(&hike) or legal (nomike) (I 162b22-23). In the case of friendship of utility, for 
example, the legal type is of the commercial variety, with a fixed debt and terms, 
and with specific stipulations for repayment (I 162b25-30). The moral type, on 
the other hand, is not on fixed terms, but the giver can rightfully expect to receive 
as much or more than he has given, as if he had not given to the recipient, but only 
152 As William James (1987), 148, states, "Wherever such minds exist, with judgments of good 
and ill, and demands upon one another, there is an ethical world in its essential features. Were all 
other things, gods and men and starry heavens, blotted out from this universe, and were there left 
but one rock with two loving souls upon it, that rock would have as thoroughly moral a 
constitution as any possible world which the eternities and immensities could harbor. It would be 
a tragic constitution, because the rock's inhabitants would die. But while they lived, there would 
be real good things and real bad things in the universe; there would be obligations, claims, and 
expectations; obediences, refusals, and disappointments; compunctions and longings for harmony 
to come again, and inward peace of conscience when it was restored; there would, in short, be a 
moral life, xvhose active energy would have no limit but the intensity of interest in each other "ith 
which the hero and heroine might be endowed. " 
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lent (I 162b3O-35). It is the legal aspect of any relationship that corresponds with 
the legal fonn of justice and, in this forrn, justice can be rendered universalizable 
in modem terms. A contract is a contract, for example, regardless of the 
relationship between the parties, and if one party is in default of the contract, the 
law will award penalties and damages to the appropriate parties. Yet, if one of the 
parties to the contract is a son, and if the son has defaulted on a contract to his 
father, there is a moral responsibility that attends the transaction, in additioii to the 
legal responsibility, which is entirely partial and dependent upon the relationship. 
On this view, it is not only unkind or unfair to defraud a family member or 
close friend,, but it is unjust as well. Associations between individuals are ethical 
relationships in the sense that they create the moral form of justice, and the degree 
of moral obligation is, therefore, dependent upon the closeness of the relationship. 
These associations are friendships either in reality or by resemblance, and the 
degree of moral responsibility moves out from a given individual in ever- 
widening concentric circles. For example, an average individual might have the 
highest degree of moral responsibility to her immediate family and close friends, 
then to kindred,, companions and comrades, fellow-citizens, and finally fellow- 
humans. In any case, although the claims of each class must be compared with 
respect to nearness of relation, excellence, or usefulness (I 165a32-36), that which 
is appropriate and becoming should be rendered to each class accordingly 
(1164b22-1165a32). 
The salient point here is that without personal relationships, there would be 
no moral form of justice, for the claims and obligations of moral justice are 
relationship-dependent. The very notion of moral justice includes the concept of 
giving and receiving in appropriate shares or to an appropriate degree. and the 
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appropriateness is determined by the relationship. For example. a woman can 
rightfully expect a degree of loyalty and honesty from her husband that she cannot 
rightfully expect from her neighbor. The relationship of husband and wife creates 
a situation in which both parties have claims and obligations, and to give or 
receive less than is demanded by the relationship sets up a scenario that includes a 
lack of reciprocity, or a lack of equality, or a lack of proportion. Thus, if a wife 
has rendered love and loyalty to her husband, and if he has repaid her with 
betrayal and dishonesty, he has not only acted unkindly, but unjustly as well. Yet, 
without the relationship of husband and wife, there would be no corresponding 
moral claims and obligations between the parties. 153 
By the fact that relationships entail moral claims and obligations, any 
theoretical move to complete impartiality indicates a failure to recognize the 
moral significance of particular others and the moral significance of partiality. It 
is not ethical evolution or moral maturity to claim that all humans can be rendered 
ethically equivalent abstractions or premises in categorical calculations, even 
though we love, or care about, or are committed to particular others. Instead, such 
a claim both acknowledges the significance of particular others, at least insofar as 
love,, loyalty, and commitment are concerned, and denies that particular people 
153 Williams (1972) points out that, while various titles, roles, and relationships (e. g. father, 
soldier) can conceptually carry broad standards of assessment of the people under those titles, 
roles, and relationships, the standards can be logically connected to the titles, roles, and 
relationships in a manner that they cannot be logically connected to the persons themselves. For 
instance, he points to people who dissociate or resign from the titles, roles, and relationships as 
well as from the assessments that apply to them, and to others who feel required to refrain from 
doing what might be expected of someone in their role. However, while Williams is correct in 
suggesting that an individual can abandon a title, role, or relationship, and thereby refuse to make 
the standards associated with the role, title, or relationship the determinants of his life, I would add 
that the titles, roles, and relationships from which an individual has not "resigned" nonetheless 
carry moral claims and responsibilities. In addition, I would add that one cannot necessarily 
relinquish the claims and obligations that accompany a title, role, or relationship such as "father" 
by merely "resigning" from the title, role, or relationship, or by refusing to make the broad 
standards of assessment associated with it the determinants of one's life. See Williams (1972), 5 1- 
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and the relationships that we share with them are (or should be) morally decisive. 
Indeed, such a claim both abstracts each individual from the narrative of a life 
lived in the company of others and presents an impoverished view of the moral 
decision-making process. 
For example, let us say that a woman can save the life of one person with 
whom she is traveling. Let us further say that she is traveling with her husband, a 
religious leader, and a corporate executive. The woman shares a deep and mutual 
love with her husband, the religious leader is beloved by thousands, and the 
corporate executive provides employment for hundreds. Each person is an 
individual') a particular other, and if the case is to be decided on some prInciple, 
say the greatest happiness of the largest number of people, the woman must still 
decide which individual best fulfills the criterion. Further, her choice must be 
based on the relationships that the various individuals share with others. If. on the 
other hand, the woman must act from duty alone (in a Kantian sense), she must 
decide which individual best fulfills the criterion of arousing obligation, 
ostensibly without emotion or personal involvement. To claim that either criterion 
is devoid of some form of partiality, which involves the individual and his 
relationship with others, is self-deceptive and inconsistent. 154 Yet, one of the 
8. Also, see Macintyre (1984), 204-225, for the self and its roles within the narrative of a human 
life. 
"' Gill (1996), summarizing Williams, states, " Crucial to Kant's theory is the idea that the 
autonomous will is not affected by emotions and desires, by practical considerations, or by 
personal and communal attachments, other than those which the agent can universalize rationally. 
Yet it is also clear that Kant envisages the moral response as being one of total commitment, and 
as involving some kind of psychological unity; as he puts it, 'duty' means acting 'out of reverence 
for the law'. Williams has, at various times, expressed deep skepticism about the possibility of 
reconciling these two requirements of Kant's theory: and about the picture of human psychology 
that seems to underlie them. Since the claims of impartial reason (on the Kantian model) invite us 
to treat as, in themselves, weightless the kind of considerations that normally motivate human 
action-for instance, the desire to save my wife's life, rather than anyone else's-he argues that it 
is unclear how those claims can conjure up the required totality of moral commitment" (64, italics 
in original). 
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three individuals-as an individual and in relation to the woman-has a 
defensible moral claim, in the sense of moral justice, and that individual is the 
woman 1) s husband. If she has saved anyone other than her husband, she will have 
failed to act upon the claims and obligations generated by a particular relationship 
and, in so doing, she will have acted in a manner that is morally unjust. On this 
view, there is a sense of duty to particular others with whom we share particular 
relationships that is generated by the relationships themselves. This sense of duty 
differs from one that arises from, say, recognizing a fellow human's rationality, 
potential rationality, or even humanity, and it must be acknowledged in order to 
make sense of certain virtues. 
For example, partiality is always crucial to some virtues (e. g. loyalty) and 
often crucial to some others. Loyalty, for instance, is always to a particular other, 
whether that other is a person, group, or nation. Loyalty is an outgrowth of a 
relationship, and without a relational context, loyalty cannot exist or be exercised. 
Even self-sacrifice, if it is to be seen as a virtuous act, must take place within a 
context that includes particular others and a relationship of some kind. An 
individual sacrifices herself for another person, perhaps, or for a beloved nation. 
Each of these scenarios includes a relationship between the individual and some 
other, and the willingness to sacrifice only makes sense, or becomes virtuous, 
within that context. Surely, duty is involved here, but duty that arises from the 
relationship itself, rather than from a sense of reverence for moral law. 
Partiality, then, is an integral aspect of Aristotelian virtue ethics, as it must 
be. If humans feel love and fear for themselves, and if love and pity for others are 
natural outgrowths of this relationship with the self, then partiality is built into the 
framework of human encounters. However, it is not enough to claim that we do 
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make partial singular moral judgments or even that we should make them. we 
must also be able to show that they have moral force. To some degree that x\-ork 
has been done in this section, but it is incomplete without an examination of 
values,, both as they pertain to particular relationships and to universal claims. So, 
it is to that task that I turn next. 
4.3 
For Aristotle, there are no abstract moral values, or anything resembling 
the Good in Itself. Instead, the human good, including all of the attendant values 
and ends, is determined by human nature. On his view, a careful examination of 
human beings will reveal what sort of creatures they are, and towards what end 
they move, and an analysis of these findings will further reveal the values 
pertaining to the human good, at least in outline. While we might be incapable of 
filling in every detail and explicating every nuance, we can ascertain the ultimate 
human good and, using it as our starting-point, determine the various values that 
contribute to that good. There is no reason to invent some abstract moral order, 
which is somehow over and above the human good, and to do so would merely 
complicate the matter in a way that could not be adequately justified by either 
experience or reason. For Aristotle, the human function and end provide a 
sufficient explanation of and justification for values. 
As we know, on Aristotle's view, the ultimate end for human beings is 
eudaimonza, 155 and so I would argue that, if moral values are to accord with 
Aristotelian-based notions of the human good, then all moral values must accord 
155 In this discussion, eudaimonia is understood as a regulating notion. See Introduction, 2.4. and 
n. 52. 
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with this end. 156 As social creatures. human beings attain eudaimonia in the 
company of others, so at least some moral values must pertain to the 
interdependency and interaction of human beings. Eudaimonia is dependent upon 
particular internal qualities and certain external goods, so moral values must 
promote, preserve, or protect these qualities and goods. Finally, by their nature, 
humans move toward the good, and so many facts about human beings must be 
understood to be imbued, at least to some degree, with moral value. 
On this view, primary moral values would be those values that can be 
derived directly ftom human nature and the end for humans, and that are 
necessary conditionsfor attaining eudaimonia. Secondar moral values would be y 
those values that are derived ftom primary moral values. For example, if 
eudaimonia is defined as living and faring well, then human life itself must be of 
value, since it is the sine qua non for living and faring well, and human life (or 
preserving and protecting human life) would be a primary moral value. Moreover, 
since life is required for eudaimonia, and since by their nature humans seek to 
preserve their lives, the human drive for life becomes imbued with value, and 
human life can be understood to be morally significant on two interrelated fronts. 
Likewise, since reason is a defining human characteristic, and one without 
which humans would be incapable of attaining eudaimonia, human reason (or 
preserving and protecting human reason) would be a primary moral value. 
Clearly, such a value tells us nothing about notions of healthy mental functioning 
or ideals of normalcy, but it places the human capacity for reason, including the 
emotions necessary for such activity, 157 into the moral sphere. Moreover, it points 
156 Although this section is informed by Aristotle, the discussion of values represents m" views. 
157 See 3.3 for a discussion of the connection between reason, emotion, and action. 
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to the fact that humans require more than mere life to attain eudairnonia: they also 
require certain attributes and qualities that may be as critical to achieving 
eudaimonia as is life itself By this reasoning, the fact that humans have a 
particular capacity for reason, one distinct from the reasoning capacity of non- 
human animals, imbues the human capacity for reason with value. 
Conversely, while we might value education and consider it necessary to 
eudaimonia,, it would be necessary by reason of the human intellect, and would be, 
thereby, a secondary value that is derived from a primary value. It would be a 
secondary value by the fact that it accords with human nature and the ultimate end 
for humans (by way of, or through, a primary value) and because it supports the 
end for humans. Moreover, while we might respect an educated individual, or 
even envy her ability to reason clearly, the fact that a person is educated would not 
be, in and of itself, imbued with value. The human capacity to reason is imbued 
with value, but a specific level of education does not have such value. In like 
manner, while we might value honesty and consider it necessary to eudaimonia, it 
would be necessary by reason of the human intellect and by the importance we 
place on the human ability and desire to consent. For these reasons, honesty 
would be a secondary moral value, derived from the primary moral value 
pertaining to human reason. 
If we continued in this manner, even without attempting to explicate the 
content of eudaimonia, we would arrive at a familiar list of primary moral values. 
Such values might include, in addition to life and reason, physical health, certain 
freedoms, justice, personal property. privacy (perhaps), and so forth. Each of 
these values can be derived from the end for humans and described in terms of it. 
In like manner, we might arrive at an equally familiar list of secondary moral 
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values-one which resembles the lists of "rights" that are granted by various state 
and city constitutions. Every primary moral value will be connected to a fact or 
facts about human beings, such that each fact about human beings that is riAtfully 
imbued with value will correspond to some primary moral value or to some 
combination of them. 
Moreover, human beings value themselves and others, and it is here that 
we find both the moral significance of partiality and the possibility of 
universal izability. Value, as discussed above, is placed on the self through the 
human ability to love oneself and the experience of living as a discrete entity. 
However, because of the social nature of humans, combined with their ability to 
love and pity, value is also placed on the particular others with whom an 
individual shares specific relationships. This value might first manifest itself in a 
self-centered manner, as in "I love and need so-and-so and, therefore, she is of 
value to me. " But human beings do recognize one another as analogous 
selves 158_selves that they come to know and comprehend through the internal 
relationships that they have with themselves and through the interpersonal 
relationships that they share with others. Thus, if an individual values herself as a 
human being, she will comprehend the fact that other individuals, as analogous 
selves, value themselves in the same, or a similar, manner. Every human becomes 
158 While I will be borrowing the phrase "analogous selves" from Caroline Whitbeck (she uses 
"analogous beings"), I wish to make it clear that she would disagree with the claim that all human 
beings can be conceived as analogous selves in an Ari stotel i an -based ethical theory. Whitbeck 
refers specifically to Aristotle's association of the male with form and the female with matter, and 
she claims both that Aristotle uses this dualistic opposition as his ontological starting-point and 
that it remains at the core of his entire philosophical perspective. However, I would argue that 
Aristotle considers both males and females to be social in nature, capable of both reason and 
emotion to a degree that distinguishes them from non-human animals, and capable of similar 
appetites and drives. These elements would be sufficient to establish a foundational analogý 
between all humans, such that only the extent of the analogous relationship shared by males and 
females would be affected by Aristotle's claims concerning women. 1, of course, would disagree 
with him concerning the extent of that analogy. SeeWhitbeck(1992). 
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an analogous self, with greater or lesser degrees of similarity, and every individual 
is placed in relation, to one degree or another, with every other. 
Our ability to recognize humans as analogous selves helps to explain our 
sympathy and concern for strangers, at least in a general sense, as well as our 
ability to generalize values. For example, we might contribute motie\' to the 
victims of famine thousands of miles away because we understand them to be 
analogous selves, with value and with fears similar to our own. We might help a 
stranger on the street for precisely the same reason and because he is a particular 
other with whom we share the relationship of fellow-humans. If we accept the 
notion that all human beings have the same basic nature, we might generalize our 
values because we are generalizing over human beings and because we feel 
empowered to do so by our common natures. At the very least, without the ability 
to stand in relation as analogous selves, we would have no corresponding ability 
to generalize our values or to make sensible laws, principles, and guidelines. 
Indeed, we would have no sensible justification for our singular moral judgments. 
With a picture of human beings as analogous selves in hand, and as ones 
whose nature and end determine values, we can more clearly outline the 
relationship between values, general principles, general guidelines, singular moral 
judgments, and moral virtues. We can suggest, as well, that values create an 
objective standard by which principles, guidelines, singular moral judgments, and 
moral virtues may be evaluated. In brief, primary moral values are derivedftom 
the nature and endfor human beings and general principles codify the primatýv 
moral values (or some aspect of the primary moral values). Secondary moral 
values are derivedfirom primary moral values and general guidelines codiA, the 
secondary moral values (or some aspect of the secondary moral values). Singular 
188 
moral judgments uphold the primary, andlor secondary moral values. Aforal 
virtues both accord with and support the primary andlor secondary moral values. 
In general, each primary moral value is a necessary condition for attaining 
eudaimonia and each secondary moral value is derived from a primarý, moral 
value or from some combination of primary moral values. Through induction and 
attention to particulars, we make various singular moral judgments in an attempt 
to honor or uphold a primary moral value and, while some singular moral 
judgments actually honor and uphold the value, others do not (or do not to the 
same degree). Largely through induction, we generalize from these singular 
moral judgments and arrive at general principles that codify the primary moral 
value, such that principles are conditional conclusions. We derive secondary 
moral values from the primary moral values, and we arrive at general guidelines 
that codify the secondary moral values. Based on the principles and guidelines, 
and on the specific circumstances in a given case, we make singular moral 
judgments that either uphold the principle/guideline or suggest revision, but that 
(ideally) accord with the value in either case. 159The moral virtues, or possession 
of the moral virtues, make it possible to act in accordance with the values 
themselves, the principles/guidelines that codify them, and the singular moral 
judgments that uphold them. 
For example, through induction and experience, humans make various 
singular moral judgments that involve various acts of killing, saving, nurturing, 
protecting, and so forth, and they find that some acts uphold the value of 
preserving and protecting human life in a way that others do not. Through 
"9 See 4.4 for a discussion on the relationship between this step and Aristotle's practical 
syllogism. 
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inductive conclusions that generalize from the singular moral judgments, they 
codify the value in a manner that might resemble the following: '"It is always 
wrong to kill except in self-defense and times of war. " 160 In accordance ý, vith the 
principle and with their own specific circumstances, humans then make further 
singular moral judgments, again concerning various acts of killing. sm, ing, 
nurturing, protecting, and so forth that either uphold the principle or suggest 
revision,, but that accord with the value. In like manner, humans derive secondary 
moral values from the primary moral values, and codify the values in a manner 
that might include varying general guidelines concerning, say, euthanasia, 
abortion, capital punishment, just war theory, and so forth. In order to deliberate 
well, choose well,, and act well, however, humans require the possession of such 
moral virtues as practical wisdom, courage, compassion, justice, and so forth. By 
the definition presented in 3.5, the moral virtues are skills, pertaining to the 
formulation and manifestation of desire, emotion, and choice that promote, 
enhance, or honor the ultimate endfor human beings. As such, they are precisely 
the skills necessary to make and carry out virtuous singular moral judgments and 
to abide by general principles. Without the moral virtues, human beings would 
lack the skills necessary to live well and fare well. 
Although the primary moral values are ascertained by analyzing human 
nature, particularly as it pertains to the end for humans, once they are ascertained, 
they create an objective standard by which principles, guidelines, singular moral 
judgments, and moral virtues may be evaluated. Moreover, they provide a 
starting-point for cross-cultural dialogue and debate, since all human beings seek 
eudaimonia and will require the necessary conditions, understood in the moral 
160 The movement to "right" and "wrong" will be discussed in 4.4. 
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realm as primary moral values. to achieve it. On this view. in order to be both 
moral and adequate, all general principles must codify a primary moral value (or 
some aspect of a primary moral value) and the relationship between the principle 
and the value must be clear and coherent. General guidelines, understood 
primarily as rules of thumb, must codify a secondary moral value (or some aspect 
of a secondary moral value), and the relationship between the general guideline, 
the secondary moral value, and the primary moral value must be equally clear and 
coherent. Singular moral judgments must meet the four conditions outlined in 3.6, 
since these guidelines provide a clear and coherent connection between singular 
moral judgments, general principles and guidelines, the relevant particulars, and 
the end for humans. Finally, a particular skill, in order to be considered a moral 
virtue, must meet the definition presented in 3.5 and, by so doing, promote, 
enhance, or honor the end for humans in a specific manner. 
To illustrate how this schema might work in practice, I will frame a 
scenario, one that I encountered during my childhood, in terms of values, 
principles, singular moral judgments, and moral virtues. In this scenario,, a 
physician explains to the parents of an infant daughter that, due to a defective 
heart, their child will die before reaching adulthood. Further, they are told that 
their daughter will most likely die before reaching adolescence if she is allowed to 
live a normal, active life, but that she might survive until late adolescence if she is 
kept entirely inactive. The parents choose to allow the child to live a full. rich, 
and active life, and they further choose to keep their daughter's condition secret 
from both the child herself and her older siblings. The child dies, while on 
horseback,, at the age of ten years. 
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The value of human life is clearly involved in this example. and the 
relevant general principles, which codify the primary moral ý, alue, would be those 
that advance the notion of protecting and preserving human life (including, 
perhaps, the quality of human life). The relevant general guidelines. which codify I 
the secondary moral values, would certainly be those that advance notions of 
protecting and preserving the quality of life, rather than merely the length of life, 
in combination with those concerning, perhaps, notions of self-expression, or of 
having the freedom and opportunity for self-actualization. And given the nature 
of human beings as we have described it, 161 the connection between the primary 
and secondary moral values could be made clear and coherent. If the four 
conditions are applied to the parents' first singular moral judgment (i. e. to allow 
their daughter to live a full and active life, even though such a decision would 
probably shorten the length of her life), we can argue that their decision is morally 
acceptable. In brief, the decision (1) accords with accepted general principles and 
guidelines (i. e. those pertaining to protecting and preserving human life), (2) 
demonstrates accurate identification and comprehension of the relevant specific 
facts (i. e. that the child would surely die, and that their decision would affect both 
the quality and length of her life; (3) demonstrates an application of the principles 
or guidelines that is informed by the specific facts (i. e. their choice of principles is 
appropriate to the particular situation); and (4) shows consideration of human 
nature, as that nature pertains to the end (i. e. by allowing their daughter to live 
161 Particularly as that nature involves reason, the movement towards eudaimonia, and social 
tendencies. Preserving the length of life by eliminating or severely limiting activity, social 
encounters, self-expression, and so forth, particularly for a person whofeels physically healthy, 
might arguably conflict with a fully developed position on what protecting and preser\, ing human 
life entails or includes. Indeed, although I am primarily characterizing protecting and preserving 
the quality of human life as a secondary moral value in this example, it could arguably be an aspect 
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well and flourish during her brief lifetime). Moreover. both making and 
successfully carrying out such a decision would most likely require, at the very 
least, the virtues of courage and compassion. Finally, their second singular moral 
judgment (i. e. to keep the condition a secret from both the child herself and her 
older siblings) could be evaluated by way of a similar process and, regardless of 
whether it was found acceptable or unacceptable, the evaluation would reveal a 
relationship between the values, the principles or guidelines, the specific facts, and 
human nature. 
No ethical theory can eliminate the possibility of moral dilemmas, but 
because of the hierarchy of moral values (i. e. primary moral values take 
precedence over secondary moral values), certain difficulties inherent to some 
deduction-based normative theories are eliminated. For example, both human life 
and human dignity (particularly as that dignity pertains to the human capacity for 
reason) might be termed primary moral values in Kantian moral theory, if such a 
theory were to be placed in similar terminology. Such values accord with reason, 
are universalizable, and accord the status of "ends" to human beings. However, 
while both preserving human life and preserving absolute honesty' 62 are 
categorical imperatives in Kantian theory, and while there can be a conflict 
between them on such a view, no such conflict could occur in the theory set forth 
here. On this view, preserving human life would accord with a primary moral 
value and it would be codified in one or more general principles. Preserving 
honesty, on the other hand, might be derived from a primary moral value 
of the primary moral value, or of protecting and preserving human life. Such a discussion, 
however, is beyond the scope of this work. 
162 In this example, I've chosen to use honesty because dishonesty places human beings in the 
position of "means" and eliminates the possibility of rational consent. The fact that willing 
dishonesty on a universal scale may be self-contradictory is beside the point here. 
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concerning human reason and, would be, thereby, a secondary moral value. 
general guideline of the sort, -honesty should be practiced whenever possible, " 
might be a rule of thumb, but it would never attain the status of a general principle 
that could compete with one pertaining to the value of human life. If a situation 
arose in which the preservation of life was dependent upon telling a lie, no moral 
difficulty would arise. A primary value and the principle that codifies it take 
precedence over a secondary moral value and the general guideline that codifies 
it-taking into account, of course, the particular circumstances and the specific 
individuals involved. 
In the case of conflicting general guidelines, however, particularly ones 
that are intended to uphold the same secondary moral value, genuine moral 
dilemmas might occur. For example, let us say that secondary moral values 
pertaining to nurturing and providing extended care to both our children and our 
parents have been derived from a primary moral value concerning the value of 
human life. In this case, a moral agent with limited financial resources might find 
herself tom between the conflicting needs of a daughter who desires a college 
education and an aging parent who requires expensive medical care. In this case, 
the option of examining the primary moral value from which the secondary moral 
values are derived, in order to ascertain which secondary moral value best upholds 
and coheres with the primary moral value, is eliminated. Both secondary moral 
values cohere with the primary moral value to the same degree, and both personal 
relationships create similar claims and obligations. In this case, as in life, the 
decision must be made based on the particular circumstances and the specific 
persons involved. No objective standard can-or should-remove careful human 
deliberation. 
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Moreover, it is important to note that this objective standard, combined 
with the ability to generalize values, does not negate the moral significance of 
particular others or specific circumstances. For, as argued above, each 
relationship is accompanied by the claims and obligations of moral justice. For 
example, let us say that a son flies into a rage and kills his innocent father. In this 
case, the son would have breached two moral codes: one involving a general 
principle pertaining to human life and the other involving the claims and 
obligations of a particular relationship. As a son, the first man owes something to 
his father as a moral obligation and, as a father, the other has a morally significant 
claim and rightful expectations. The son can be blamed for his action, as 
represented by his singular moral judgment, by reason of the four conditions for 
the acceptability of a singular moral judgment and by reason of a breach of moral 
justice. 
Fortunately, there is little conflict involved in recognizing the moral 
significance of both general principles and concrete specifics, including particular 
others and particular relationships. The four conditions that count as evidence for 
the acceptability of a singular moral judgment balance the significance of 
principles and guidelines with the importance of specifics and particulars. 
However, although we have a basic idea of the relationship between values, 
principles, guidelines, judgments, and moral virtues, we must discuss ideas of 
good/bad and right/wrong, at least in outline. 
44normativity" in Aristotelian terms. 
Finally, we must reexamine 
jqý 
4.4 
As I have described them, the primary moral values are the necessary 
conditions for achieving the ultimate end for humans and, as such, they are goods. 
They are derived from the end for humans, or from the human good itself, as it is 
manifested in and explained by human nature and human function. I have 
categorized eudaimonia as a regulating notion and explicated its relationship to 
understanding, directing, and evaluating human behavior. Clearly, if one objects 
to the notion of eudaimonia, one can argue that moral values have their origin 
elsewhere and that human nature and human function do not adequately explain or 
justify moral values. Even in that case, however, although another explanation for 
moral values must be offered and justified, the following procedure for explaining 
and justifying moral principles and singular moral judgments, along with the 
procedure for recommending and evaluating actions, would remain essentially 
unchallenged. For regardless of the origin of moral values, I would argue that the 
procedure for determining general principles, singular moral judgments, 
recommendations, ' and evaluations relies largely on induction and on a specific 
relationship between good, "right, " and "ought. " Before setting out this 
procedure, however, a brief explanation of the tenns "right" and "ought" is 
necessary. 
In the theory presented here, I have argued that because human nature has 
a particular character, moral values and virtue also have a particular character. 163 
Because of the relationship between human nature, moral values. and virtue, 
certain principles and guidelines can be described as "valuable- or -preferable, " 
and certain behaviors as "desirable" or "recommended. " However, while this 
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theory includes workaday principles and guidelines, it is not formulated as a 
system of rules and it doesýnot incorporate notions of strict obligation. Terms 
such as "right" and "ought" are not being used in a strictly Kantian sense and, for 
this reason, they are placed in quotation marks throughout this section. Indeed, 
the terms "right" and "ought" are being used in a less stringent manner than is 
customary, such that "right" in this context can be understood to indicate 
'6valuable" or "preferable, " and "ought" to indicate -recommended- or -advised. - 
Moreover, while this section is meant to introduce the relations upon which such 
terms as good, "right, " and "ought" depend, these relations suggest implications 
for future development and they require detailed treatment that is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
In general, then, good, "right, " and "ought" are tenus that represent the 
relationship between values, principles, guidelines, judgments, and moral virtues. 
Primary and secondary moral values, properly derived, are goods that contribute 
to eudaimonia, the primary human good and goal. General principles and 
guidelines, again properly derived, are "right, " in the sense that they uphold and 
apply the values in a practical sense, and, in this way, they are both valuable and 
preferable to those that do not. Principles and guidelines that conflict with the 
moral values are "wrong, " in the sense that they neither codify nor uphold the 
moral values. The status of -right" implies, at least in a practical sense, that one 
"ought" (i. e. one is advised) to act in accordance with it, or that one is permitted to 
act in accordance with it, or, at any rate, that one should not act in opposition to it. 
On this view, one "ought" (i. e. one is advised) to act in accordance with the 
necessary conditions for eudaimonia, or one is permitted (but not necessarilv 
163 See Chapter 2 for human nature, particularly 2.1, and Chapter 3 for virtue. particularly 3.5. 
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required) to act in accordance with them, in order to increase one's own share of 
human good. 164 Singular moral judgments are acceptable if they meet the four 
conditions and unacceptable if they do not, thereby making some judgments 
morally praiseworthy and others morally blameworthy. Thus, we arrive at a 
system in which there are specified goods, -right" and "wrong understandings 
and codifications of these goods, and moral recommendations, permissions, and 
prohibitions based on the same goods. In addition, we have the moral virtues that 
are necessary to act in a morally correct manner. 
In practice, at any given time, we have a system of general principles in 
place that codifies and upholds the primary moral values to a greater or lesser 
degree (as well as a system of general guidelines that codifies and upholds the 
secondary moral values to a greater or lesser degree). Generally, in our moral 
decision-making process, we are either moving from these principles (or 
guidelines) to singular moral judgments or evaluating the principles (or 
guidelines) in light of our singular moral judgments. In the former case, we have 
a scenario that augments Aristotle's practical syllogism and, while there is a 
methodology here, it is one that clashes irreparably with a strictly deduction-based 
model, particularly if that model incorporates the claim that all singular moral 
judgments can be derived, by way of strict deduction, from general principles. 
For example, Aristotle is careful to avoid the suggestion that ethical 
judgments can be reduced to a formula or method that relieves the agent of 
personal judgment, discretion, or attention to particulars. Indeed. he never offers 
explicit examples of practical syllogisms that involve moral choice and his 
164 Cf. Maclntyre's description of classical moral judgments. He states, "They were hypothetical 
insofar as they expressed a judgment as to what conduct would be teleological 1ý appropriate for a 
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distinction between moral reasoning and other forms of practical reasoning z: 7 
concerns content rather than method. To be sure, he is limited by the fact that his 
account of action is not an account of human action per se, but an account that 
includes any sort of animal movement whatsoever. 165 This limitation reduces his 
ability to incorporate many of the interesting and pertinent features of human 
desire and intention, and it leads to an oversimplified version of action. In his 
account, for instance, all animals represent goods to themselves, in one way or 
another, and these goods, as objects of desire, become objects of thought. toward 
which the animal immediately moves (AM 70014-29). However, this account 
can be enriched with a more distinctly human version of deliberation, desire, and 
intention, as Aristotle himself offers in EN 6, and, by so doing, the relationship 
between the practical syllogism and moral decision-making can be explicated. 
In the Movement of Animals, for example, Aristotle claims that when one 
puts together a major premise, such as every man ought to walk, with an 
appropriate minor premise, such as I am a man, the conclusion, I ought to walk, 
becomes an immediate action (701alO-15). In this sort of reasoning, the premises 
of action are of two kinds, the good and the possible, and the conclusion is an 
action (70la23-24), which, if there is nothing to compel or prevent it, is taken 
immediately upon the close of the reasoning process (701al. 6). Aristotle also uses 
the example of a coat and the reasoning is a bit more convoluted: I need a 
covering, a coat is a covering: I need a coat. What I need, I ought to make, I need 
a coat. - I make a coat (701 a 17-20). Again, the conclusion, I make a coat, is an 
action, but the action goes back to the starting-point, such that, if there is to be a 
human being: 'You ought to do so-and-so, if and since your telos is such-and-such' or perhaps 
'You ought to do so-and-so, if you do not want your essential desires to be frustrated"' ( 1984,60). 
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coat, then first there must be this, and if this then that, and so forth to the action 
(701a20-22). 
Before we place our general principles into the position of major premises, 
or the premises of the good, however, we must admit that these princIples are 
content-rich and laden with prior assumptions. We do not, for example, suggest 
that "killing is wrong except in self-defense or times of war" without having prior 
knowledge of and assumptions concerning the value of human life, the definition 
of killing, appropriate notions of what constitutes self-defense, some theory of 
war, some concept of an enemy, and so forth. The premise of the good may 
represent or uphold a value that accords with the end, but it has been codified for 
specific reasons, after deliberation, and as a content-rich conditional conclusion. 
Likewise, the premise of the possible, however it might be worded or represented, 
is also content-rich and dependent upon various specifics and circumstances. We 
deliberate only about the possible, or about what it is possible to attaiii through 
action, and these possibilities are often situation- specific and laden with 
assumptions, opinions, beliefs, ' and emotions. 
For example, even if we use a 
major premise as simple as "nourishment is good for all humans, " we recognize it 
as containing numerous assumptions concerning nutritious and properly prepared 
foods, the physiology of the human body, adequate portions, and so forth. If we 
were to add premises of the possible, they would be equally loaded with 
assumptions concerning the available foods and nutrients, personal tastes and 
desires, ideas of adequate nourishment, expectations pertaining to future meals. 
165 See MA 698a 1 -5. Also, cf Sherman (1997), 276-28 1. The following 
discussion is infori-ned bN 
her work. 
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and so forth. The conclusion,, while it would involve the act of eating, would be 
vastly more than a mere movement in response to desire. 
Moreover,, human action can be delayed and take the form of future 
intentions and plans, so that the conclusion of the practical syllogism, at least for 
humans and arguably for some non-human animals, does not always result in 
immediate action. We may, for example, decide along with Aristotle that we 
ought to create goods for ourselves and that a house is a good (701a16-17). 
However, while Aristotle suggests that such reasoning will lead to the immediate 
creation (or, in modem terms, purchase) of a house., we are much more likely to 
examine our budget, research interest rates and terms, consider our future 
employment possibilities, research crime statistics in particular neighborhoods, 
and so forth before purchasing or building a house. In fact, it may be precisely 
these same calculations that determine our inability to purchase or build a house at 
a particular time and bring about plans for the distant future. Indeed, it is such 
things as prior knowledge, assumptions, the ability to delay present action or plan 
future action that both enrich Aristotle's theory of action and allow a meaningful 
reexamination of his practical syllogism. 
With this in mind, we can argue that the movement from general principles 
(or general guidelines) to singular moral judgments replaces or augments 
Aristotle's practical syllogism and that it does so by way of the four conditions 
outlined in 2.6. In condition number one, for example, accordance with accepted 
general principles or general guidelines, the principles or guidelines stand in for 
the major premise, or the premise of the good, and the singular moral judgment 
must represent an instance of that specific good. Condition number two. accurale 
identi/Ication and comprehension of the relevant specýfic facts, demands a 
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thorough examination of the circumstances and specifics, along with deliberation 
concerning the possible. Condition number three, informed application of the 
accepted general principles or general guidelines 0. e. informed by specýfic fiwts) 
requires that the singular moral judgment cohere with an appropriate major 
premise (or with appropriate major premises) and it allows the major premises 
themselves to be called into question. For, on this view, the mqjor premises have 
no claims concerning truth-value and, on these grounds, they may be revised or 
rejected. Condition number four, consideration of human nature, as that nature 
pertains to human ends, requires a careful evaluation of the relationship between 
the singular moral judgment and the end, as a final means by which the agent's 
intentions and the character of the action can be gauged. In addition, the four 
conditions may be utilized prior to action in order to evaluate proposed actions 
and to recommend morally praiseworthy action. 
At this point, then, we can summarize the relationship between good, 
((right, " and "ought, " and suggest a procedure for recommending and evaluating 
human behavior. The human good is a function of the human movement towards 
eudaimonia and the primary moral values are the necessary conditions for 
achieving eudaimonia. Secondary moral values are derived from primary moral 
values and they must uphold primary moral values in a clear and coherent manner. 
General principles that accurately and adequately codify the primary moral values, 
and general guidelines that accurately and adequately codify the secondary moral 
values, are "right, " in the sense of being strong inductive conclusions that aid 
humans in achieving eudaimonia. Such general principles and guidelines provide 
a guiding "ought, " in the sense that humans are advised to act in accordance with 
the human good, for their own sakes and for the sake of their ultimate end. 
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However, because "ought" does not carry a sense of strict obligation. it may 
constitute either a strong recommendation 166 or a permission, depending upon 
specific circumstances and in light of particular relationships. Humans act 
according to singular moral judgments, which balance general principles and 
guidelines with concrete specifics, and these judgments can be evaluated 
according to the four conditions. In like manner, behavior can be recommended 
or advised by utilizing the four conditions prior to action, as a guideline for 
singular moral judgments, and suggestions for action can be offered to agents. 
Such a procedure is not mechanical in nature, nor reducible to a formula 
that can be applied on a universal basis, regardless of the agent or of the specific 
circumstances. Instead, it is a procedure that relies on the human ability to 
deliberate and choose and, for this reason,, it more accurately represents the human 
decision-making process than would an entirely formulaic or mechanical 
approach. Moreover, it stresses human character, in the form of skills, and it 
grounds the ethical decision-making process in the agents themselves, rather than 
in principles and straight-line deductions from those principles. It provides the 
tools for ethical decision-making, as well as a guiding process, but it does not 
pretend to replace complex deliberation and choice with simplistic (and generally 
inadequate) computations. While it does not rely on strictly logical relationships 
between moral terms, it need not lead to logical inconsistencies or practical 
absurdities. 
166 Future implications may also involve strict requirements and prohibitions, but these too would 
be based on human nature and human ends, rather than on deductions from principles or rules. An 
example might be a strict prohibition against killing innocent human beings. However, until such 
future implications can be developed, I will use "strong recommendation" rather than 
"requirement. - 
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In practice, the theory presented here requires that NN e focus on human 
character development and attempt to provide each individual \ýith the skills 
necessary to make good, informed choices and to carry out those choices once 
made. It requires that we rely upon our stock of general principles and guidelines 
up to the point that they accord with our primary and secondary moral values and 
that, when we find them inadequate or incorrectly formulated, we revise them 
accordingly. It requires that we consider both our principles and our 
circumstances., an it suggests that no decision that ignores particular people and 
particular circumstances will be adequately formulated. It provides a standard by 
which singular moral judgments can be evaluated and recommended, but it does 
not pretend that such a standard will remove the process of deliberation and 
replace it with a formula that shifts the locus of responsibility from the agent to 
the theory. 
Such a theory or approach also requires that we reexamine our ideas of 
normativity, as well as our requirements for normative theories. As I argued in 
the introduction, in contemporary ethics, normative theories are often understood 
as those that meet certain minimum requirements concerning the internal, logical 
relationship between requirements, permissions, and prohibitions, and these 
requirements tend to involve the formal relationship between general principles 
and singular moral judgments. In addition, I argued that by "normative" we tend 
to mean a system of ethics that prescribes morally correct conduct and that is 
evaluative, rather than merely descriptive. Such a theory has come to be rather 
narrowly understood as a system that establishes a standard of correctness by I 
prescription of rules, within which singular moral judgments are derived from one 
or more general principles. 
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In contrast, I suggest that we reexamine -normativity" in Aristoteliaii 
terms. Such an endeavor requires that we determine the function of a normative 
ethical theory and, in order to accomplish this task, we must determine what it is 
that a normative theory does, or what it is that distinguishes a normative ethical 
theory from all other ethical theories. To make such a deten-nination, I suggest 
that we retain familiar criterion, and state that a normative ethical theory is 
distinguished by the fact that it is evaluative, rather than merely descripti\, e, in 
that it provides guidelines for prescribing/recommending and evaluating human 
conduct. I further suggest that we add the "well" to the function, such that a 
normative ethical theory that accords with excellence is one that performs its 
function well. 
To continue in an Aristotelian vein,, we must examine what it would mean 
for a normative theory to perfon-n its function well, or to perform its function in 
accordance with excellence. Surely, this requires some degree of theoretical 
consistency, but only insofar as the subject-matter allows. For example, human 
conduct is far from an exact science, since it is affected by developmental and 
environmental differences, as well as by situation- specific particulars and non- 
repeating scenarios. Thus, an ethical theory that attempts to sidestep or minimize 
the significance of particulars will fail to take human life, as it is lived, into 
consideration. Moreover, an ethical theory that is presented in anything other than 
outline forra would lend an irrelevance, which could not be supported by either 
induction or experience, to particular others, incommensurate goods, non- 
repeating scenarios, and concrete situations. Human beings live and act in the 
company of others, and in complex relationships with their environments, 
communities, acquaintances, and loved ones, and human lives fail to demonstrate 
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the kind of consistency of action that can be reduced to, or evaluated in. logical 
terms alone. 
A normative theory, then, in order to perform its function well must 
prescribe/recommend and evaluate human conduct with a degree of exactness that 
is consistent with its proper subject. It must be formulated with an emphasis on 
human beings, rather than on logical relations, since logic is the proper subject- 
matter of the relations between propositions, rather than the relations between 
people. The normative elements must be well outlined and functionally operative, 
but they must be open enough to revision to reflect human growth and 
development. There must be an appropriate degree of universal izability, but that 
degree must be determined by human nature and human ends. 167 Finally, there 
must be an equally appropriate degree of partiality, based, again, on an 
understanding of and respect for human nature and human life. 
In the induction- informed non-native theory that I have described 
throughout this work, which takes human nature and human ends as starting- 
points, the normative elements are present and operative. They are less precisely 
formulated in logical terms, and thus less universalizable, than are the normative 
elements in a deduction-based theory, but such a departure is necessary in human 
terrns. In this theory, strict deductions from general principles to singular moral 
judgments are impossible to justify in terms of truth-value alone, for general 
principles make no claims to truth-value. Indeed, principles are value-laden and 
merely acceptable, rather than true, and they must be informed by specifics in 
order to be correctly applied or revised. Singular moral judgments must be made 
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in accordance with general principles, but they are never strict deductions in the 
formal, logical sense. Recommendations and evaluations are based on an 
objective standard, but because they must also take the relevant specific facts into 
consideration, they cannot be entirely universalized, such that one f6mi of right 
conduct fits all agents in ostensibly similar circumstances. Morally praiseworthy 
conduct is agent- and circumstances-specific, and it requires sincere deliberation 
on the part of both agents and evaluators. 
Clearly, such a theory avoids the logical pitfalls that involve truth-value 
claims or the movement from facts to values. Moreover, it avoids tension 
between virtue/character and general rules, for it admits that an agent who is 
without specific skills will be incapable of making good decisions, or acting upon 
good decisions, or both. Indeed, it argues that such skills are necessary for 
abiding by whatever rules and guidelines are in place, since, on this view, a person 
who is without virtue will be the one most likely to mistake immediate advantage 
or avoidance of immediate pain for the human good. Virtue and character 
development are understood as the starting-points for consistently moral behavior, 
rather than as mere supplements that help to inspire or explain virtuous behavior 
and its beneficial qualities. 
In addition,, while this theory provides a relative order, such that values 
and moral principles are derived from an analysis of human nature and ends, there 
is no attempt to reduce the infinite diversity of particular moral judgments to 
logical consistency. Human nature provides a relative order and harmony, but one 
that remains in the process of being discovered and analyzed. This order is both 
167 That is, the degree of universalizability must correlate with our ability to generalize over human 
beings, based on their nature as humans. On this view, values are universalizable because the% are 
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stable enough to allow for a workable consistency and flexible enough to 
incorporate ethical evolution. By utilizing an Aristotelian framework, induction- 
informed theory is capable of incorporating both order and evolution without 
incoherence. 
Because normativity is possible by reason of this relative order and 
harmony, Aristotelian-based virtue ethics (even with all of its diversity) may be 
recovered from the proponents of anti-theory. 168 In general, anti-theory holds that 
normative theories, specifically covering-law or deductivist models, are inherently 
flawed in that they are based on erroneous claims of order or unity. Anti-theory 
argues more for specificity in the moral decision-making process than for 
universality, and it holds not only that the endless diversity of particular 
judgments cannot be reduced to any order, either absolute or relative, but also that 
the attempt at such a reduction is either an exercise in futility or a failure to 
comprehend the limitations of ethical theory. 
However, anti-theory fails to sufficiently recognize the order and han-nony 
that is provided by the nature and function of human beings, which locates moral 
values in human persons themselves. There is a difference, of course, between 
such a locus of moral values and an absolute standard of order, but while such a 
difference negates certain logical maneuvers, it allows for a theory that is 
evaluative,, rather than merely descriptive, and that is, thereby, normative. As 
long as we have an ob ective standard, however flexible through time or subject to j 
reinterpretation, we have a means by which to evaluate and recommend human 
conduct with appropriate degrees of universality and partiality. On this vie-ý, N-, and 
derived from human nature and the human movement towards eudaimonia. 
168 See Clark, Simpson, eds. (1989). 
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in reference to the kinds of judgments that human beings make regularly, 
partiality is necessary to adequate moral judgment. That is. while values are 
universal i zabl e, their application depends upon specific circumstances, and all 
evaluations and recommendation must take both the universal and the particular 
into account. Therefore, we have both an ordered system and one that makes 
room for, rather than attempts to reduce, the diversity of particular moral 
judgments. 
Indeed, such a system requires human judgment, but it is insincere to 
suggest that covering-law or deductivist systems are devoid of human judgment 
and deliberation. Under such theories. agents must still determine the correct or 
applicable general principle or principles, rightly identify their situation as an 
instance of such a principle, and correctly apply the principle to their specific case 
in the form of an action or decision. While cases such as killing and stealing 
might be straight-forward applications of an obvious principle and an obvious 
instance of the principle, our moral decisions are rarely so clean and conveniently 
conceived. It is much more likely that we will face daily decisions concerning the 
conflicting needs of loved ones, the awkward demands of attempting to balance a 
career and family, the often-times conflicting demands of physical and emotional 
health,, financial decisions and commitments, and so forth. 
Besides, if all of life's rich and complex circumstances could be reduced to 
a formulaic approach to moral decision-making, it seems that moral development 
and advanced moral thinking would cease. At some point, humans would have 
nothing left except the rules of their ancestors, which they would follow -vvithout 
-)Og 
examination. 169 When they were faced, as they eventually would be. with I 
situations that fell outside of the rules or with conflicting general principles. they 
would have no alternative but to reinvent moral struggle and some sort of moral 
decision-making process. It seems that when abstract moral orders failed to 
provide an adequate explanation for the human good, they would once again be 
forced to turn inward to themselves, their nature, and their end. In the final 
analysis, we can defend the human good on human terms in a way that we cannot 
on abstract terms. 
Let us say, for example, that we recognize an abstract moral order that can 
be ascertained by reason alone. In such a case, we have to either suggest an origin 
for this abstract order that is outside of human nature or suggest that it is created 
by human reason (i. e. by the universal ability of humans to reason in a particular 
way, based on their nature). In the former case, we are left defending a divine 
creator, an intelligent universe, absolute thought, or some such thing, as well as a 
connection between this order and the human ability to perceive it. We are left 
defending human nature, at least as it pertains to human reason, and some 
explanation of the origin, goodness, and authority of the abstract order. In the 
latter case, we are back to human nature, but to an impoverished notion of human 
nature that minimizes such things as emotion, an inherently social structure, 
complex neurobiological capacities, internalized others, and so forth. Rather than 
recognizing reason, in all of its complexity, as a distinctly human capacity, we 
must reduce humans to a particular form of reasoning. Either way. it seems that 
we must either over-complicate the issue and step beyond adequate justification or 
over-simplify it in a dangerously reductionist manner. By so doing, we might 
169 Cf. Hare (1961), 72-4. 
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arrive at some form of logical consistency. but we will have reduced the human 
struggle to a sanitized science fiction in the process. 
Instead, we return to the narrative of human lives lived in the company of 
others who matter (and, sometimes, even the company of others who-we think 
do not matter). We retain a focus on human nature and human ends. and Nxe find 
that,. by being necessary for attaining those ends, certain things become values. 
We recommend and evaluate human conduct within a context that allows for 
particular attachments and incommensurable goods, based upon the relationship 
between singular moral judgments, general principles and guidelines, and primary 
and secondary moral values. We promote habituation and education, based on the 
findings of neurobiology and in accordance with the contention that moral virtue 
is necessary for making and acting upon good decisions. We evaluate principles, 
singular moral judgments, and moral virtues by way of their accordance or lack 
thereof with primary moral values. We agree with Aristotle that eudaimonia is an 
activity, one that spans and takes into account the entire life of a human being. 
We accept that, while we can describe the form of eudaimonia and use it as a 
regulating notion, we must allow for cultural and individual variations concerning 
the content of eudaimonia. 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, then, incorporated into an induction-informed 
theory, can be advanced as a normative theory that is evaluative and that takes 
into account the richness and complexity of human life. Such a claim demands a 
reexamination of contemporary ideas of normativity and suggests that we require 
a broader definition of "normativity" than is currently in vogue. However, once 
we advance a definition of "normativity" that is based on the function of 
normative theory. we have the ability to argue that ethical theory can sidestep 
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certain logical considerations and remain normative. Moreover. we have the 
ability to avoid such skeptical approaches as anti-theory. such objections as might 
concern the movement from facts to values, and such narrowly defined parameters 
as might be set by strict deduction from absolute principles. 
In the end, we will have discovered that Aristotle offered a normative 
theory after all, and that we failed to recognize it as such by reason of our own 
definitions, rather than by reason of theoretical deficiencies. 
2 12 
Conclusion 
Although the theory presented above has numerous implications, and 
although it raises questions concerning aspects of moral theory as diverse as 
neurobiological capacity and logical inference, a thorough examination of these 
implications is beyond the scope of this work. However, it seems valuable to 
conclude by examining a few of the most important implications, at least in brief. 
To begin, a presentation of normative theory as functional, rather than as 
strictly logical, requires a reexamination and, possibly, a redefinition of normative 
theory itself It can be argued, for example, that Aristotle presents an ethical 
theory that is more than descriptive, insofar as it contains prescriptive and 
evaluative elements, at least in outline. Yet, it is clear that Aristotle never 
formulates a normative theory in modem terms, nor develops a system that 
establishes a standard of correctness by prescription of rules (within which 
specific moral judgments are derived from one or more general principles). It is 
only when Aristotle's work is examined in functional terms, or in terms of 
Aristotelian thought and composition, that the normative elements become visibly 
present and operative. It is this shift in approach to a classical ethical theory that 
suggests that modem definitions and standards of normativity may be overly 
restrictive and narrow,, and that we might be criticizing classical theory in terms 
that it neither recognizes nor represents. Once Aristotelian ethical theory is 
examined on its own terms, however,, it offers a live alternative to modem notions 
of normativity. 
Having such an alternative approach to normative theory suggests that 
relying upon one, overarching definition of non-nativity, particularly one that is 
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based on restrictive notions of logical relations between terrns. is insufficient for 
the task of prescribing/recomm ending and evaluating human conduct. If this is 
the case, then we have created an opening for further development of normative 
theory itself, perhaps in unexpected directions and with unexpected implications 
for meta-theory, and we have invited diverse objectors to modem normative 
theory to the discussion. For example, feminist or pragmatist ethicists who have 
formerly either rejected or attempted to reformulate normative theory may find a 
point of departure in the notion of functional normative theory that opens up 
avenues of discussion and further research. 
In addition, the inclusion of induction in nonnative ethical theory 
refocuses our attention on the origin and conditional nature of general principles, 
and it calls into questions the wisdom of relying upon a strict process of deduction 
from such principles to singular moral judgments. If general principles, however 
elevated they may have become in certain modem theories, are nothing more than 
conditional conclusions, then their status is far from inviolable. In this case, the 
process by which we arrive at singular moral judgments, as well as that by which 
we determine our pre scriptions/recommendations and evaluations, must rely on 
more than strict deduction from general principles. It must incorporate some kind 
of attention to particulars. At the very least, calling the nature and acquisition of 
general principles into question requires a reexamination of such things as the 
relationship between human nature and ethical theory, the significance of 
particulars, and the scope and reliability of the requirements and prohibitions that 
are deduced from general principles. 
Once we situate values in human nature, and we argue that the origin and 
force of moral values arise from and rely upon human nature, 'we also raise 
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questions concerning the logical distinction between facts and values. If facts 
about humans are value-laden, and if the value is inextricably linked to aspects of 
human nature and human behavior, then we have the possibility of inferences 
from value-laden facts to imperatives, at least in theory. Although these 
implications would require extensive treatment by logicians. it is enough to 
suggest here that certain practical inferences might become both plausible and 
acceptable. 
In another area altogether, the suggestion that aretý remains a dunamis for 
most people, one which enables human beings to develop and act from the moral 
virtues, helps to clarify the process of actualizing excellence and has important 
implications for comprehending, directing, and evaluating human conduct. For 
example, if the neurobiological approach to moral virtue is correct and if the 
moral virtues can be correctly classified as skills, then there is no question that the 
character of an agent will directly affect her ability to make and carry out ethical 
decisions, regardless of which moral theory she embraces. On this view, humans 
can be understood to have the capacity for virtue, and to develop this capacity 
through habituation and education into a reasonably stable state of character. 
Deliberation, choice, and action will proceed from the character of an agent, or 
from the family and set of skills that she possesses, and an agent will be just as 
prepared for moral decision-making as she is habituated to various skills. As 
stated in 3.5, in the ideal case, the process of actualizing excellence would 
involve, first, the capacity to acquire excellence (i. e. humans are adapted, by 
nature, to receive the virtues); second, the capacity to further develop and act from 
excellence (i. e. aretO as a dunamis); and, finally, the development of a stable state 
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of character, from which excellent decisions and actions proceed (i. e. aretý as a 
hexis). 
These claims suggest that character development matters to ethics in a 
central and foundational manner, and they have implications for the habituation 
and education of human beings. For example, ongoing habituation and education 
will allow an agent's skill level to be altered and expanded, and this alone 
suggests that it is beneficial, for all but the phronimoi, to retain a capacity for 
virtue, for a hexis could be as negative, in the case of vice. as it is positive, in the 
case of virtue. Once an agent develops a state of character, or one in which the 
skills are thoroughly resistant to change, the agent has very little hope of 
correcting behavioral deficiencies and of developing new skills. At the very least, 
such changes would require extensive time and retraining. This focus on neural 
networks redirects our attention to habituation, education, and character 
development, and it suggests that vicious agents will be incapable of being 
reformed by even the most consistent ethical theories. Indeed, our attention must 
be focused on the agents who are expected to abide by ethical theory and on their 
capacity for developing and sustaining virtue. 
Such a focus also reinforces the claim that the phronimos is a role model, 
rather than an ethical standard. If human beings have various skill levels, 
depending upon their level of habituation and education, then the phronimos is 
simply a human being who has been habituated to virtue to a particularly high 
degree. He would be the person most resistant to wicked behavior, and he would 
be the person most capable of retaining virtue in difficult circumstances. but he 
would not be a standard. The phronimos would differ from the average person by 
a matter of degree and from the thoroughly vicious individual by a matter of the 
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highest degree. But, because we can classify the degrees, and attach names such 
as virtuous, average, and vicious, we must recognize some standard by which ý\e 
are classifying each individual that is separate from the individuals themselves. 
Indeed, even if my reasoning concerning an objective standard is rejected. the 
claim that the phronimos presents no objection to Aristotelian virtue ethics can be 
maintained,, for it seems that neurobiology supports both Aristotle's notion of a 
phronimos, as one highly skilled in virtue, and the claim that a morally 
knowledgeable adult must have knowledge of something. That something, 
however explained or defended, is objective and it is the standard by which the 
phronimosisjudged. 
Moreover, the classification of the moral virtues as specifically defined 
skills suggests that cross-cultural understandings of the moral virtues, as well as 
disagreements within a particular culture as to what should or should not be 
classified as a moral virtue,, can be discussed in terms of a definition that is both 
based in modem science and consistent with classical notions of virtue. Prior to 
such a scientific basis,, we were left to argue from cultural perspectives and for the 
sake of theoretical advantage, and this weakness has left virtue ethics open to 
justifiable criticism. However, with a scientific understanding in place, and one 
that relates to human nature and capacity, we can frame the moral virtues in terms 
that welcome both a cross-cultural dialogue and differing notions of virtuous 
behavior. It is one thing, for example, to frame a definition ot the moral virtues in 
terms of human capacity and human ends; it is another thing altogether to flesh 
out that definition with argumentation in defense of particular skills as virtues. 
Indeed, even if certain aspects of my definition are rejected, particularly those 
aspects that pertain to human ends. it is still possible to argue in defense of virtues 
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as skills and to formulate other definitions that accord, at least to that degree, \ý ith 
the one offered here. 
The understanding of eudaimonia as a regulating notion has the potential 
to open discussion concerning ideas of teleology and human ends that circumvents 
the necessity of demonstrating that humans are directed, by their nature, to one, 
carefully defined and stipulated end. While we may never be able to conclusiN, ely 
prove that human beings are teleological by nature, we can inductively conclude 
that humans move towards the form of eudaimonia, and we can begin to 
incorporate this notion, to differing degrees and with varying understandings, into 
ethical theory. For example, even if one rejects the particulars of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, the idea of eudaimonia as a regulating notion might still be 
constructively incorporated into other induction-informed ethical theories, should 
such theories be developed. Or, such a notion might inform, for example, 
utilitarian and feminist theories that take either human happiness or human 
flourishing as ethically significant starting-points. At the very least, it provides an 
objection to the claim that there must be general agreement or consensus as to the 
content of eudaimonia prior to a meaningful application of such phrases as 
"human happiness" and "human flourishing. " 
The fact that the content of eudaimonia is purposefully left undefined in 
this work suggests that an overly restrictive definition would be harmful to both 
our understanding of eudaimonia and to the formulation of ethical theory. In 
addition, it suggests that cross-cultural perspectives and critiques can enrich our 
understanding of eudaimonia. For example, even though Aristotle is incapable of 
defining every virtue and vice in terms of his culture and era, and even though he 
describes eudaimonia in outline only, he has been accused of formulating an 
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ethical theory that is time- and culture-dependent. Yet, it seems clear that he 
intends to explicate a theory that pertains to human conduct, rather than one that 
merely promotes cultural ly-speci fic behaviors and virtues. To complicate matters, 
it has been argued that, as long as we have no general consensus as to the 
particulars of living and faring well, we will have a corresponding lack of 
agreement as to what we even mean by the term eudaimonia. However. the 
theory presented here argues the precise opposite, namely, that cross-cultural 
discussion is possible only when the content of eudaimonia is left reasonably 
open. For instance, although notions of physical and mental health, the possession 
of certain external goods, and freedom from fear and oppression might be 
included, inter alia, in any description of the content of eudaimonia, the precise 
formulation of each of these components would vary from culture to culture. 
Discussion and argumentation is critical to moral evolution, and we require 
starting-points for such discussion and argumentation in a way that we do not 
require consensus. It is the lack of a precisely formulated definition of the content 
of eudaimonia, both in the work of Aristotle and in this work, that strengthens the 
theory by including the opportunity for cross-cultural interpretations and 
discourse. 
In like manner, presenting conclusions that pertain to human nature and 
the function of humans as regulating notions provides a starting-point for 
discussion that is defensible from a cross-cultural or cross-theoretical perspective. 
These conclusions require that we accept, as regulating notions, only (1) that 
reason is a distinguishing aspect Of human nature, (2) that reason bears on all 
other distinctly human characteristics; (3) that facts about human nature are 
imbued with values (whether or not we agree with the specific values). and (4) 
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that human nature admits of both virtue and vice. Clearly, the third regulating 
notion would be present the most difficulty, but, otherwise, we find little that 
would be overtly objectionable to a utilitarian or a Kantian. Such a starting-point 
is important to theory building, insofar as it encourages a dialogue that is set in 
terms of points of intersection and departure, rather than in terms of immediate 
dissent and foundational quarrels. This work suggests that there are areas of 
agreement between Aristotelians and others,, and that if these areas of agreement 
are placed in terms of regulating notions, rather than in terms of absolute truth, 
they will have a greater potential to positively inform their respective theories. 
Finally, this work has important implications for the ethical significance of 
partiality, particularly in its claims concerning the origin of certain moral claims 
and obligations. If the conclusions presented here are correct, namely those that 
suggest that morally significant claims and obligations arise from and rely upon 
particular relationships, then we must reexamine the estimation in which we hold 
universalizability, particularly as it relates to prescriptions and evaluations. 
Certainly, there are justifiable claims concerning universal human qualities and 
their relationship to morality, and these claims have been presented and defended 
in this work. However, this work suggests that we must continue to explore the 
relationship between particular relationships and moral theory, as well as to 
carefully explicate the place of partiality in ethical theory. For although partiality 
has often been viewed as a deterrent to normative theory, we have seen that 
partiality has an integral place in normative theory. In addition, we have seen that 
acknowledging the moral significance of particular relationships is critical to 
developing an ethical theory that adequately accounts for values, ethical claims 
and obligations. and non-repeating events and persons. 
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Although this brief discussion of implications is necessarily incomplete 
and underdeveloped, it seems clear that this work presents a challenge to modem 
definitions and formulations of normative theory, offers points of departure for 
cross-theoretical and cross-cultural discussions, and presents an enriched 
understanding of Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is my hope, as well, that it 
contributes something of merit to the discussion of both classical and 
contemporary philosophy. 
-)-) I 
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